Wilkerson v. Thrift
| Decision Date | 04 August 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:99CV127-T.,1:99CV127-T. |
| Citation | 124 F.Supp.2d 322 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | Richard WILKERSON, and Lemmer Wilkerson, Plaintiffs, v. C.D. THRIFT, individually, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer and as an agent of Defendant City of Rutherfordton, North Carolina; Robert Baker, individually, in his official capacity as a law enforcement officer and as an agent of Defendant City of Rutherfordton, North Carolina; Christopher Justice, individually, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer and as an agent of the City of Spindale, North Carolina; Chief Jack Conner, individually, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer and as an agent of the City of Spindale, North Carolina; the City of Rutherfordton, North Carolina, a municipal corporation; the City of Spindale, North Carolina, a municipal corporation; and T. Eugene Mitchell, individually and in his capacity as an agent of Defendant City of Spindale, Defendants. |
Michael Lee King, King & Stockton, Salisbury, NC, for plaintiffs.
John H. Watters, N.C. State Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, interested party.
Frank P. Graham, Roberts & Stevens, P.A., Asheville, NC, for C.D. Thrift, Robert "Bob" Baker, City of Rutherfordton, North Carolina, defendants.
Frank J. Contrivo, Asheville, NC, for Christopher "Chris" Justice, individually, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer and as an agent of the City of Spindale, North Carolina, defendant.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the parties' timely filed objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Max O. Cogburn, Jr. Pursuant to standing orders of designation and 28 U.S.C. § 636, the undersigned referred the Defendants' motions to dismiss and a motion for judgment on the pleadings to the Magistrate Judge for a recommendation as to disposition. All of the parties except Defendant Justice, who moved for judgment on the pleadings, have filed objections to the recommendation. The Court therefore conducts a de novo review of those portions of the recommendation to which objections have been filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state causes of action upon which relief may be granted.1 Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must Flood v. New Hanover County, 125 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir.1997); Shepard's, Motions in Federal Court, § 5.124, at 367 (2d ed.1991). Conclusory allegations are examined in light of the factual claims. Id. "To survive a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a complaint need only outline a recognized legal or equitable claim which sufficiently pinpoints the time, place, and circumstances of the alleged occurrence and which, if proven, will justify some form of relief." Id., § 5.123, at 366. If "relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations," the motion must be denied. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984).
The Plaintiffs in this action are the parents of Sterling Wilkerson who is the Plaintiff in another action stemming from the events of July 4, 1996. See, Sterling Wilkerson v. Hester, Civil Action No. 1:99cv130, 1999 WL 1564975 (W.D.N.C. 1999). According to the allegations of the complaint, Plaintiff Richard Wilkerson allowed Sterling to borrow his 1992 Chevrolet pickup on July 4, 1996. Later that day, Richard learned that Sterling had been stopped by law enforcement authorities while driving. Richard and his wife, Plaintiff Lemmer Wilkerson, drove to the location where Sterling had been stopped. There, they saw the pickup but their son was absent. Defendant Thrift, a police officer with the City of Rutherfordton, was there and Richard asked him where Sterling was but received no answer. Richard then walked over to the truck and was told by Thrift not to touch it. At that point, Richard told Thrift that he was the owner of the pickup and began walking back toward his car. However, Thrift grabbed Richard's right arm and forced it behind his back with such force that it was broken and he then sprayed Richard with pepper spray. About this time, Defendant Justice, a police officer with the City of Spindale, arrived and exited his car with his police dog. On Justice's command, the dog attacked Richard, biting him on the leg, arm, face and head. Defendant Baker, another Rutherfordton police officer, handcuffed Richard and placed him on the ground. Richard suffered another dog bite after he was handcuffed and on the ground. Lemmer was also assaulted by Thrift who hit her head against the side of the pickup.
The Defendants charged Richard with resisting an officer, assault on an officer and assault on a government official. Lemmer was charged with disorderly conduct, creating a public disturbance, assault on a government official and inciting a riot. Plaintiffs allege that due to a conspiracy and perjured testimony, they were found guilty of some of these charges in the state district court. Richard was found guilty of two charges of resisting an officer and one charge of assault on an officer. He was found not guilty of assault on a government official. However, when he appealed these convictions to the state superior court, the jury found him not guilty of all charges. Likewise, in the district court, Lemmer was found guilty of disorderly conduct, creating a public disturbance and inciting a riot. She was found not guilty of assault on a government official. When Lemmer appealed her convictions to superior court, the jury acquitted her of all charges.
The Wilkerson family is African-American. Earlier during the day, Sterling was stopped by a deputy sheriff. After the stop, Defendant Thrift arrived at the scene and assisted in arresting Sterling. In the companion action, Sterling alleges that the deputy sheriff broke his finger during the stop and arrest.
Plaintiffs have alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a result of the use of excessive force, illegal seizure and unlawful prosecution. They have also pled violations of state constitutional rights, a claim of malicious prosecution and two claims of conspiracy to violate their civil rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. The Magistrate Judge recommended the dismissal of some but not all claims. The objections will be considered sequentially.
The caption of the complaint names the individual Defendants as, e.g., "C.D. Thrift, individually, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer and as an agent of defendant City of Rutherfordton, North Carolina. ..." The Magistrate Judge concluded the caption was sufficient to put the Defendants on notice that they were sued individually as well as officially. Defendants object, arguing that Plaintiffs' complaint alleges only conduct taken in their official capacities; thus, they claim no action lies against them personally. Defendants also claim that in the companion case of Sterling Wilkerson v. Hester, supra, the undersigned dismissed claims against Defendant Thrift because no allegations had been made that he acted in anything other than an official capacity. However, the issue of official versus individual capacity was not addressed in that decision.
As the Magistrate Judge noted, "a plaintiff need not plead expressly the capacity in which he is suing a defendant in order to state a cause of action under § 1983." Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir.1995). And, contrary to Defendants' position, they may be sued personally for actions taken in their official capacities.
Personal-capacity suits ... seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law. Thus, "[o]n the merits, to establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right...." [T]he phrase "acting in their official capacities" is best understood as a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury .... The requirement of action under color of state law means that [the defendant] may be liable for discharging respondents precisely because of her authority as [a state officer] .... Congress enacted § 1983 "to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it."
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-29, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) () (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court recently stated, "State officers are subject to § 1983 liability for damages in their personal capacities ... even when the conduct in question relates to their official duties." Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 n. 24, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (emphasis added). Thus, despite the fact that the Defendants may have been acting in "the course and scope of their employment as police officers" at the time of the events alleged, they still are subject to...
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