Wiley v. Bell

• Decision Date: 09 August 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 05-CV-70486
• Parties: CALVIN R. WILEY, Petitioner, v. THOMAS BELL, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

CALVIN R. WILEY, Petitioner,

v.THOMAS BELL, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 05-CV-70486

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Dated: August 9, 2012

HON. BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

AND DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner Calvin R. Wiley has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner, who is currently incarcerated at the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility in Adrian, Michigan, challenges his second-degree murder conviction. Petitioner raises three claims for habeas relief. Respondent argues that the claims are meritless and that one of the claims is procedurally defaulted. For the reasons stated below, the court shall deny the petition and decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

I. Background

Petitioner's conviction arises from the beating death of Kenneth Wideman. Late in the evening of September 5, 2000, Wideman stopped by the home of Al Jones in Detroit to ask to borrow $5.00. Jones did not have any money for Wideman, so Wideman left. Jones fell asleep. He was awakened sometime later by a noise coming from his front porch. Jones testified that he looked out his front window and saw petitioner and co-defendant Larry Wesley jumping up and down on Wideman about 15 or 20 times. Jones banged on the window. Petitioner and Wesley took Widemanoff the front porch. Jones opened his front door and heard a noise from Wideman that sounded like someone was choking him. Jones returned to his bed for about half an hour, then decided to look out his front window again. He saw the three men across the street from his house. Petitioner and Wesley were punching and jumping on Wideman. Wideman did not appear to be attempting to defend himself. Jones then saw the three men walking down the street side-by-side.

Teresa Perry testified that she was awakened by voices at approximately 2:00 a.m. on September 6, 2000. She looked out her window and saw petitioner, Wesley and Wideman talking. Suddenly, she saw that Wideman was on the ground and petitioner and Wesley were jumping and stomping on top of him.

Sarah Johnson, Wideman's grandmother, with whom Wideman lived, testified that, during the early morning hours of September 6, 2000, she heard a noise at her front door. She found Wideman slumped against the door. His clothes were ripped off and there was blood everywhere. She called 911 and Wideman was taken to the hospital.

Dr. Charles Edward Lucas, a surgeon, testified that he treated Wideman at Detroit Receiving Hospital. Dr. Lucas operated on Wideman to treat a severe laceration to the liver. A second operation was performed to remove a portion of his intestines. Petitioner died several days later. The medical examiner identified the cause of death was multiple blunt trauma.

II. Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Wayne County Circuit Court of second-degree murder. Petitioner and co-defendant Larry Wesley were tried before the same jury. On November 21, 2002, Petitioner was sentenced to 15-25 years imprisonment.

Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals, presenting the following claims:

I. Defendant was deprived of his Ams. V and XIV rights of due process when photos of the victim were admitted into evidence.

II. Defendant was deprived of his Ams. V and XIV rights of due process when the prosecutor injected improper references into his summation.

The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. See People v. Wiley, 2004 WL 787144 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2004).

Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, presenting the same claims presented to the Michigan Court of Appeals, as well as the following claim:

Appellant Calvin Wiley was denied his state and federal right to a fair and impartial trial when the trial court denied his motion for a separate jury, admitted into evidence the incriminating statement of his co-defendant implicating Mr. Wiley without affording him an opportunity to confront his co-defendant in violation of Crawford v. Washington, issued March 8, 2004.

The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. See People v. Wiley, 471 Mich. 886 (2004). Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, presenting the same claims he presented to the Michigan Supreme Court. After filing the petition, he asked the court to stay further proceedings so that he could return to state court to exhaust an unexhausted claim. On July 7, 2006, the court issued an opinion and order granting that motion and administratively closing the case.

Petitioner then filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court, raising these claims:

I. Defendant was denied his state and federal rights to a fair and impartial trial when the trial court denied his motion for a separate jury, admitted into evidence the incriminating statement of his co-defendant implicating defendant without affording him an opportunity to confront his accuser.

II. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

The trial court denied the motion. See People v. Wiley, No. 00-11010-01, 2004 WL 787144 (Wayne County Cir. Ct. June 12, 2007).

Petitioner raised the same claims in applications for leave to appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court. Both state appellate courts denied leave to appeal. See People v. Wiley, No. 281608 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2008); People v. Wiley, No. 136403 (Mich. Oct. 27, 2008).

This habeas corpus proceeding was then reopened. Petitioner raises the following claims:

I. Petitioner was denied his federal right to a fair trial when the trial court denied his motion for a separate trial, admitting into evidence the incriminating statement of his co-defendant that implicated him without being afforded an opportunity to confront him in violation of Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004) and its progeny.

II. Petitioner was deprived of his Ams. V and XIV rights of due process when the prosecutor injected improper references to penalty in his summation and when asking the jury to put themselves in the shoes of the victim.

III. Petitioner was deprived of his Ams. V and XIV rights of due process when photos of the victim were admitted into evidence.

III. Discussion

A. Legal Standards

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

"A state court's decision is 'contrary to' . . . clearly established law if it 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]' or if it 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [this] precedent.'" Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). "[T]he 'unreasonable application' prong of the statute permits a federal habeas court to 'grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts' of petitioner's case." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). However, "[i]n order for a federal court find a state court's application of [Supreme Court] precedent 'unreasonable,' the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application must have been 'objectively unreasonable.'" Wiggins, 539U.S. at 520-21; see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 789 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). "Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal. . . . As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 786-87 (internal quotation omitted). Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court's review to a determination of whether the state court's decision comports with clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Section 2254(d) "does not require citation of [Supreme Court] cases - indeed, it does not even require awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). "[W]hile the principles of "clearly established law" are to be determined solely by resort to Supreme Court rulings, the decisions of lower federal courts may be instructive in assessing the reasonableness of a state court's resolution of an issue." Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2007). Further, a federal habeas court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this...