Wiley v. Epps

Decision Date05 November 2009
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 2:00CV130-P-A.
Citation668 F.Supp.2d 848
PartiesWilliam Lee WILEY, Petitioner v. Christopher EPPS, et al., Respondents.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

Robert B. McDuff, Jackson, MS, Timothy C. Hester, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Marvin L. White, Jr., Mississippi Attorney General's Office, Jackson, MS, for Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

W. ALLEN PEPPER, JR., District Judge.

Petitioner William Lee Wiley filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking to challenge his otherwise final death sentence for capital murder.

Procedural and Factual History

Shortly after closing his convenience store around midnight on August 22, 1981, J.B. Turner and his daughter, Patricia Harvey, were shot outside of Mr. Turner's store with a sawed-off, .20-gauge shotgun. Mr. Turner suffered a gunshot wound to his back and a fatal wound to his chest, and he died at the scene. Mrs. Harvey survived but was blinded as a result of the shooting. A black receipt box, in which Mr. Turner had placed the night's receipts and a leather money bag containing between $350 and $400, was taken. An investigation of the scene disclosed three spent .20-gauge shotgun shells and one live round. A green army fatigue cap and black box were found near the scene of the crime. Several days later, a .20-gauge sawed-off pump shotgun was found in the weeds behind Mr. Turner's store, and a subsequent trace revealed that William Lee Wiley, Petitioner, was the owner of the gun. Approximately two and one-half weeks later, Petitioner was arrested in Memphis, Tennessee, and he subsequently confessed to the murder and robbery. Petitioner led police to where he discarded the empty money bag and to an automobile where he had kept the shotgun hidden prior to the commission of the crime.

On February 18, 1982, a jury in the Circuit Court of DeSoto County, Mississippi, convicted Petitioner of capital murder and sentenced him to death.1 On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the jury's finding of guilt but remanded the case for resentencing due to the prosecutor's improper references of appellate review of the death sentence. Wiley v. State, 449 So.2d 756 (Miss.1984). On June 20, 1984, following a new sentencing hearing, a jury sentenced Petitioner to death for a second time. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the sentence and denied Petitioner rehearing on March 19, 1986. Wiley v. State, 484 So.2d 339 (Miss. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 906, 107 S.Ct. 304, 93 L.Ed.2d 278 (1986). Petitioner's application for post-conviction relief was denied by the Mississippi Supreme Court on November 25, 1987, and rehearing and certiorari were later denied. Wiley v. State, 517 So.2d 1373, cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1246, 109 S.Ct. 6, 101 L.Ed.2d 957 (1988). Petitioner then filed a petition in this Court seeking federal habeas relief, which was denied by unpublished opinion and order on May 4, 1990. Wiley v. Puckett, No. DC88-132-B-O. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the portion of the judgment relating to the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance and remanded the matter to this Court with instructions to issue the writ unless the State initiated proceedings within a reasonable time. Wiley v. Puckett, 969 F.2d 86, 105-06 (5th Cir.1992).

Petitioner filed a "Motion and Application for a Life Sentence, or, in the Alternative, for a New Sentencing Hearing" on February 23, 1993, which the Mississippi Supreme Court denied as to the life sentence but granted as to the new sentencing. Wiley v. State, 635 So.2d 802 (Miss. 1993). The court remanded the matter to the DeSoto County Circuit Court, and following a jury trial, Petitioner was sentenced to death for a third time on February 3, 1995. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. Wiley v. State, 691 So.2d 959 (Miss.1997), reh'g denied, 693 So.2d 384 (Miss.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 886, 118 S.Ct. 219, 139 L.Ed.2d 153 (1997) ("Wiley I").

On April 17, 1998, Petitioner filed an application for state post-conviction relief, which the court denied on June 3, 1999. Wiley v. State, 750 So.2d 1193 (Miss.1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1275, 120 S.Ct. 2742, 147 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2000) ("Wiley II"). A second post-conviction application was filed on October 17, 2002, which the Mississippi Supreme Court denied on April 17, 2003. Wiley v. State, 842 So.2d 1280 (Miss.2003) ("Wiley III"). Petitioner filed a third post-conviction application on June 19, 2003, based on the United States Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). The Mississippi Supreme Court denied relief on August 26, 2004, 890 So.2d 892 (Miss.2004), and rehearing was denied on October 28, 2004. Wiley v. State, 890 So.2d 892 (Miss.2004) ("Wiley IV"). No petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was filed.

Petitioner filed his initial petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this Court on June 29, 2000, 530 U.S. 1275, 120 S.Ct. 2742, 147 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2000), and his third and final amended petition was filed on December 14, 2004 (docket entry no. 23). On February 2, 2007, 2007 WL 405041, this Court denied Petitioner relief on all fourteen claims of error raised in his petition, but it later withdrew the opinion, order, and judgment when it partially granted Petitioner's motion to alter the judgment based solely upon its resolution of Petitioner's Atkins claim. (See docket entry no. 38). The Court held an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's Atkins claim on June 17, 2009. Petitioner and Respondents have had the opportunity to file post-hearing briefs on the issue of whether Petitioner suffers from mental retardation, and the Court is now ready to rule on all of Petitioner's claims of error. Petitioner raises the following claims of error from his 1995 State court proceedings:

I. WILEY WAS DENIED HIS FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL OF HIS SENTENCING TRIAL.

II. WILEY WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT HIS SENTENCING TRIAL.

III. WILEY WAS DENIED HIS EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WHEN THE MISSISSIPPI COURTS ALLOWED EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF PAROLE DURING VOIR DIRE.

IV. WILEY WAS DENIED HIS EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WHEN THE MISSISSIPPI COURTS REFUSED WILEY'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE "DIMINISHED CAPACITY" STATUTORY MITIGATING FACTOR.

V. WILEY WAS DENIED HIS EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WHEN THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT FOUND THAT WILEY'S DEATH SENTENCE WAS PROPORTIONAL TO COMPARABLE CASES.

VI. WILEY'S EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY THE STATE'S REPEATED REFERENCES TO PAROLE.

VII. WILEY'S EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO STRIKE ALL REFERENCES TO MERCY AND SYMPATHY FROM THE JURY INSTRUCTION.

VIII. WILEY'S EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY THE STATE'S IMPROPER "SEND A MESSAGE" ARGUMENT.

IX. WILEY'S EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY THE IMPOSITION OF A DEATH SENTENCE IN RELIANCE ON THE AVOIDING ARREST AGGRAVATING FACTOR.

X. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO DEFINE THE ELEMENTS OF ROBBERY FOR THE JURY VIOLATED THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.

XI. WILEY'S SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT MITIGATION EVIDENCE CRUCIAL TO THE SENTENCING DETERMINATION.

XII. THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT'S DENIAL OF INVESTIGATIVE FUNDS TO WILEY VIOLATED HIS EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS.

XIII. EXECUTION OF WILEY, WHO IS MENTALLY RETARDED, WOULD VIOLATE THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS UNDER ATKINS V. VIRGINIA, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

XIV. THE ACCUMULATION OF ERROR IN THIS CASE VIOLATED WILEY'S SIXTH, EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS.

Petitioner's claims, while individually considered, have been renumbered and consolidated for the sake of convenience.

Applicable Standard

Petitioner filed his federal habeas corpus petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"); therefore, the AEDPA governs this Court's review of his claims. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001). Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) allows a district court to consider a petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus based on a claim that the petitioner is, as a result of a state court judgment, "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." The AEDPA prohibits a petitioner's relitigation of issues that were adjudicated on the merits in state proceedings unless that adjudication either "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). A state court's factual findings carry a presumption of correctness on federal habeas review, and a petitioner wishing to challenge state court fact-finding must rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See Foster v. Johnson, 293 F.3d 766, 776 (5th Cir.2002); Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 849, 121 S.Ct. 122, 148 L.Ed.2d 77 (2000).

The "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of § 2254(d)(1) have independent meanings. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, ...

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