Wilkes-Barre Tp. School Dist. v. Corgan

• Decision Date: 23 March 1961
• Docket Number: WILKES-BARRE
• Citation: 403 Pa. 383,170 A.2d 97
• Parties: TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. John B. CORGAN.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 97

170 A.2d 97

403 Pa. 383

WILKES-BARRE TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. John B. CORGAN.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 23, 1961.

Rehearing Denied May 18, 1961.

Thomas C. Moore, Gifford Cappellini, Wilkes-Barre, for appellant.

Michael H. Sheridan, Wilkes-Barre, for appellee.

Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and BELL, MUSMANNO, BENJAMIN R. JONES, COHEN BOK and EAGEN, JJ.

EAGEN, Justice.

The appellant, the Wilkes-Barre Township School District, sued the defendant, John B. Corgan, to recover for intentional damage to the surface of land resulting from trespass and deep excavations thereon by the defendant. Preliminary objections to the complaint in the nature of a demurrer were sustained by the court below, and judgment entered for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

For the purposes of this appeal every well-pleaded, material, relevant fact, and every inference fairly deducible therefrom must be accepted as true: Byers v. Ward, 1951, 368 Pa. 416, 84 A.2d 307.

On January 13, 1893, by deed from the Lehigh and Wilkes-Barre Coal Company, the plaintiff, the Wilkes-Barre Township School District, became 'the owner' of the 'surface and right of soil' of certain land in Luzerne County. The deed discloses that it excepted and reserved to the grantor, ownership in the coal and other minerals in, under and upon the land, and also the right and privilege of removing the same. The grantor was given the right to make and drive tunnels and passageways under the surface for the purpose of mining. The deed also stipulated, inter alia, that the grantor would not, in any event, incur liability for any injury to the surface of the land or improvements thereon, by reason of the mining and removal of the coal or minerals, and did not guarantee lateral or vertical support.

In April 1959, the defendant, John B. Corgan, a successor in title to the Lehigh and Wilkes-Barre Coal Company, without the permission or knowledge of the plaintiff, Wilkes-Barre Township School District, moved heavy machinery, consisting of draglines, onto the surface of the land and began operations digging up the earth and soil. As a result, the surface was disheveled and soil was removed, leaving a hole or a crevice one hundred and fifty feet in depth. These facts constitute a cause of action and the lower court erred in summarily entering judgment for the defendant.

The basic issue revolves around the proper interpretation of the terms of the deed involved. In construing a deed or a contract, certain general principles must be kept in mind. First, it is the intention of the parties at the time of entering in thereto that governs, and such intention is to be gathered from a reading of the entire contract: Philip Morris & Co. v. Stephano Bros., 1938, 331 Pa. 278, 200 A.2d 605; Maxwell v. Saylor, 1948, 359 Pa. 94, 58 A.2d 355. In addition, "Contracts must receive a reasonable interpretation, according to the intention of the parties at the time of executing them, if that intention can be ascertained from their language. (Citing cases). Where the language of a contract is contradictory, obscure, or ambiguous, or where its meaning is doubtful, so that it is susceptible of two constructions, one of which makes it fair, customary, and such as prudent men would naturally execute, while the other makes it inequitable, unusual, or such as reasonable men would not be likely to enter into, the interpretation which makes a rational and probable agreement must be preferred. ¹ If one construction would make it unreasonable, while another would do justice to both parties, the latter will be adopted": Percy A. Brown & Co. v. Raub, 1947, 357 Pa. 271, 287, 54 A.2d 35, 43. It is also beyond controversy, that a written document must be construed most strongly against the parties drafting it: Cities Service Oil Co. v. Haller, 1958, 393 Pa. 26, 142 A.2d 163. It is equally well fixed in the law that a doubtful reservation or exception in a deed will be construed most strongly against the grantor and in favor of the grantee: Bundy v. Myers, 1953, 372 Pa. 583, 94 A.2d 724; Sheffield Water Co. v. Elk T. Co., 1909, 225 Pa. 614, 74 A. 742. This rule applies with special force to a reservation or exception which amounts to cutting down of the grant: Klaer v. Ridgway, 1878, 86 Pa. 529.

The deed in issue 'granted, bargained, sold, aliened, enfeoffed, released, conveyed and confirmed * * *' to the grantee 'the surface and right of soil' of the land involved. These words were effective in passing and transmitting the entire title to the 'surface.' See, Act of May 28, 1715, 1 Sm.L. 94, § 6, 21 P.S. § 8, as amended. Other jurisdictions also so hold: Crookshanks v. Ranslarger, 1917, 80 W.Va. 21, 92 S.E. 78; McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 1939, 23 Tenn.App. 434, 134 S.W.2d 197. The term 'surface,' when used in law, is seldom, if ever, limited to mere geometrical superficies. Where, however, the surface is granted to one and the underlying coal to another, the 'surface' includes whatever earth, soil or land which lie above and is superincumbent upon the coal: Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 1927, 148 Va. 437, 139 S.E. 308, 55 A.L.R. 1376; Stonegap Colliery Co. v. Hamilton, 1916, 119 Va. 271, 89 S.E. 305. Therefore, the grantor conveyed complete title and right of possession in and to the soil and earth resting upon the coal. But, title to the coal with the right to remove it remained in and was reserved to the grantor. These facts are clearly established by the language of the deed. As to the method to be employed in the removal of the coal, that is something again. What did the parties contract in regard to this? How did they intend that this would be accomplished? Did they contemplate that, by virtue of the stated mining rights, the grantor was entitled to occupy the surface, mine the coal by intentionally removing and destroying the soil overlying it? This is the pivotal question and the answer is not specifically spelled out in the deed. Nor is there language from which the same may be implied. To conclude that such extraordinary rights were reserved and intended, one must necessarily read into the deed an intent that is just not there. Such a construction would violate every principle of law we have hereinbefore enunciated. It would amount to construing the reservation in favor of the grantor, stretching it and adding substantially thereto. It would be an unreasonable interpretation; one grossly inequitable and of a nature well meaning men would not likely bargain for. It would be inconsistent with the grant itself. Further, the standard of interpretation to be applied is the meaning that would be attached by a reasonably intelligent person, acquainted with all operative usages, and knowing all the circumstances prior to and contemporaneous with the making of the contract: Restatement, Contracts § 320; Clearfield Development Corp. v. Devonian Co., 1956, 385 Pa. 248, 122 A.2d 718. The excavations carried out in this case were, undoubtedly, those incident to...