Wilk v. Kochara

• Decision Date: 23 September 1994
• Citation: 436 Pa.Super. 258,647 A.2d 595
• Parties: Rose Marie WILK v. Shirley KOCHARA, Individually and d/b/a Don Wilk Flowers and Designs by Shirley, Appellant, v. PENN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 595

647 A.2d 595

436 Pa.Super. 258

Rose Marie WILK v. Shirley KOCHARA, Individually and d/b/a Don Wilk Flowers and Designs by Shirley, Appellant, v. PENN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 16, 1994.

Filed July 19, 1994.

Reargument Denied Sept. 23, 1994.

Caram J. Abood, Johnstown, for appellant.

Thomas J. Dempsey, Jr., Pittsburgh, for Wilk, appellee.

Before WIEAND, DEL SOLE and HUDOCK, JJ.

WIEAND, Judge:

While a petition to open or strike a confessed judgment was pending, the judgment creditor was successful in attaching funds in the hands of a garnishee. When the judgment creditor thereafter satisfied the judgment, the trial court dismissed the petition to open or strike the judgment as being moot. The judgment debtor appealed. After review, we reverse.

Rose Marie Wilk was lessor and Shirley Kochara was lessee under the terms of a written lease of a commercial property. When Kochara allegedly fell behind in the payment of rent, Wilk, on February 16, 1993, caused judgment to be confessed against Kochara for five thousand ($5,000) dollars, plus costs, pursuant to a warrant of attorney contained in the lease. On April 8, 1993, Wilk caused a writ of attachment to be issued and served upon Penn National Insurance Company. In answers to interrogatories the garnishee admitted that it had in its possession certain proceeds which were payable to Kochara by virtue of an insurance settlement.

On April 21, 1993, Kochara filed a petition to open or strike the judgment. Penn National thereafter forwarded the insurance proceeds to Wilk's lawyer, with a letter which suggested that the money was being sent pursuant to an agreement that the proceeds would be held in escrow pending the outcome of Kochara's petition to open or strike the judgment. Denying the existence of an agreement, Wilk's counsel proceeded to distribute the funds and to satisfy the judgment against Kochara. Wilk then requested the court to dismiss Kochara's petition to strike/open the judgment on grounds that it was moot.

Generally, the payment of a judgment and entry of satisfaction discharges the judgment. 20 P.L.E. Judgment § 471. Because the law contemplates an end to litigation, further proceedings may not commence upon a judgment which has been satisfied. Lance v. Mann, 360 Pa. 26, 29, 60 A.2d 35, 36 (1948). Where a judgment has been satisfied, there no longer exists an obligation which may be opened or stricken, and all questions of liability and damages are deemed extinguished. Sanctis v. Checco, 195 Pa.Super. 193, 194, 171 A.2d 542, 544 (1961), affirming, 24 Pa.D. & C.2d 121 (Allegheny 1960). See also: Linde Enterprises, Inc. v. Hazelton City Authority, 412 Pa.Super. 67 77-78, 602 A.2d 897, 902 (1992), allocatur denied, 533 Pa. 601, 617 A.2d 1275 (1993); Holzapfel v. Mahony, 367 Pa.Super. 93, 96, 532 A.2d 469, 471 (1987); Continental Bank v. Frank, 343 Pa.Super. 477, 483, 495 A.2d 565, 567 (1985); Kalman v. Muzikar, 304 Pa.Super. 503, 505, 450 A.2d 1025, 1026 (1982). Satisfaction of a judgment, however, may be stricken where it has been obtained through fraud or mistake. Neustein v. Ins. Placement Facility of Pa., 271 Pa.Super. 126, 129, 412 A.2d 608, 609 (1979). See also: Winfree v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 520 Pa. 392, 395, 554 A.2d 485, 486 (1989).

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