Wilds v. Akhi LLC
| Decision Date | 29 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-142-MW-GRJ |
| Parties | JOHN C. WILDS, JR., Plaintiff, v. AKHI LLC and AHTNA PROFESSIONAL SERVS. INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim, ECF No. 26, in this case brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Florida Statute § 413.08(3), ECF No. 5. Pro se in forma pauperis plaintiff, John C Wilds (“Wilds”) has responded, ECF No. 32, so the motion is ripe for resolution.
Upon careful consideration, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the motion is due to be GRANTED on the grounds that Wilds has no federal claim against Defendants and the Court should decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Wilds' lone state law claim. Notwithstanding that recommendation, because the remedy Wilds seeks is an accommodation for his disability so that he can have access to the federal courthouse in Gainesville, Florida, the undersigned directs the Clerk to conduct a reasonable investigation to see whether Wilds' request that he be permitted to enter the courthouse building with his service dog off leash can be accommodated.
Taking the allegations in the Complaint as true: Plaintiff, John C. Wilds (“Wilds”) is disabled[1] and uses a service dog to navigate life. ECF No. 1 at 4-5.[2]On July 22, 2021, Wilds brought his service dog with him, off leash, to the United States Courthouse in Gainesville, Florida. Id. Upon entry into the building, Defendants' court security officers denied Wilds access, telling him that his dog needed to be on a leash for him to enter the building. ECF No. 5 at 4. Wilds says that his service dog must remain off leash in the event he has a blackout (for the safety of his dog). ECF No. 5 at 4. By denying him access to the courthouse, Wilds contends Defendants violated the ADA and Florida law. For relief, Wilds asks to be permitted to enter the courthouse in the future with his service dog off leash. ECF No. 5 at 4.
“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1955). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of the complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Detailed factual allegations are not required, but the complaint must offer more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted).
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id., 127 S.Ct. at 1964 (citations omitted).
“The mere possibility the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (2012). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take the factual allegations therein as true. See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing SEC v. ESM Grp., Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir. 1988)).
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). This leniency, however, does not confer on pro se litigants “a right to receive special advantages not bestowed on other litigants.” Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107, 1115 (11th Cir. 1985). The Pro se litigant must, for example, “abide by local rules governing the proper form of pleadings.” Id. Further, “this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party... or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” GRJ Investments, Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
In determining whether a Pro se litigant has stated a claim, “the court ought not penalize the litigant for linguistic imprecision in the more plausible allegations,” while keeping in mind that “wildly implausible allegations in the complaint should not be taken to be true.” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008).
In this case, Wilds asserts federal claims pursuant to the ADA and state law claims for violations of Florida statute § 413.08(3). For the reasons discussed below, Wilds cannot state a federal claim against these Defendants under the ADA, Section 1983, or Bivens. Further, the Court concludes that, even though Section 413.08(3) provides no private right of action, Wilds may pursue damages for alleged violations of the statute under the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”). The state courts, however, not this Court, should resolve Wilds' FCRA claim.
Construing Wild's allegations quite liberally, the Court cannot find a federal claim under the ADA (or its counterpart with respect to federal buildings), Section 1983, or Bivens against Defendants on the facts alleged. Ironically, had the events that gave rise to this lawsuit taken place in a State courthouse, Wilds would have been able to pursue his claims under both Title II of the ADA and Section 1983.
Defendants contend that the only provisions under the ADA that could possibly give rise to Wilds' claims are found in Title III.[3] Yet, Defendants argue that Wilds' Title III ADA claims fail for two reasons. First, a federal courthouse is not a place of “public accommodation.” Second, Defendants do not “own, lease, or operate a place of public accommodation.” ECF No. 26.
Title III of the ADA provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). “Public accommodation” includes various private entities, if the operations of such entities affect commerce, including places of lodging, establishments serving food or drink, theaters, places used for public transportation, and places of education. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Under the ADA, “damages are not recoverable ... only injunctive relief is available.” Wanderv. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)).
There is only one federal district court that as haddressed the question of whether a federal courthouse constitutes a place of public accommodation under Title III of the ADA. That court found that it does not. See Weber v. Eash, No. 2:15-cv-225-RMP, 2015 WL 8481885, at *3-4 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2015) ().[4] The lack of case law on whether a federal courthouse constitutes a public accommodation under Title III of the ADA is likely because federal government buildings are generally exempt from the ADA. See Fiedler v. AMC, Inc., 871 F.Supp. 35, 37 (D.D.C. 1994) (). Federal buildings are governed instead by the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968 (“ABA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4151, et seq. Fiedler, 871 F.Supp. at 37.
“Congress enacted the ABA ‘to insure whenever possible that physically handicapped persons will have ready access to, and use of, [federal] buildings.'” Cooke v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 926 F.Supp.2d 720, 727 (E.D. N.C. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4152). The ABA, however, does not provide a private right of action and courts have refused to imply one. See Logan v. Matveeskii, 175 F.Supp.3d 209, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (collecting cases). A person aggrieved under the ABA may, however, file a complaint with the U.S. Access Board regarding any alleged ABA violation. See https://www.access-board.gov Further, because the Access Board has been given jurisdiction to investigate and resolve ABA violations, some courts have held that a litigant must first grieve his complaint to the Board before filing suit in federal court. See Logan, 175 F.Supp.3d at 232-33.
In view of the above, Wilds has no ADA claim against Defendants, and to the extent he has an ABA claim, he may file a complaint with the Access Board.
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