Wiley v. Midwest Poultry Servs., LP

• Decision Date: 19 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 93A02-1107-EX-593,93A02-1107-EX-593
• Parties: MARK WILEY, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. MIDWEST POULTRY SERVICES, LP., Appellee-Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

MARK WILEY, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. MIDWEST POULTRY SERVICES, LP., Appellee-Defendant.

No. 93A02-1107-EX-593

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

March 19, 2012

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),

this Memorandum Decision shall not be

regarded as precedent or cited before

any court except for the purpose of

establishing the defense of res judicata,

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:

DAVID M. LUTZ

David M. Lutz LLC

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

KARL J. VERACCO

LARRY L. BARNARD

Carson Boxberger LLP

Fort Wayne, Indiana

APPEAL FROM THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION BOARD OF INDIANA

Members of the Indiana Worker's Compensation Board

Cause No. C-180134

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

ROBB, Chief Judge

Case Summary and Issues

Mark Wiley sustained injuries in the course of his employment with Midwest Poultry Services, LP. After the Worker's Compensation Board of Indiana (the "Board") approved an agreement between Wiley and Midwest regarding Wiley's permanent disability benefits and a second agreement regarding other outstanding and pending issues, Wiley filed a motion to reinstate his application for adjustment of claim with the Board. After a single-officer hearing, the Board rendered a decision, and Wiley filed for review by the Full Board. The Full Board affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Wiley now appeals, raising three issues for our review, which we restate as: 1) whether the Full Board erred by not issuing findings of fact; 2) whether the Worker's Compensation Act entitles Wiley to reimbursement for the cost of repairs to his original motorized wheelchair; and 3) whether Wiley waived any right to reimbursement for repairs to his original motorized wheelchair in the Parties' Agreement Regarding All Outstanding and Pending Issues. Midwest cross-appeals, raising one issue for our review: whether the Full Board erred in concluding that Wiley is entitled to receive payment for repairs to the chair lift on his truck. Concluding the Full Board should have issued findings of fact but we need not remand because the issues presented are either indisputable based on the evidence or questions of law, and Wiley is entitled to reimbursement for the cost of repairs to his wheelchair and chair lift under the Worker's Compensation Act and did not waive his claim for recovery, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

In April 2004, Wiley sustained injuries resulting from his employment with Midwest. While attempting to weld pipes together, Wiley lost his balance and fell approximately fifteen feet. Wiley suffered a spinal cord injury and is now paralyzed from the waist down. Midwest, via its worker's compensation insurance carrier, treated Wiley's injuries as work-related and paid Wiley temporary total disability benefits at the rate of $588.00 per week for over 109 weeks from April 2004 through May 2006. The total temporary disability benefits awarded was $64,482.60. As a result of his paralysis, Wiley is not able to walk. Because Wiley lives in a rural area, Midwest provided Wiley with a Journeyman scooter, a motorized wheelchair specially designed to handle rough and uneven terrain. Midwest also supplied other equipment, including a hydraulic chair lift for Wiley's pick-up truck.

In February 2009, the Board approved an agreement between Wiley and Midwest regarding the payment of permanent total disability benefits. Midwest agreed to pay retroactive benefits for the period from May 2006 through January 2009 in the amount of $83,075.99, and it agreed to begin paying $1,176.00 every two weeks for an additional 249 weeks. Sometime thereafter, Wiley filed an application for adjustment of claim with the Board. In June 2010, the Board approved a second agreement between Wiley and Midwest regarding all outstanding and pending issues. The second agreement included, in relevant part:

4. The parties have agreed to settle and resolve all outstanding and pending issues as follows:

A. [Midwest] shall authorize and provide to [Wiley] a bed lift as prescribed by Dr. Jody Neer on or about January 14, 2009. [Midwest] agrees to authorize Life Essentials to provide such bed lift to [Wiley];

* * *

C. [Midwest] shall pay to [Wiley] the sum of $3,000 in exchange for [Wiley] waiving and releasing his pending claim for the cost of a replacement scooter at the Medicare-approved rate of reimbursement. [Wiley] may choose to apply such payment to the purchase [sic] a more rugged and durable scooter;

D. [Wiley] agrees to forever waive and release any and all claims he may have for the repair to his current pickup truck and topper which was originally paid for by [Midwest]. [Wiley] agrees that any and all costs relative to the present damage to his pickup truck caused by the hydraulic lift shall be paid for solely by [Wiley] and no further claims shall be made of [Midwest] or its worker's compensation insurance carrier for such items;

* * *

5. In addition to the foregoing terms, the parties hereto further agree that this Application No. C-180134 shall be dismissed, without prejudice.

Appellant's Appendix at 61-62. The Board approved the agreement, and pursuant to provision 5 the Board dismissed Wiley's application for adjustment of claim with the Board.

In November 2010, Wiley filed a motion to reinstate his application. A single member of the Board held a hearing on Wiley's motion. The evidence presented included Wiley's testimony, invoices showing the costs of repairing Wiley's motorized wheelchair and chair lift, and a transcript of the deposition of Dr. Mark V. Reecer, who examined Wiley on two different occasions, along with a portion of Wiley's medical records offered during the deposition. Dr. Reecer stated Wiley's spinal cord injury resulted in paraplegia and bowel and bladder problems. He also stated Wiley's original motorized wheelchair, which was designed to handle uneven and rough terrain, is necessary for Wiley to get around in the rural area where he lives, and a chair lift is necessary in his vehicle to enable him to get in and out of the vehicle. Dr. Reecer determined Wiley's permanent partial impairment rating is 89%.The single member Board issued an order without findings of fact, declining to enter an award of additional payments to Wiley for costs arising from his wheelchair or chair lift.

After Wiley filed an application for review by the Full Board, the Full Board conducted a hearing and "having reviewed its file and the evidence herein, and having heard arguments of counsel" issued an order whereby it affirmed in part and reversed in part the single-member Board. Id. at 10. Specifically, the Full Board stated, in relevant part:

1. The Board has reviewed the parties' agreement of June 4, 2010 with respect to the provision of certain disputed supplies and equipment.

2. The Full Board finds and concludes that [Wiley] is entitled to payment of or reimbursement for the disputed expenses claimed with respect to the chair lift on his pickup truck.

3. The Full Board finds and concludes that at this time, [Wiley] is not entitled to the disputed payments claimed with respect to one of his scooters.

Id.

Wiley now appeals, and Midwest cross-appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

When reviewing an appeal from a decision of the Worker's Compensation Board, this court is generally bound by the Board's findings of fact and may consider only errors in the Board's conclusions of law. Niegos v. ArcelorMittal Burns Harbor LLC, 940 N.E.2d 323, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. When questions of law are presented, however, the standard of review is de novo. Stytle v. Angola Die Casting Co., 783 N.E.2d 316, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The interpretation of contract provisions is a question of law. Niccum v. Niccum, 734 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Unless contract terms are ambiguous,they are given their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. Controversy between the parties regarding interpretation of contract terms does not necessitate ambiguity in the contract. Id. When provisions of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they are conclusive and we will not construe the contract or look at extrinsic evidence, but will merely apply the contractual provisions. Id. However, if the language of a contract is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be considered. Bernel v. Bernel, 930 N.E.2d 673, 682 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Our paramount goal in interpreting a contract is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the parties. Id.

II. Findings of Fact

Neither the single-member Board's order or the Full Board's order contained findings of fact. Wiley requests we remand this case to the Full Board with instructions to provide findings of fact because without them "[t]his Court cannot adequately review the Full Board's decision" and it is "quite difficult for the parties in this matter to formulate intelligent and specific arguments for review." Brief of the Appellant at 11-12. In support of his argument, Wiley cites Indiana Code section 22-3-4-7, which provides that when the Full Board receives an application for review of a Board decision made by less than the Full Board, the Full Board shall conduct a hearing and "shall make an award and file the same with the findings of fact on which it is based."

In Stytle, this court addressed whether the Board is required to issue findings of fact when the facts are undisputed by the parties and only questions of law remain. 783 N.E.2d at 319. We concluded "under certain circumstances, the Board may forego its statutory duty toissue findings of fact when ruling on a motion to dismiss an application. Specifically, when the facts are not disputed and the parties present the Board with a pure question of law, . . . findings are not required." Id. at 320. Like Stytle, this case presents undisputed evidence and pure questions of law - the interpretation of contract provisions. Thus, contrary to Wiley's assertion that this court...