Wildwest Institute v. Castaneda, No. CV 06-24-M-DWM.
| Decision Date | 21 November 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 06-24-M-DWM. |
| Parties | WILDWEST INSTITUTE, Plaintiff, v. Bob CASTANEDA, in his official capacity as Forest Supervisor for the Kootenai National Forest; Abagail Kimbell, Regional Forester of Region One of the U.S. Forest Service; and, United States Forest Service, an agency of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Defendants, and F.H. Stoltze Land & Lumber Co., Fousts, Inc., Regehr Logging, Inc., Ponderay Valley Fibre, Inc., and Lincoln County, Defendant-Intervenors. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
Thomas J. Woodbury, Forest Defense, Missoula, MT, for Plaintiff.
Mark Steger Smith, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Billings, MT, for Defendants.
Julie A. Weis, Scott W. Horngren, Haglund Kelley Horngren Jones & Wilder, Portland, OR, Patrick G. Frank, Worden Thane, Missoula, MT, for Defendant-Intervenors.
Plaintiff, Wildwest Institute, is challenging the United States Forest Service's approval of nine logging projects in the Kootenai National Forest ("KNF"). The challenged projects include the Bristow Area Restoration Project (DN June 16, 2004), the Fortine Project (ROD October 12, 2004), the West Troy Project (ROD June 14, 2004), the Pipestone Timber Sale and Restoration Project (ROD June 2, 2004), the Lower Big Creek Project (ROD June 30, 2004), the South McSwede Timber Sale and Restoration Project (DN June 16, 2004), the Alder Creek Project (DN June 16, 2005), the Cow Creek Project (DN June 16, 2005), and the McSuttan Project (ROD May 12, 2005). Plaintiff raises claims under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq., and the National Forest Management Act ("NFMA"), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600 et seq. Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, Plaintiffs motion to supplement the record, and Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiffs supplemental materials.
The crux of Plaintiffs argument is that flawed, forest-wide management practices in the KNF render the Forest Service's approval of the nine challenged projects unlawful. Plaintiff places great reliance on the results of the 1993 Draft Five-Year Monitoring and Evaluation Report (the "1993 Draft Report"). According to Plaintiff, the 1993 Draft Report revealed numerous deficiencies in the management practices being implemented in the KNF. Plaintiff claims, instead of addressing these deficiencies by amending the Forest Plan, the Forest Service merely abandoned the five-year review process, and thus many of the problems that existed in 1993 still exist today. Specifically, Plaintiff challenges management practices relating to the use of forest plan amendments, water quality and aquatic habitat, old growth, soil productivity, and noxious weeds. Plaintiff argues the ineffective management practices render the challenged projects unlawful.
Defendants first claim Plaintiff has abandoned all claims alleged in its Complaint except those based on a cumulative effects theory because Plaintiff failed to address any other claims in its summary judgment brief. Defendants contend Plaintiffs cumulative effects claims are without merit because the Forest Service adequately analyzed the cumulative impact of past, present, and future actions on water quality, old growth habitat, soil productivity, and noxious weeds for each of the challenged projects.
Defendants further contend Plaintiffs attempt to establish forest-wide management problems in the KNF by relying on monitoring data from over ten years ago must fail. According to Defendants, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to suggest conditions from 1993 still exist today. Defendants note the five-year review process is no longer required by law, but assert the Forest Service has continued to conduct monitoring as required by the Forest Plan.
Defendant-Intervenors claim Plaintiffs suit, which seeks to affect change in forest-wide management practices, is not viable. Defendant-Intervenors contend Plaintiff is limited to challenging individual projects. Even if a challenge to forest-wide management practices is permitted on the coattails of site-specific projects, Defendant-Interveners argue Plaintiffs suit is directed at the wrong timber sales. Defendant-Intervenors note most of the challenged projects do not require harvest of old growth or construction of roads in old growth habitat.
Defendant-Intervenors also assert Plaintiff's suit is barred by lathes, claim preclusion, and issue preclusion. Defendant-Intervenors point out that the most recent of the challenged projects was approved in June 2005, but Plaintiff did not file suit until February 2006. According to Defendant-Intervenors, permitting Plaintiffs suit to proceed would unduly prejudice logging companies because implementation of the challenged projects has already begun. Defendant-Intervenors further contend many of Plaintiffs claims are barred by issue or claim preclusion because the claims were litigated or should have been raised in Ecology Center, Inc. v. Castenada, CV-02-200-M, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26446 (D. Mont. June 27, 2003).
Finally, Defendant-Intervenors argue, if the Court determines the Forest Service's approval of any of the challenged projects violated environmental laws, an injunction should not be issued. Defendant-Intervenors claim halting the challenged projects would harm logging companies, their employees, and the public. Defendant-Intervenors note the challenged projects are largely intended to improve forest health by eliminating dead, dying, or diseased timber and timber slated for salvage is a perishable commodity.
Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgement is a particularly appropriate tool for resolving claims challenging agency action. See Occidental Eng'g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir.1985). When a district court is reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, the administrative agency acts as the fact finder and the district court's role is limited to deciding the legal question of whether the agency could reasonably have found the facts as it did. Id.
Judicial review of an agency's compliance with NFMA and NEPA are governed by the judicial review provisions of the APA. Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir.2005). Therefore, a district court may set aside an agency's decision only if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
NFMA imposes both substantive and procedural requirements on the Forest Service. Ecology Ctr., 430 F.3d at 1062. NFMA envisions a two-stage approach to forest planning. Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 757 (9th Cir.1996). At the first stage, the Forest Service develops a land and resource management plan for each forest. Id. The forest plan must comply with NFMA's substantive requirements. Id. At the second stage, the forest plan is implemented through individual, site-specific projects. Id. Each project must comply with both the forest plan and NFMA's substantive requirements. Ecology Ctr., 430 F.3d at 1062.
NEPA, on the other hand, imposes only procedural requirements. It requires federal agencies to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") whenever they propose to undertake any "major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The goal of NEPA is two-fold: to "ensure the agency will have detailed information on significant environmental impacts when it makes its decisions" and to "guarantee that this information will be available to [the public]." Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 758. NEPA therefore "does not mandate particular results, but simply describes the necessary process that an agency must follow in issuing an EIS." Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir.2004) (quotation omitted). In reviewing agency action under NEPA, a district court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Id. Rather, "[i]ts focus must be on ensuring [the agency] took a `hard look' at the environmental consequences of [its] decision[]." Id. A district court Id. (quotation omitted).
Plaintiff has filed a motion to supplement the record with various documents. Plaintiff seeks to add eight documents from the administrative record in a prior case dealing with the KNF (No. CV-96-142-M). The most important of these documents appears to be the 1993 Draft Report which Plaintiff relies on heavily in its summary judgment briefing. Plaintiff also seeks to add (1) a 1998 memorandum from a KNF hydrologist concerning a proposal to eliminate monitoring item F-2; (2) an undated draft entitled "KNF Sensitive Species Management — Fish"; (3) two Forest Service replies to FOIA requests; and (4) a 1994 memorandum from a Forest Service fish biologist discussing the bull trout.
Defendants oppose Plaintiff's motion. Defendants contend the documents were not part of the administrative process and were not considered by the agency in...
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Ecology Center v. Castaneda
...for summary judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service. Wildwest Inst. v. Castaneda, 462 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1163 (D.Mont.2006). The district court noted that, on many of its claims, WildWest had failed to "establish[ ] a connection between the chal......
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Ecology Center v. Castaneda
...for summary judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service. Wildwest Inst. v. Castaneda, 462 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1163 (D.Mont.2006). The district court noted that, on many of its claims, WildWest had failed to "establish[ ] a connection between the chal......
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Case summaries.
...the Pipestone, West Troy, Bristow, South McSwede, Lower Big Creek, McSutten, and Fortine projects. (346) Wildwest Inst. v. Castaneda, 462 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1163 (D. Mont. (347) McFarland v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008). (348) Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. [sectio......