Wilkes v. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 07 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:17-cv-47-J-39JBT |
| Parties | JONATHAN HARVES WILKES, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Jonathan Harves Wilkes is challenging a Clay County judgment of conviction for aggravated manslaughter of a child through his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition) (Doc. 1). He raises six grounds. Respondents filed an Answer in Response to Order to Show Cause (Response) (Doc. 14).1 Petitioner filed a Reply to the State's Response (Reply) (Doc. 16). See Order (Doc. 5).
The six grounds are: (1) a violation of substantive due process rights, claiming Petitioner's actions did not constitute the crime of aggravated manslaughter of a child; (2) the ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion to dismiss the charge; (3) the ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to inform Petitioner of the defenses to the charge before Petitioner entered his plea; (4) the ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to the inclusion of sentencing points for causing the death of the victim; (5) the trial court's commitment of a fundamental error for imposing victim-injury points without a finding by a jury that the victim's death was the direct result of the Petitioner's criminal actions; and (6) the ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion in limine.
The pertinent facts are fully developed in this record or the record otherwise precludes habeas relief; therefore, the Court is able to "adequately assess [Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1034 (2004). As the record refutes the asserted factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007).Petitioner has not met his burden demonstrating a need for an evidentiary hearing. Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1120 (2012).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This statute "imposes important limitations on the power of federal courts to overturn the judgments of state courts in criminal cases." Shoop v. Hill, 139 S.Ct. 504, 506 (2019) (per curiam). The AEDPA statute: "respects the authority and ability of state courts and their dedication to the protection of constitutional rights." Id. Therefore, "[u]nder AEDPA, error is not enough; even clear error is not enough." Meders v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, Nos. 14-14178; 15-14734, 2019 WL 101161, at *10 (11th Cir. Jan. 4, 2019) (citing Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S.Ct. 1726, 1728 (2017) (per curiam)).
Applying the statute as amended by AEDPA, federal courts may grant habeas relief:
only when the adjudication of a federal constitutional claim "on the merits in State court proceedings" either "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the Statecourt proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "This narrow evaluation is highly deferential, for a state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision." Morrow v. Warden, 886 F.3d 1138, 1146-47 (11th Cir. 2018) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011)). The decision of a state court is "contrary to" federal law only if it "contradicts the United States Supreme Court on a settled question of law or holds differently than did that Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Cummings v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1355 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The decision of a state court "involves an unreasonable application of federal law if it identifies the correct governing legal principle as articulated by the United States Supreme Court, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the petitioner's case, unreasonably extends the principle to a new context where it should not apply, or unreasonably refuses to extend it to a new context where it should apply." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "The question ... is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was correct but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 898 F.3d 1314, 1321 (11th Cir. 2018).
A district court is charged with reviewing the conclusions of the state court, deferring to the state court decisions, and granting habeas relief only if the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved anunreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. "Clear error will not suffice." Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S.Ct. at 1728. This formidable barrier to habeas relief is very difficult to overcome as highly deferential AEDPA deference is due, unless the petitioner shows the state court's ruling was so lacking in justification that there was error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. Thus, if some fairminded jurists could agree with the lower court's decision, habeas relief must be denied. Meders, 2019 WL 101161, at *10.
When reviewing a state court's decision, AEDPA deference is not based on the "specificity or thoroughness" of the decision; indeed, the "no-grading-papers, anti-flyspecking rule remains the law of the circuit." Meders, 2019 WL 101161, at *12. Consequently, a district court is not obliged to "flyspeck the state court order or grade it." Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 898 F.3d at 1345. Notably, AEDPA deference is given even if no rationale or reasoning is provided. Meders, 2019 WL 101161, at *12 (citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011)).
A district court should afford a presumption of correctness to state trial and appellate courts' factual determinations. Pope v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 680 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003)), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1233 (2013). Thusly, Morrow v. Warden, 886 F.3d 1138, 1147 (11th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 19, 2018) (No. 18-6409).
The Supreme Court of the United States has imparted its wisdom in employing AEDPA review:
"Deciding whether a state court's decision 'involved' an unreasonable application of federal law or 'was based on' an unreasonable determination of fact requires the federal habeas court to 'train its attention on the particular reasons—both legal and factual—why state courts rejected a state prisoner's federal claims.'" Wilson v. Sellers, --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1191-92, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2018) (). The Supreme Court recently held that, when the relevant state court decision is not accompanied by a reasoned opinion explaining why relief was denied, "the federal court should 'look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale" and "presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning." Id. at 1192. "[T]he State may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state court's decision." Id.
Johnson v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 737 F. App'x 438, 441 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
If the last state court to decide a federal claim provides an explanation for its merits-based decision in a reasoned opinion, the district court simply reviews the specific reasons given by the state court and defers to those reasons, if they are reasonable.But, if no explanation is provided, for example, the opinion simply states affirmed or denied, the district court should "look through" the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that provides relevant rationale. The district court presumes the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning as the lower court, however, this presumption is not irrebutable, as strong evidence may refute it. See Kernan v. Hinojosa, 136 S.Ct. 1603, 1606 (2016) (per curiam). In an effort to rebut the presumption, the state may attempt to show the higher state court relied or most likely relied on different grounds than the lower state court, "such as alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed." Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) (Wilson).
To prevail on his Sixth Amendment claims, Petitioner must satisfy the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), requiring that he show both deficient performance (counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness) and prejudice (there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different). See Brewster v. Hetzel, No. 16-16350, 2019 WL 272835, at *6 (11th Cir. Jan. 22, 2019) (...
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