Wiler v. Kent State Univ.
| Decision Date | 03 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 5:20-cv-490 |
| Parties | KATHLEEN WILER, Plaintiff, v. KENT STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kathleen Wiler, a former coach of women's field hockey at Kent State University, alleges that the university paid her less than her male counterparts. Also, she claims that Kent State constructively discharged her following her complaints about the unequal treatment she alleges, retaliated against her, and otherwise engaged in unlawful sex discrimination. Defendant Kent State University moves to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), which for reasons discussed below, the Court construes as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). (ECF No. 13.) For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Kent State's motion.
On Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court takes the following allegations in the amended complaint as true and construes them in Plaintiff's favor.
Kathleen Wiler coached women's field hockey at Kent State University from 2006 until February 2019, when she resigned. (ECF No. 35-1, ¶¶ 15, 32, PageID #367, 369.) During her time at the helm of Kent State's NCAA Division I women's field hockey program, the team dominated the Mid-America Conference, also known as the MAC: it won eight regular season titles, five conference tournament titles, and made five NCAA post-season appearances. (Id., ¶ 17, PageID #367.) For her team's successes, Ms. Wiler earned recognition five times as MAC Coach of the Year. (Id., ¶ 18.) Like other head coaches at Kent State, Ms. Wiler had many broad responsibilities, including teaching, training, counseling, and advising her players, fundraising for and managing the program and its budget, public relations, and recruiting. (Id., ¶ 26.) For all this, Ms. Wiler says she was paid "approximately $85,496.00." (Id., ¶ 21.)
Compared to male coaches at Kent State, Plaintiff alleges she received "unequal pay" and had "more difficult conditions," "higher expectations," "more work," and "more responsibility" but with "less resources and less support," notwithstanding Kent State's non-discrimination policies. (Id., ¶¶ 29-31, PageID #369.) Ms. Wiler reported these perceived disparities. (Id., ¶ 32.) Although Kent State has a policy to investigate incidents of discrimination "that are reported in an appropriate and timely manner," it allegedly "refused to investigate or remedy" Wiler's claim. (Id., ¶¶ 33-34.)
On August 31, 2017, Ms. Wiler filed a charge against Kent State with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Id., ¶¶ 32, 79.) Little changed, and Kent State allegedly failed to investigate or remedy her complaints. (Id., ¶¶ 32-35.) On February 26, 2019, Wiler supplemented her complaint with the EEOC. (Id., ¶ 79.) Two days later, she resigned. (Id., ¶ 34.) In December 2019, Plaintiff filed a second complaint with the EEOC. (Id., ¶ 35.)
On March 3, 2020, Wiler filed this lawsuit against Kent State for wage discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation under corresponding provisions of Title VII, Title IX, and the Equal Pay Act. (See ECF No. 1.) In the operative pleading, the amended complaint filed on February 2, 2021 (ECF No. 35-1), Plaintiff alleges she "was paid the lowest of any . . . coaches, most of whom were male[,]" because of pervasive "gender stereotypes" that negatively affected her "pay at the time of hire, during consideration of raises/contract extensions and in the evaluation of work performed and success obtained, relative to her male peers." (Id., ¶¶ 51-52, PageID #373.)
To buttress her allegations, Plaintiff points to several other coaches at Kent State who she says were equally (if not less) successful, but paid more. First, she identifies several others at Kent State who were MAC Coaches of the Year: Jeff Duncan (baseball), Herb Page (golf), Roberto Marinaro (women's soccer), and Eric Oakley (softball). (Id., ¶ 70, PageID #376-77.) She alleges their average compensation was $145,423. (Id., ¶ 70, PageID #377.) Among coaches whose teams won MAC regular season championships, coaches Oakley, Duncan, Page, GregRobertson (women's golf), and Brice Biggin (gymnastics), their compensation averaged $136,028 per year. (Id., ¶ 71, PageID #377.) Marinaro, the one other coach to win a MAC Tournament championship, was paid $95,554. (Id., ¶ 73.) As for male coaches whose teams made it to the NCAA tournament—Page, Robertson, and Biggin—their average pay was $128,777. (Id., ¶ 73.) Plaintiff excludes football and cross-country from her comparisons. (Id., ¶ 70(b) & n.4.) According to the amended complaint, Ms. Wiler "was in the top two of successes, but was the only female coach, sixth in seniority, and 12th in pay out of fourteen total coaches" and that her average pay "has always been lower and substantially lower than the average of the males" with "similar or far less success" than her. (Id., ¶ 74, PageID #377-78.)
Since 2006, Plaintiff claims "there have been 26 head coaches in the various sports KSU offers, but only five have been women," and "there are no women coaching men and only two sports are currently coached by women." (Id., ¶¶ 91-92, PageID #381.) All this, she claims, amounts to illegal wage discrimination on the part of Kent State. Because of these persistent disparities, Plaintiff alleges she was discriminated and retaliated against, and eventually constructively discharged.
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts three claims for: (1) wage discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII (Count I); (2) violation of the Equal Pay Act (Count II); and violations of Title IX (Count III). (ECF No. 35-1; ¶¶ 101-30; PageID #383-87.) Each count also appears to claim wrongful discharge. (Id., ¶¶ 105-06; 116-17; 126-27, PageID #384-86.) In addition to damages for economic and non-economic losses, including back pay and front pay, Plaintiff seeksequitable relief to enjoin gender bias and stereotyping in making pay decisions, plus mandating various training and other remedial measures at Kent State. (Id., PageID #387.)
Before turning to the merits of Kent State's motion, there are two threshold procedural issues to address: (1) Plaintiff's EEOC charges; and (2) the posture of Kent State's motion.
In her initial complaint, Plaintiff alleged she received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on her first complaint filed in August 2017. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 110, PageID #21.) Plaintiff averred she requested, but had not received, a right-to-sue letter for her second complaint to the EEOC made in December 2019. (Id.) In her amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she received a right-to-sue letter, though the pleading does not specifically say whether it applies to both claims or if she is merely referencing the first letter. (ECF No. 35-1, ¶ 9, PageID #366.) Neither party raises the issue in their briefing, but the Court briefly pauses to consider whether Plaintiff has properly exhausted her claims.
Before filing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must bring claims to the EEOC to provide the agency an opportunity to investigate and decide if it wants to pursue charges on behalf of the federal government. See EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 455-56 (6th Cir. 1999). "[F]or 180 days after the filing of a charge, the EEOC retains 'exclusive' jurisdiction over the subject matter of that charge[,]" a period of time that is "crucial to the statutory scheme." Id. at 456 (quoting EEOC v.Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d 462, 466 (5th Cir. 1997)). In contrast, Title IX Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 255 (2009).
The Sixth Circuit holds that the lack of a right to sue letter does not deprive a district court of jurisdiction, but instead constitutes a condition precedent to filing suit that is curable (by receiving a right-to-sue letter) or waivable (by the parties or the Court). Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 309 (6th Cir. 2000) (); Rivers v. Barberton Bd. of Educ., 143 F.3d 1029, 1032 (6th Cir. 1998) ().
Notwithstanding this administrative regime, the court in Parry noted that waiving the condition precedent was appropriate in the absence of evidence of prejudice and, in any event, the plaintiff cured the issue by obtaining a right-to-sue letter. Parry, 236 F.3d at 309. District courts retain discretion, however, to dismiss claims or actions without prejudice where a plaintiff fails to obtain a right-to-sue letter before filing. See Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 820 n.10 (6th Cir. 2003); accord Jones v. Toledo Pub. Schs., No. 3:14CV911, 2016 WL 1047247, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2016) (); Lott v. Kmart, No. 2:13-cv-228, 2013 WL 3927617, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 29, 2013) ( without prejudice).
Here, the record does not confirm that Plaintiff exhausted administrative review of her allegations before bringing her Title VII claims. Neither party makes much of this issue in briefing. For that reason, and because Kent State makes no argument of prejudice, the Court deems the issue whether Plaintiff had a right-to-sue letter when she filed her initial complaint waived.
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