Wilkins v. Conn. Childbirth & Women's Ctr.

• Decision Date: 09 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. 18998.,18998.
• Citation: 104 A.3d 671,314 Conn. 709
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Kristin WILKINS et al. v. CONNECTICUT CHILDBIRTH AND WOMEN'S CENTER et al.

314 Conn. 709

104 A.3d 671

Kristin WILKINS et al.

v.CONNECTICUT CHILDBIRTH AND WOMEN'S CENTER et al.

No. 18998.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 25, 2014.

Decided Dec. 9, 2014.

Carey B. Reilly, with whom, on the brief, was David M. Bernard, Bridgeport, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Matthew M. Sconziano, Bridgeport, for the appellees (defendants).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.

Opinion

EVELEIGH, J.

The plaintiff Kristin Wilkins¹ appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court dismissing her medical malpractice action against the defendants, Connecticut Childbirth & Women's Center (Connecticut Childbirth) and Women's Health Associates, P.C. (Women's Health), on the basis of the plaintiff's failure to comply with the requirements of General Statutes § 52–190a.² Because the plaintiff brought this action against the defendants principally on the basis of vicariously liability for the alleged negligence of specified employees or agents, namely, certain certified nurse-midwives, we conclude that § 52–190a (a) required the plaintiff to supply an opinion letter authored by a similar health care provider as defined by General Statutes § 52–184c (c), namely, someone who is certified in the same specialty as those nurse-midwives. Because the plaintiff provided an opinion letter of a physician who is board certified in obstetrics, which is the same specialty practiced by the nurse-midwives, we conclude that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing this action pursuant to § 52–190a (c). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. “On June 11, 2009, the plaintiff filed this medical malpractice action based on alleged negligence on the part of employees or agents of the defendants during the April 17, 2007 delivery of her child, and, subsequently, at postpartum office visits. The plaintiff alleges in her complaint that Connecticut Childbirth is a medical facility that is staffed by various health care providers, including physicians, [nurse-midwives], surgeons and nurses, who specialize in providing obstetrical and gynecological care. Women's Health owned, operated, controlled and/or had a financial interest in Connecticut Childbirth. The plaintiff alleges that Katy Maker, Catherine Parisi and Catherine Gallagher, who are certified [nurse-midwives], and Carly Detterman, who was a registered nurse and midwife in training at the time treatment was rendered to the plaintiff, were agents or employees of the [defendants] who negligently failed to diagnose and to treat a fourth degree tear of the plaintiff's vaginal tissue, perineal skin and anal sphincter at the time of delivery and during postpartum checkups. As a result of that alleged negligence, the plaintiff has allegedly sustained severe and permanent injuries, and consequently, her husband has sustained a loss of her consortium.

“With her complaint, the plaintiff submitted a good faith certificate signed by her attorney, who represented therein that he had made a reasonable inquiry into the circumstances of the plaintiff's claims and that, on the basis of that inquiry, he believed in good faith that the defendants and their servants, agents or employees had been negligent in their treatment of the plaintiff. Additionally, the plaintiff submitted a document entitled ‘Physician's Opinion Pursuant to [General Statutes §] 52–190a.’ The opinion letter was authored by a board certified obstetrician and gynecologist, who opined, in relevant part, that Maker, one of the certified [nurse-midwives] who cared for the plaintiff, ‘departed from the accepted standard of care when she failed to diagnose and repair the fourth degree tear following delivery of the fetus and at the postpartum visits.’ In conclusion, the author of the letter stated: ‘[I]t is my opinion that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence on the part of ... Maker and Connecticut Childbirth and Women's Center.’

“On August 6, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action, pursuant to § 52–190a (c), on the ground that the physician opinion letter submitted by the plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of § 52–190a (a) because the letter was not authored by a similar health care provider, as defined in § 52–184c (c). Because the care rendered to the plaintiff was provided by certified [nurse-midwives] or, as the allegations pertain to Detterman, by a registered nurse, the defendants argued that the plaintiff was required to submit an opinion letter authored by a certified [nurse-midwife] or a registered nurse in order to satisfy § 52–184c (c). The plaintiff filed an objection, claiming that an obstetrician ‘is considered to be a “similar health care provider” for purposes of ... § 52–184c (c) when rendering an opinion regarding the standard of care applicable to certified [nurse-midwives] ... and registered nurses ... engaged in supervising a patient's labor and delivery....’ The plaintiff also argued that the defendants are institutions to which § 52–184c does not apply, because the definitions of ‘similar health care provider’ set forth therein refer to individuals, not institutions. The [trial] court agreed with the defendants, finding that the plaintiff's action was based on the negligence of the individuals who cared for the plaintiff, and the defendants as the employers of those individuals. On that basis, the [trial] court concluded that the plaintiff was required, pursuant to §§ 52–190a (a) and 52–184c (c), to submit an opinion letter by an individual who is trained, experienced and certified in [nurse-midwifery] or nursing. Because the plaintiff failed to do so, the [trial] court dismissed her action.” (Footnote omitted.) Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women's Center, 135 Conn.App. 679, 683–85, 42 A.3d 521 (2012). The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court improperly dismissed her complaint on the ground that she did not submit an opinion letter authored by a similar health care provider. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the opinion letter that she submitted, which was authored by an obstetrician, was sufficient to meet the requirements of §§ 52–190a (a) and 52–184c.³ Id., at 685–86, 42 A.3d 521.

The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that “[b]ecause the plaintiff failed to submit an opinion letter authored by an individual who is trained, experienced and certified in [nurse-midwifery] or nursing, the court properly concluded that she failed to meet the requirements of § 52–190a (a).” Id., at 690, 42 A.3d 521.

The plaintiff filed a petition for certification to appeal, which we granted, limited to the following question: “Did the Appellate Court properly determine that, in this action against institutional defendants ... § 52–190a (a) required that the ‘similar health care provider’ opinion letter be authored by a person trained and experienced in [nurse-midwifery] or nursing, instead of being written by a board certified obstetrician and gynecologist?” Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women's Center, 305 Conn. 921, 47 A.3d 881 (2012).

On appeal to this court, the plaintiff asserts that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the judgment of the trial court and improperly concluded that § 52–190a (a) required the plaintiff to provide an opinion letter authored by a person certified in nurse-midwifery or nursing instead of a board certified obstetrician and gynecologist. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that § 52–190a (a) does not require a good faith opinion certification for a claim against an institutional defendant. The plaintiff further claims that, even if § 52–190a (a) requires a good faith opinion certification for institutional defendants, the opinion letter submitted from a board certified obstetrician and gynecologist meets the requirements of § 52–184c (c). The plaintiff also claims that the use of a good faith opinion certification from a physician who is board certified in obstetrics and gynecology satisfies the purpose of § 52–190a (a). In response, the defendants assert that the Appellate Court properly affirmed the judgment of the trial court and properly concluded that §§ 52–190a (a) and 52–184c (c) required the plaintiff to provide an opinion letter authored by a person certified in nurse-midwifery or nursing. Specifically, the defendants claim that a good faith opinion certification is required for an institutional defendant and that, in the present case, a physician who is board certified in obstetrics and gynecology does not meet the definition of a “ ‘similar health care provider’ ” in § 52–184c (c). Although we conclude that the plaintiff was required to submit an opinion letter in accordance with § 52–184c (c), we agree with the plaintiff that her letter satisfied her obligations and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

Before addressing the plaintiff's claims on appeal, we address the applicable standard of review, which is well settled. “A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.... [O]ur review of the court's ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [determination] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo.... When a ... court decides a ... question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light.... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.... The motion to dismiss ... admits all facts which are well pleaded,...