Wiley v. Buncombe Cnty., No. 1:10–cv–181–RJC.

• Decision Date: 02 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 1:10–cv–181–RJC.
• Citation: 846 F.Supp.2d 480
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
• Parties: Carl Edward WILEY, Plaintiff, v. BUNCOMBE COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

846 F.Supp.2d 480

Carl Edward WILEY, Plaintiff,

v.BUNCOMBE COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:10–cv–181–RJC.

United States District Court,

W.D. North Carolina,

Asheville Division.

March 2, 2012.

Carl Edward Wiley, Laurinburg, NC, pro se.

Curtis William Euler, Asheville, NC, David John Adinolfi, II, North Carolina Attorney General's Office, Raleigh, NC, for Defendants.

ORDER

ROBERT J. CONRAD, JR., Chief Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon the following motions:

1. Defendants Buncombe County, Sheriff Van Duncan and the Buncombe County Detention Facility's Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 20);

2. Defendant Kathryn M. Hansen's Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 21); and

3. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Alter Judgment, (Doc. No. 47).

I. BACKGROUND

On August 25, 2010, Plaintiff Carl E. Wiley (“Plaintiff”) filed a civil rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, alleging that Defendants unlawfully subjected him to multiple periods of involuntary commitment and failed to take proper action on a state habeas corpus petition that he filed challenging the periods of commitment. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff contends that Defendants Buncombe County (“County”), Buncombe County Sheriff Van Duncan in his official and individual capacities (“Sheriff Duncan”) and the Buncombe County Detention Facility (“BCDF”) failed to bring him to a habeas corpus hearing on August 13, 2010 at 2:00 before the Honorable Alan Z. Thornburg (“Judge Thornburg”) resulting in an unlawful incarceration.

Plaintiff states that on September 3, 2008 Plaintiff was wrongfully committed to Dorothea Dix Hospital. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 10). On March 5, 2009, Plaintiff was ordered to be involuntarily committed to Broughton Hospital because Plaintiff was allegedly found to be incapable to proceed to trial. ( Id. at ¶ 11). On June 25, 2009, Plaintiff was ordered back to Dorothea Dix Hospital and then returned to BCDF on or about July 1, 2009. ( Id. at ¶ 12). On August 13, 2009, Plaintiff was escorted to Broughton Hospital and held there until December 17, 2009. ( Id. at ¶ 14).

On May 28, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a pro se petition for a Request for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. ( Id. at ¶ 15). Plaintiff alleges that on or about June 3, 2010, Defendant Kathryn M. Hansen, Buncombe County Deputy Clerk of Courts (“Hansen”), received the pleading. ( Id. at ¶ 16). However, according to Plaintiff, Hansen “is believed to have failed to deliver the ch–17 Writ of Habeas Corpus order by Chief Resident Superior Court Judge Alan Z. Thornburg, to intended parties. ... And [Hansen] suggested that the plaintiff, do not write this office again.” ( Id. at ¶¶ 6, 16). On or about July 30, 2010, Judge Thornburg stated that there was probable cause for relief on Plaintiff's capacity/confinement issue and ordered that Plaintiff be produced in Superior Court pursuant to an accompanying writ. ( Id. at ¶ 16).

On or about August 13, 2010, Plaintiff alleges that he waited to be escorted to court for his probable cause hearing for confinement relief and that Sheriff Duncan and/or agents of Sheriff Duncan failed to produce Plaintiff. ( Id. at ¶ 18). Plaintiff alleges he showed the commanding officer of the Housing Unit a copy of the court order and also showed the order to the sergeant, requesting to be taken to court for his scheduled hearing. ( Id.). The sergeant stated that they must wait until someone from the court called for the plaintiff to be brought over. ( Id.).

On or about August 16, 2010, Plaintiff filed a grievance with BCDF stating that he was intentionally detained in violation of the Constitution. ( Id. at ¶ 19). On or about August 18, 2010, Lt. Honeycutt of BCDF denied Plaintiff's grievance, stating:

Mr. Wiley, the reasoning behind you not being delivered to Superior Court on your writ as you have stated is your attorney had received a secured leave (vacation as it has been explained to me). Due to your attorney not being in town your writ has been postponed until later this month when you can have proper representation in the courtroom. This responsibility cannot be placed upon the Sheriff nor those that represent him therefore your grievance is dismissed in full.

( Id. at ¶ 21).

On August 20, 2010, Judge Thornburg issued another writ of habeas corpus and set Plaintiff's habeas corpus hearing for August 27, 2010. (Doc. No. 20–1 at 4). Plaintiff filed his Complaint on August 25, 2010. (Doc. No. 1). On August 27, 2010, Plaintiff was brought before Judge Thornburg and his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. (Doc. No. 20–1 at 5).

Plaintiff alleges that the County, Sheriff Duncan, and BCDF violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff has further alleged that the County and Hansen have violated his right to due process by failing to deliver his writ of habeas corpus order to the intended parties. Plaintiff also contends that the Defendants have violated Article IV § 18, Subsection 2 and Article I, § 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In its review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “the court should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.1993). The plaintiff's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will survive if it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

III. DISCUSSIONA. Habeas Claims

Claims affecting the fact or duration of confinement generally may not be litigated under § 1983. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). In Preiser v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court considered the overlap between a case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a case filed under the habeas corpus statute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and concluded that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release. 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973).

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court considered a case not covered by Preiser, in which a petitioner sought not immediate or speedier release, but monetary damages. The Heck Court concluded that in order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been: (1) reversed on direct appeal, (2) expunged by executive order, (3) declared invalid by a state tribunal, or (4) called into question by a federal court's issuance of a § 2254 writ. 512 U.S. 477, 486–87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). The Supreme Court required that “when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in plaintiff's favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364.

In 2005, the Supreme Court clarified that § 1983 actions are barred, no matter the relief sought, “if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005). The Wilkinson Court emphasized that habeas corpus was the exclusive remedy for state prisoners who “seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement—either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State's custody.” Id. at 81–82, 125 S.Ct. 1242.Section 1983 relief “remains available for procedural challenges where success in the action would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he is being unlawfully confined as a pretrial detainee in the Buncombe County Detention Facility. Plaintiff contends that his confinement in the BCDF is without probable cause. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 16). Plaintiff's claim challenges the terms of his confinement and calls into question the validity of his criminal charges. In addition, on August 27, 2010, Judge Thornburg denied Plaintiff's petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his incarceration. Because Plaintiff's § 1983 action is challenging the terms of Plaintiff's confinement and attempting to overturn Judge Thornburg's denial of Plaintiff's petition for writ of habeas corpus, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim intrudes upon the “core” of habeas corpus and cannot be maintained under § 1983. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487, 93 S.Ct. 1827;Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 74, 79, 125 S.Ct. 1242 (2005).

Courts have applied the Heck holding to suits filed by pretrial detainees. Green v. Dewitt, No. Civ.A.8:06–0626–MBS, 2006 WL 1074983, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 20, 2006) (“Although the decision in Heck v. Humphrey concerned a...