Wiles v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
| Docket Number | 8:21-cv-183-WFJ-TGW |
| Decision Date | 21 December 2023 |
| Parties | LORENZO WILES, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Lorenzo Wiles, a Florida prisoner, timely filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). Respondent filed a response opposing the petition. (Doc. 10). Mr. Wiles filed a reply. (Doc. 16). Upon consideration, the petition is DENIED.
In March 2012, a state-court jury convicted Mr. Wiles of violating Florida's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (“RICO”) Act, conspiracy to commit racketeering, trafficking in cocaine, and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. (Doc. 10-2, Ex. 6). The state trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of twenty-five years' imprisonment on each count. (Id.) In addition, the sentences for trafficking and conspiracy to traffic included mandatory minimum terms of fifteen years' imprisonment. (Id.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed the convictions and sentences. (Id., Ex 11).
Mr Wiles subsequently filed petitions alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Id., Exs. 14, 15). In April 2015, the state appellate court granted the amended petition in part, holding that Mr. Wiles's appellate counsel “was ineffective in failing to argue that his convictions for both conspiracy to commit racketeering and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine violate[d] the prohibition against double jeopardy.” (Id., Ex. 18, at 2-3). The court thus permitted Mr. Wiles to file a second direct appeal. (Id. at 4).
In August 2016, the state appellate court ruled that double jeopardy barred Mr. Wiles's “convictions for both conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and conspiracy to commit racketeering.” (Id., Ex. 27, at 1-2). As a result, the court “reverse[d] and remand[ed] for the trial court to vacate” the sentence for conspiracy to commit racketeering, the “lesser punishable offense.” (Id. at 4). The court affirmed Mr. Wiles's “remaining convictions and sentences in all other respects.” (Id.) The trial court subsequently entered an amended judgment and sentence vacating the conviction for conspiracy to commit racketeering. (Id., Ex. 29).
In April 2017, Mr. Wiles moved for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. (Id., Ex. 30). He later filed an amended Rule 3.850 motion. (Id., Ex. 32). The state postconviction court ultimately rejected all of Mr. Wiles's claims, issuing a final order denying relief on July 8, 2020. (Id., Exs. 31, 33, 36). That order informed Mr. Wiles that he had “thirty (30) days from the date of this Final Order within which to appeal.” (Id., Ex. 36, at 6). Mr. Wiles missed the deadline to appeal.
On October 23, 2020, Mr. Wiles filed a petition for belated appeal, contending that COVID-related restrictions at his prison had interfered with his ability to file a timely appeal. (Id., Ex. 38). The state appellate court denied the petition. (Id., Ex. 41). Mr. Wiles subsequently filed his federal habeas petition, which raises three claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Doc. 1).
A federal habeas petitioner must exhaust his claims in state court before presenting them in his federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) (). The exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the petitioner fairly presents his claim in each appropriate state court and alerts that court to the federal nature of the claim. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971).
The doctrine of procedural default provides that “[i]f the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is established.” Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001). A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs in an extraordinary case where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir. 2003). To establish cause for a procedural default, a petitioner “must demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded the effort to raise the claim properly in state court.” Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th Cir. 1999).
A petitioner demonstrates prejudice by showing that “there is at least a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different” absent the constitutional violation. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892.
Mr. Wiles alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are analyzed under the test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland requires a showing of deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. Id. at 687. Deficient performance is established if, “in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. However, “counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id.
Mr. Wiles must show that counsel's alleged error prejudiced the defense because “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Id. at 691. To demonstrate prejudice, Mr. Wiles must show Id. at 694.
In Ground One, Mr. Wiles alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to object when his co-defendant Collier Childs “testif[ied] as an expert witness,” and (2) failing to establish for the jury that “Mr. Childs's real motive for testifying was [to receive] a more lenient sentencing recommendation” from the State. (Doc. 1 at 9). In Ground Two, Mr. Wiles claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by (1) neglecting to file a motion to suppress certain “phone calls” on the ground that they were “partially inaudible,” and (2) failing to object when a detective provided a “narrative” description at trial of this allegedly “unintellig[ible]/inaudible evidence.” (Id. at 11).
Respondent is correct that Grounds One and Two are procedurally defaulted because Mr. Wiles did not properly exhaust them in state court. (Doc. 10 at 4-5). Mr. Wiles raised these claims in his Rule 3.850 motion, and the state postconviction court rejected them. (Doc. 10-2, Exs. 30, 31, 32, 33, 36). But Mr. Wiles did not timely appeal the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion. Instead, over two months after the appeal deadline passed, Mr. Wiles filed a petition for belated appeal, which the state appellate court denied. (Id., Exs. 38, 41).
Mr. Wiles's failure to timely appeal the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion caused a procedural default of Grounds One and Two. See Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 847 (“[Petitioner]'s failure to present three of his federal habeas claims to the Illinois Supreme Court in a timely fashion has resulted in a procedural default of those claims.”); Leonard v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 807, 808 (5th Cir. 1979) (); Roberts v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., No. 3:18-cv-434-TJC-JRK, 2021 WL 808852, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2021) (). These claims are therefore barred from review “unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is established.” Smith, 256 F.3d at 1138.
Mr. Wiles seeks to establish cause for the default based on his alleged inability to file a timely notice of appeal. (Doc. 16 at 6-8). As noted above, the state postconviction court issued its final order denying relief on July 8, 2020, and informed Mr. Wiles that he had “thirty (30) days from the date of this Final Order within which to appeal.” (Doc. 102, Ex. 36, at 6). According to Mr. Wiles, on July 23, 2020, his prison “went on full institutional quarantine” due to COVID-19. (Id., Ex. 38, at 3). As a result, “no inmates were allowed to have contact with any inmate outside of the dormitory they were assigned to.” (Id.) Moreover, the “law library remained closed” during this time. (Doc. 16 at 7). Mr. Wiles also alleges that, at some unspecified time during the thirty-day appeal window, he tested positive for COVID-19 and was “placed into medical isolation.” (Id.) He claims he was “released from medical isolation” on September 4, 2020, and moved to a “medical recovery dorm.” (Doc. 10-2, Ex. 38, at 3). Shortly thereafter, the law library reopened, and Mr. Wiles filed his unsuccessful petition for belated appeal. (Doc. 16 at 7).
These allegations are insufficient to establish that “some external impediment prevent[ed]” Mr. Wiles from timely appealing the denial of his ...
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