Wilkins v. Perales

• Decision Date: 18 March 1985
• Citation: 128 Misc.2d 265,487 N.Y.S.2d 961
• Parties: Joseph A. WILKINS, John A. Gross, Adrienne J. Lesponne, and Katherine Butler Watts, on their own behalves and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and The Bronx Homeless Shelter Task Force, on its own behalf and on behalf of its members, Plaintiffs, v. Cesar A. PERALES, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, and Mario M. Cuomo, as Governor of the State of New York, Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 961

487 N.Y.S.2d 961

128 Misc.2d 265

Joseph A. WILKINS, John A. Gross, Adrienne J. Lesponne, and Katherine Butler Watts, on their own behalves and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and The Bronx Homeless Shelter Task Force, on its own behalf and on behalf of its members, Plaintiffs, v. Cesar A. PERALES, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, and Mario M. Cuomo as Governor of the State of New York, Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term New York County, Part I.

March 18, 1985.

Bronx Legal Services, 579 Courtlandt Avenue, New York City, for plaintiffs; Lucy Billings, Sean Delaney, Robert M. Hayes, Coalition for the Homeless, New York City, of counsel.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., New York City, for defendants; Howard L. Zwickel, Roy P. Moskowitz, New York City, of counsel.

EUGENE R. WOLIN, Justice:

The plaintiffs in this action are the homeless. Often afflicted with a physical or emotional handicap, these destitute men and women are relegated to living in either the streets or the shelter facilities operated by the City of New York. By this action they seek an order directing the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services (hereinafter DSS) to enforce certain regulations which establish maximum limits for the capacity of each shelter facility. ¹ The matter is now before the Court on the motion of the plaintiffs for partial summary judgment and the cross-motion of the defendants for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

At issue are two sections of Title 18 of the New York Code of Rules & Regulations (hereinafter NYCRR): Section 491.3(g)(1)(i) which limits the total capacity of each shelter facility to 200 beds and Section 491.10(o)(9)(iv) which limits the capacity in a sleeping room to 30 beds. At present the City furnishes shelter for thousands of the homeless pursuant to court order at armories and other large facilities throughout the five boroughs. It is conceded that the homeless population lodged at these facilities exceeds the capacity limits set in the regulations. ² Clearly enforcement of these regulations would have a dramatic and immediate impact not only on the thousands of homeless but on the City generally. The matter is further complicated by the prior litigation between the parties.

The availability and the quality of the shelter facilities and the services provided by the City to the homeless was first challenged in the Courts in 1979 (Callahan v. Carey, Sup.Ct. NY Cty, Index No. 4258 2/79) (hereinafter Callahan). After two years of negotiations and with the aid of the Court (Wallach, J.) a consent judgment was entered into by the representatives of the homeless, the City and the State. By its terms the judgment requires the City to provide shelter and board for each homeless man who applies for it. ³ The Callahan judgment was entered into in August, 1981. At that time the City was operating shelters at two large facilities: the Keener Building on Ward's Island and Camp LaGuardia in Chester, New York. Pursuant to the judgment the maximum capacity of the Keener facility was set at 450 men; no maximum limit was established for Camp Laguardia which then sheltered approximately 1000 men. The State had not yet promulgated the regulations, which are at issue here in their final form. However, many of the specific space requirements for shelter facilities which were part of the regulations proposed by the State, were set forth in an appendix to the Callahan judgment. Those requirements were referred to throughout the judgment and the City agreed to comply with those standards. The language of the judgment was also clear that nothing contained therein would limit or interfere with the authority of the Commissioner to enforce the Social Services Law and the regulations set forth in Title 18 of the NYCRR. Finally the Court retained continuing jurisdiction to permit modification or termination of the judgment as necessary. Modification became necessary shortly thereafter. In the early fall of 1981 the population of homeless in the City increased substantially. The number of homeless in need of shelter outstripped the space available in the existing facilities operated by the City. On October 21, 1981 after a hearing, Justice Wallach issued an order directing the City and the State to open an armory to be operated as a shelter facility. Initially two armories were opened for use as shelters and as the number of homeless has grown additional armories have been opened. At present six armories are operating as shelter facilities in the City. On December 1, 1981 subsequent to the original Callahan judgment and the October, 1981 order which required the use of armories as shelter facilities, the State promulgated final regulations for shelters for adults (Title 18 NYCRR §§ 491.1 et seq.). As part of the continuing jurisdiction retained by the Court in Callahan (supra), Justice Wallach has issued several orders modifying that judgment with respect to capacity limits, as well as more specific items such as the resident to shower ratio, lockers, bedding and transportation. While the standards established by Title 18 were implicit in these subsequent orders the regulations themselves have never been explicitly incorporated into the Callahan judgment.

In the instant action plaintiffs argue that nothing in the Callahan litigation constitutes a waiver of their rights under Title 18 and that the Court can enter an order directing the defendants to enforce the existing regulations. Plaintiffs also ask for damages incidental to their request for enforcement. ⁴ In urging dismissal the defendants advance several arguments: the plaintiffs lack standing; the issues involved are non-justiciable; the regulations are not applicable to armories and that the claims presented are precluded by the Callahan judgment.

Aid to the needy is not dependent upon governmental compassion but is a fundamental right guaranteed by the State Constitution (Art. XVII, § 1). The State has an affirmative duty to aid the needy and this constitutional mandate cannot be ignored in either its letter or its spirit (Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728, 371 N.E.2d 449 (1977)). The plaintiffs herein are recipients of aid in the form of shelter facilities and the regulations at issue concern the operation of those facilities. Title 18 was promulgated to ensure that certain minimum standards were enforced at shelter facilities. Clearly the purpose of these regulations is to protect the homeless. Insofar as the specific sections of Title 18 set the minimum standards for the adequacy of the shelter facilities, they affect the fundamental rights of the plaintiffs. The decision by the defendants not to enforce the capacity limits established by the regulations impacts upon interests of the plaintiffs which are protected by the Constitution. Plaintiffs therefore have standing to bring this action (Matter of Bradford Cent. School Dist. v. Ambach, 56 N.Y.2d 158, 451 N.Y.S.2d 654, 436 N.E.2d 1256 (1982); Matter of Fritz v. Huntington Hosp., 39 N.Y.2d 339, 384 N.Y.S.2d 92, 348 N.E.2d 547 (1976); Dairylea Cooperative, Inc. v. Walkley, 38 N.Y.2d 6, 377 N.Y.S.2d 451, 339 N.E.2d 865 (1975)). In addition where the administrative action complained of is a determination by the agency not to enforce its own regulations, the failure to accord standing to those affected would in effect raise an impenetrable barrier to any judicial scrutiny (Matter of Bradford Cent. School Dist. v. Ambach, supra; Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623, 334 N.E.2d 579 (1975)).

The concept of justiciability essentially involves a recognition by the Court of the constitutional limitation on its authority. By attempting to set broad policy guidelines, the Court usurps the function of the executive and legislative branches of government. Cases which involve the Courts in the direct management of administrative programs, e.g., the exercise of discretion in the allocation of resources or the establishment of program goals, have been found to be beyond the competence of the Court and non-justiciable (Jones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449, 380 N.E.2d 277 (1978); James v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 357, 397 N.Y.S.2d 934, 366 N.E. 1291 (1977); Matter of Abrams v. New York City Tr. Auth., 39 N.Y.2d 990, 387 N.Y.S.2d 235, 355 N.E.2d 289 (1976)). However a distinction must be drawn between a decision of the Court which imposes its own policy determination on the other branches of the government and a decision which merely enforces the individual rights which have already been conferred by the executive and legislative branches (Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247, 463 N.E.2d 588 (1984)). This case falls within the latter category. Not only do the plaintiffs assert a right under a broad constitutional mandate but they also seek protection pursuant to a specific statutory framework.

The declared policy of the State is to maintain adult care facilities, i.e., shelter facilities, of the highest quality (Social Services Law § 460). To this end the DSS has been given the comprehensive responsibility for the development and administration of programs and the implementation of standards of operation for all facilities. Concomitant with this the Commissioner of DSS is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the administration of all public assistance programs (Social Services Law § 34(3)(f)). The Commissioner has also been given the responsibility for the inspection and supervision of all facilities (Social Services Law § 461-a) and various enforcement powers (Social Services Law § 460-d). The regulations contained in Title 18 of the NYCRR are derived from this statutory framework and are the expression of the policy of the State on this issue. The discretion vested in the DSS to formulate policy, to choose from various options and to allocate resources...