Wilkerson v. Par. of Jefferson

• Decision Date: 14 June 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION No. 20-3031 SECTION I
• Parties: DOMINIQUE K. WILKERSON v. PARISH OF JEFFERSON, ET AL.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

DOMINIQUE K. WILKERSON v. PARISH OF JEFFERSON, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION No. 20-3031 SECTION I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

June 14, 2021

ORDER & REASONS

Plaintiff Dominique K. Wilkerson ("Wilkerson") claims her former employer, Jefferson Parish and the Rivarde Juvenile Detention Center ("Rivarde"), terminated her because of her race and sex.¹ She sued the municipality that operates Rivarde, the Parish of Jefferson ("Jefferson Parish" or "the Parish"), as well as the Director and Assistant Director of the agency that manages Rivarde, Roy Juncker ("Juncker") and Christopher Trosclair ("Trosclair") (collectively, "the defendants"). She alleges, inter alia, race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1983, disparate treatment and retaliation under Title VII and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law ("LEDL"), and state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") and defamation.

Before the Court is the defendants' motion² for partial dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The defendants seek dismissal of Wilkerson's §§ 1981 and 1983 claims, Title VII and LEDL retaliation claims, her state-law claims for IIED and defamation, as well as her requests for adeclaratory judgment and permanent injunction. Wilkerson opposed the motion,³ to which the defendants replied.⁴ The motion is granted in part and denied in part for the reasons below.

I.⁵

Wilkerson was employed as a Juvenile Home Detention Supervisor for the Parish's Department of Juvenile Services ("DJS") from August 27, 2019 until February 19, 2020.⁶ When she started work in August, she was assigned to Rivarde and provided four weeks of on-the-job training under another Home Detention Supervisor, Viollet Troulliet ("Troulliet").⁷ After being assigned to the night shift in September, "Wilkerson almost immediately began to have issues related to [a] lack of personnel and training."⁸ She complained to supervisors about these issues,⁹ blaming many of the problems on Troulliet's mismanagement of the detention officers' work schedules.¹⁰

She alleges that these complaints were "met with continued scrutiny and complaints from Trosclair."¹¹ Things apparently continued downhill from there. After "Wilkerson persisted in her requests to management to address the issues she had brought to their attention, she began to be targeted, harassed, and scrutinized."¹²

Wilkerson claims she was eventually targeted and terminated based on her race, sex, or both. On January 13, 2020, Trosclair visited Rivarde; he was acting "on an alleged tip he received from" a white male colleague of Wilkerson (a fellow Home Detention Supervisor), who in turn relayed a tip from a white male Detention Officer, who reported "that multiple people were sleeping on the night shift."¹³ Among those accused of sleeping were Wilkerson and fellow Supervisor Brishawna Silby ("Silby") (who, like Wilkerson, is an African American female).¹⁴

The tip panned out—upon arrival, Trosclair "found two Detention Officers asleep on duty."¹⁵ Trosclair also claimed that he saw Silby "sleeping on duty when he peered through holes in the window blinds" overlooking the office in which Silby and Wilkerson were sitting.¹⁶ Wilkerson provided a written statement "advising thatshe did not see Silby sleeping;" she said the same during later hearings.¹⁷ Trosclair, in late January, "pressured Wilkerson to issue a statement confirming that Silby was asleep" that night, which Wilkerson refused to do "and was subsequently retaliated against."¹⁸

On February 11, 2020, "Wilkerson had a surprise performance evaluation that was conducted by Trosclair," who gave Wilkerson poor marks—a combined performance rating of "Below Expectations."¹⁹ Also on February 11, Wilkerson "received notice of a pre-disciplinary hearing due to the evaluation she received from Trosclair," to be held on February 13, during which "she would be allowed to provide evidence and her position."²⁰

On February 12, "Wilkerson filed a grievance against Trosclair advising of retaliation for her refusal to claim that Silby was asleep on duty" during Trosclair's January 13 visit.²¹ During her pre-disciplinary hearing on February 13, Wilkerson claims that she "was not provided with the opportunity to address the false statements and allegations made against her during the February 13, 2020 [sic]."²² Attending the hearing were "HR Representative Gretchen Tilton, Director [of DJS]Roy Juncker, Assistant Director [of DJS] Christopher Trosclair, and Home Manager Ralph Sacks,"²³ who was Wilkerson's "immediate supervisor."²⁴

On February 17, "Wilkerson sent an email to Juncker and Sacks outlining the untrue statements that were made about her during her pre-disciplinary hearing."²⁵ The email also alleged that "Trosclair failed to follow policy regarding [Wilkerson's] evaluation, that she has never received a coach and counseling and that Trosclair is discriminatory toward women, including Wilkerson[,] and that she is treated differently than other male supervisors."²⁶ On February 18, Director Juncker "signed Wilkerson's evaluation" (apparently the one completed by Trosclair on February 11), which noted that there were "no changes made [in Wilkerson's performance over the previous seven days]²⁷ and that employment would cease on February 19, 2020."²⁸ Wilkerson was terminated on February 19; "the reasons for termination were the same listed [sic] on her evaluation of February 11, 2020."²⁹

On February 28, Wilkerson "filed an intake questionnaire to [sic] the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights [sic] Office of the Governor," but she received no response.³⁰ She filed her charge of discrimination with the EEOC on June 12, 2020,and received her right to sue letter on August 10, 2020.³¹ This lawsuit was filed on November 8, 2020.³²

After the defendants filed their first motion to dismiss, Wilkerson was granted leave to amend her complaint.³³ She filed the present six-count amended complaint, which added several claims and factual allegations.³⁴ The defendants appear to challenge all claims raised therein except for her two Title VII and parallel LEDL race- and sex-based disparate treatment claims.³⁵

II.

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss a complaint or part of a complaint when a plaintiff fails to set forth well-pleaded factual allegations that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007). The complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. If the well-pleaded factual allegations "do not permit thecourt to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct," then "the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2)) (alteration in original).

In assessing the complaint, a court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and liberally construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999); Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 543-44 (5th Cir. 2010). However, courts "do not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions." Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, "the Court must typically limit itself to the contents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto." Admins. of the Tulane Educ. Fund v. Biomeasure, Inc., No. 08-5096, 2011 WL 4352299, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2011) (Vance, J.) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000)). "Dismissal is appropriate when the complaint 'on its face show[s] a bar to relief.'" Cutrer v. McMillan, 308 F. App'x 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1986) (alteration in original)).

III.

A. Count One: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1983 - Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Training

The defendants first attack count one of the amended complaint: Wilkerson's "negligent hiring, retention, and training" claims, which she labels as a "[v]iolation of42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983."³⁶ These claims are asserted against Juncker and Trosclair (but only in their official capacities) and Jefferson Parish.³⁷ Count one raises a number of claims that the defendants argue should be dismissed for a number of reasons. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

Wilkerson's § 1981 Claims May be Asserted Under § 1983

First, the defendants insist that § 1981 "does not provide an independent cause of action against local governmental entities such as Jefferson Parish,"³⁸ so her § 1981 claims must be dismissed as to all defendants. They are right and wrong.

True, a plaintiff may not "maintain an independent cause of action under § 1981" against local government entities or government actors sued in their official capacities. Oden v. Oktibbeha Cty., Miss., 246 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Jett v. Dallas Independent Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 703 (1989)). But that does not mean § 1981 is of no use to Wilkerson; a damages claim arising under that section can—indeed, if brought against government actors, it "must"—"be asserted by means of the § 1983 procedural remedy." Escamilla v. Elliott, 816 F. App'x 919, 925 (5th Cir. 2020) (reversing the district court's dismissal of a § 1981 claim, which was dismissed solely because the plaintiff failed to expressly invoke § 1983 as the procedural vehicle for the § 1981 claim); see also Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (...