Wilke v. First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Eau Claire

Decision Date27 July 1982
Docket NumberNo. 81-1633,81-1633
Citation323 N.W.2d 179,108 Wis.2d 650
PartiesGerald L. WILKE and Diane K. Wilke, James V. Swift and Dorothy V. Swift, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF EAU CLAIRE, Defendant-Appellant. Denison L. WILLIAMS and Cherlon F. Williams, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF EAU CLAIRE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtWisconsin Court of Appeals

John D. Hibbard, Donald R. Marjala and Hibbard, Proctor, Schrage & Marjala, Eau Claire, for defendant-appellant.

John A. Kaiser and Losby, Riley, Farr & Ward, Eau Claire, and James N. Youngerman and Montie & Youngerman, Madison, for plaintiffs-respondents.

Before FOLEY, P. J., and DEAN and CANE, JJ.

CANE, Judge.

The issue is whether the interest-escalation clause in the parties' notes allows a federal savings and loan association to increase the interest portion of each monthly payment, in effect, reamortizing the loan over a longer period without changing the monthly payment. The circuit court concluded it does not. We reverse.

The named borrowers brought these actions, consolidated by stipulation, for declaration of their rights. They sought to require First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Eau Claire (First Federal) to roll back the escalated interest on loans to themselves and similarly situated borrowers. Because summary judgment was granted only in favor of the named borrowers, the notes between First Federal and the other members of the proposed class are not before us on appeal.

At the time the named borrowers financed their homes, First Federal used a note with the following escalator clause:

The interest rate provided herein may be increased or decreased at the option of the Association, with a corresponding adjustment in the required monthly payment. However, the Association shall not increase the rate of interest until after three years from the date of this note, and then only upon at least four months' written notice to the Promisors and Mortgagors who may then repay the loan within such notice period without penalty.

Effective April 10, 1972, federal regulations codified at 12 C.F.R. § 541.14(a) provided:

Installment loan. The term 'installment loan' means any loan repayable in regular periodic payments sufficient to retire the debt, interest and principal, within the loan term. However, no required payment after the first payment shall be more, but may be less, than any preceding payment.

The named borrowers purchased homes with loans from First Federal, closing after April 10, 1972. The loans were amortized over twenty-five years, but the note stated that the loan should be "paid in full" within the time prescribed by law, which at that time was thirty years.

First Federal mailed notices in November, 1979, informing the borrowers of an increase effective April 1, 1980. First Federal collected a higher rate of interest by increasing the interest portion of each monthly payment. Since the principal payments were smaller each month, each loan was effectively extended over a term longer than twenty-five years. The adjustment did not cause any of the loans to extend beyond thirty years, however.

The trial court interpreted the escalator clause to allow increases or decreases only by changing the amount of the total monthly payment. Since federal regulation prohibited raising the monthly payment, the circuit court's interpretation left First Federal with no way to increase the interest rate on the named borrowers' loans.

The named borrowers assert the increase in payment to be the only method of imposing a rate increase permitted by the clear and unambiguous language of the note. If the note is found ambiguous, they contend that the ambiguity should be construed against the drafter, First Federal. First Federal argues that the escalation clause in its note is not ambiguous, but is flexible, permitting it to effect increases in the interest rate by adjusting the proportion of interest to principal in each monthly payment and extending the term or by raising the monthly payment.

The circuit court did not think the escalation clause was ambiguous and, apparently, neither did the parties arguing the motion for summary judgment, though they could not agree on its unambiguous effect. Ambiguity exists when a statute or contract "is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses." Security Savings & Loan Association v. Wauwatosa Colony, Inc., 71 Wis.2d 174, 179, 237 N.W.2d 729, 732 (1976). A clause is not ambiguous, however, merely because its language is general enough to encompass more than one option. Broad terms may be used to permit flexibility in the choice of methods available without creating an ambiguity. The term "corresponding adjustment in the required monthly payment" is an example. The interpretation advanced by named borrowers, though reasonable, does not preclude application of the interpretation advanced by First Federal.

There is more than one way to make a "corresponding adjustment in the required monthly payment." It may refer to a change in the total amount of the payment, as the named borrowers argue. It could mean reamortizing the loan over a longer period so that a greater portion of the present payments would be allocated to interest. It could also mean reamortizing with the intent to collect only the number of payments that the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
53 cases
  • Piaskoski & Associates v. Ricciardi
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • July 1, 2004
    ...A contract is ambiguous if its terms are susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Wilke v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 108 Wis. 2d 650, 654, 323 N.W.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1982). When the terms of a contract are unambiguous, we will construe the contract as it stands without exam......
  • Henry v. Riverwood Clinic, S.C.
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • June 15, 1995
    ...of the document and avoid a construction that renders portions of the contract meaningless. Wilke v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 108 Wis.2d 650, 657, 323 N.W.2d 179, 182 (Ct.App.1982). Goldmann Trust v. Goldmann, 26 Wis.2d 141, 131 N.W.2d 902 (1965), involved a partnership agreement conta......
  • Craig v. Hastings State Bank
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • January 31, 1986
    ...merely because such provision is general enough to encompass more than one transaction or option, see, Wilke v. Eau Claire First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 108 Wis.2d 650, 323 N.W.2d 179 (1982), and Truck Ins. Exch. v. Marks Rentals, 288 Md. 428, 418 A.2d 1187 (1980), the virtually unlimited breadth......
  • Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. La Follette
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • July 27, 1982
    ... ...         The contract clause of the federal constitution, art. I, sec. 10, clause 1, ... , then Reserve has satisfied half of the first Allied Structural Steel criterion for an ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT