Wilfong v. Com.
| Decision Date | 16 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 2002-CA-000535-MR.,2002-CA-000535-MR. |
| Citation | 175 S.W.3d 84 |
| Parties | Raymond WILFONG, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Dennis Stutsman, Frankfort, KY, for appellant.
Albert B. Chandler III, Attorney General, Brian T. Judy, Assistant Attorney General, Frankfort, KY, for appellee.
Before JOHNSON, MINTON, and TACKETT, Judges.
Raymond Wilfong has appealed from the judgment and sentence of the Meade Circuit Court entered on March 12, 2002, which sentenced him to one-year imprisonment on his conviction for rape in the third degree1 and a subsequent three year period of conditional discharge as required by KRS 532.043.2 Having concluded that KRS 532.043 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine and that the conditions of Wilfong's conditional discharge as of this time have not deprived him of his right to due process, we affirm.
On June 7, 2001, a Meade County grand jury indicted Wilfong on one felony count of incest3 and one felony count of rape in the third degree for having sexual intercourse with his mentally retarded, 20-year-old stepdaughter. On February 20, 2002, before he actually pled guilty to any charge, Wilfong filed a motion requesting the trial court to enter an order prohibiting the Department of Corrections from imposing the post-incarceration, three-year conditional discharge term required under KRS 532.043. Wilfong maintained the statute violated the separation of powers doctrine, the right to jury sentencing, and the right to access to the courts.
On February 21, 2002, pursuant to a plea agreement with the Commonwealth which recommended a prison sentence of one year, Wilfong entered a plea of guilty under North Carolina v. Alford,4 to one count of rape in the third degree. The incest charge was dismissed. During the guilty plea hearing, the parties discussed Wilfong's motion challenging KRS 532.043, and the Commonwealth was allowed additional time to submit a written response to the motion pending final sentencing.5
At the final sentencing hearing conducted on March 7, 2002, the trial court denied Wilfong's motion, although the judge expressed reservations about the statute. The trial court sentenced Wilfong to prison for one year, plus a three-year period of conditional discharge following his release from incarceration upon expiration of his sentence or completion of parole. This appeal followed.
We begin our analysis by noting that acts of the General Assembly carry a presumption of constitutionality.6 A statute will not be invalidated as unconstitutional unless it clearly, unequivocally, and completely violates provisions of the constitution.7 "Moreover, the Commonwealth does not bear the burden of establishing the constitutionality of a statute, rather `[t]he one who questions the validity of an act bears the burden to sustain such a contention.'"8 The issue of whether a statute is unconstitutional is a question of law subject to de novo review.9
First, Wilfong alleges that KRS 532.043 violates the separation of powers doctrine by infringing upon the judiciary's duty to administer justice because it places unreasonable restrictions on the court's exercise of discretion. He notes that unlike most sentencing statutes, which provide minimum and maximum terms and permit the exercise of discretion within a range of punishment, KRS 532.043 removes all discretion from the trial court by imposing a three-year mandatory conditional discharge.
The separation of powers doctrine precludes each of the three branches of government from encroaching upon the domain of the other two branches.10 Section 2711 of the Kentucky Constitution creates three distinct branches of government and Section 2812 precludes one branch from exercising any power properly belonging to either of the other two branches. Section 11613 reserves to the Supreme Court the power to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice.14
The legislature, rather than the judiciary, designates the elements of criminal conduct and the penalty for crimes.15 The legislature is vested with the power to prescribe punishment for crimes and the judiciary's role is to impose sentences within the statutory limits prescribed by the legislature.16 The legislature has the exclusive authority to establish the punishment for crimes subject only to substantive constitutional restrictions such as due process, equal protection, ex post facto or cruel and unusual punishment.17 Consequently, we reject Wilfong's assertion that the General Assembly's enactment in KRS 532.043 of the specific penalty of a mandatory three-year conditional discharge violated the separation of powers doctrine by infringing upon the judiciary's duty to administer justice.
Similarly, we reject Wilfong's contention that the legislature unconstitutionally usurped judicial functions by eliminating the exercise of discretion by the trial court in fixing a sentence. While conceding that the legislature may restrict judicial discretion within a sentencing term range, Wilfong argues that eliminating such discretion entirely is forbidden. However, this argument is contrary to the plenary power of the legislature to set criminal penalties. "The legislature's discretion necessarily includes the power to prescribe mandatory sentences, even if these mandatory sentences restrict the judiciary's discretion for imposing sentences."18 The courts have no authority to impose a sentence contrary to that authorized by the legislature.19
Furthermore, there is no constitutional right to individual sentencing based on the exercise of judicial discretion. In Chapman v. United States,20 the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the argument that the legislature could not eliminate discretionary sentencing.
Such a sentencing scheme — not considering individual degrees of culpability — would clearly be constitutional. Congress has the power to define criminal punishments without giving the courts any sentencing discretion. Determinate sentences were found in this country's penal codes from its inception and some have remained until the present. A sentencing scheme providing for "individualized sentences rests not on constitutional commands, but on public policy enacted into statutes" [emphases added] [citations omitted].21
Thus, any judicial discretion in setting criminal penalties is derived from and subject to the legislature's power to establish criminal punishment. In turn, the courts are required to impose an otherwise valid sentence prescribed by the legislature and the fact that the sentence is a single mandatory term does not violate the separation of powers.22 Accordingly, KRS 532.043 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine by usurping judicial authority or by infringing upon judicial functions.
Wilfong further suggests that "public policy" cautions against allowing the legislature to create mandatory punishment for sexual offenders because it could lead to abuse in sentencing for other crimes. This argument raises the same issues presented in Wilfong's separation of powers argument. It is well-established that the enunciation of public policy is the domain of the legislature; the courts interpret the law and do not enact legislation.23 "The propriety, wisdom and expediency of statutory enactments are exclusively legislative matters."24 The court cannot invalidate a statute merely because it disagrees with the public policy embodied in the statute.25
As indicated earlier, the determination of penalties for criminal conduct necessarily concerns the consideration of various public policy interests that are peculiarly within the role of the legislature. In Harmelin v. Michigan,26 Justice Kennedy stated:
Determinations about the nature and purposes of punishment for criminal acts implicate difficult and enduring questions respecting the sanctity of the individual, the nature of law, and the relation between law and the social order. . . . The efficacy of any sentencing system cannot be assessed absent agreement on the purposes and objectives of the penal system. And the responsibility for making these fundamental choices and implementing them lies with the legislature [citations omitted].
Absent challenges involving specific constitutional or statutory prohibitions, this Court has no authority to invalidate KRS 532.043 on public policy grounds.
Wilfong also contends that KRS 532.043 is invalid because it infringes upon the duties of the jury. He correctly concedes that he has no federal or state constitutional right to have a jury fix the sentence or penalty.27 Further, Wilfong does not challenge the legislature's authority to eliminate jury consideration of that portion of the sentence mandating post-incarceration conditional discharge.28 However, he notes that KRS 532.055, the Truth in Sentencing Statute, provides generally for jury sentencing. Wilfong asserts that in order to fulfill its role in sentencing, the jury should be provided information regarding the statutorily required post-incarceration, three-year term of conditional discharge for sex offenders. He argues that KRS 532.043 should not be construed to prohibit informing the jury of the mandatory post-incarceration, conditional discharge term. He contends that such a procedure would illegally infringe upon the jury's duty in considering the indeterminate term of the sentence.29 However, since Wilfong pled guilty and was not sentenced by a jury, his request that this Court declare KRS 532.043 to be in violation of KRS 532.055 and the constitutional guarantee of due process is wholly without merit.30
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