Wilkins v. Superintendent
| Decision Date | 11 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 3:14-CV-585 |
| Parties | DANIEL E. WILKINS, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on the Amended Petition under 28 U.S.C. Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Daniel E. Wilkins, a pro se prisoner, on May 28, 2014. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the amended habeas corpus petition, DENIES a certificate of appealability, and DIRECTS the clerk to close this case.
Daniel E. Wilkins is challenging his convictions for robbery, criminal confinement, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 30 years on March 24, 2008, by the Allen Superior Court under cause number 02D04-0707-FB-98.
Wilkins filed a direct appeal. The Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed in Wilkins v. State, 901 N.E.2d 535 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), DE 17-7. The Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer. DE 17-3 at 2-3. The Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed the denial of his post-conviction relief petition in Wilkins v. State, 2013 WL 5777074, (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), DE 17-12. The Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer. DE 17-4 at 1. In this habeas corpus petition, Wilkins raises eleven grounds for habeas corpus relief.
"Federal habeas review . . . exists as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. ___, ___; 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
[This] standard is intentionally difficult to meet. We have explained that clearly established Federal law for purposes of §2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions. And an unreasonable application of those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice. To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.
Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. ___, ___; 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015). (quotation marks and citations omitted).
In Ground One, Wilkins argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a Speedy trial. The respondent argues that Ground One was not fairly presented to the State Courts. Nevertheless, "[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(2).
In Ground Two, Wilkins argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in connection to his speedy trial claim.However, Ashburn v. Korte, 761 F.3d 741, 751 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).
Here, because Wilkins is not entitled to habeas corpus relief even under a de novo review, it is unnecessary to address any of the procedural issues in connection with Ground One and Ground Two.
The Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, (1972), set forth the now well-established standard governing Sixth Amendment speedy trial challenges. That four-part test considers: whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay's result.
Ashburn v. Korte, 761 F.3d 741, 751-752 (7th Cir. 2014) (). However, all four factors of the Barker test are not equal. "Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Thus, "the length of the delay operatesas a trigger — a delay longer than one year triggers the full Barker analysis." O'Quinn v. Spiller, 806 F.3d 974, 977 (7th Cir. 2015). Conversely, a delay of less than one year ends the analysis.
Here, Wilkins was charged on July 6, 2007, and his jury trial was held on February 20 and 21, 2008. Wilkins v. State, 901 N.E.2d 535, 536-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). DE 17-7 at 2-3. This was less than an eight month delay. Because an eight month delay is not presumptively prejudicial, a full Barker analysis is not necessary, and Wilkins has not established a Sixth Amendment violation. Therefore neither Ground One nor Ground Two is a basis for habeas corpus relief.
Wilkins argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he prevented Wilkins from waiving a jury and demanding a bench trial. However, "there is no federally recognized right to a criminal trial before a judge sitting alone." United States v. Clark, 943 F.2d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 1991) (ellipsis omitted) quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965). Because Wilkins could not have a meritorious bench trial demand claim, he "cannot possibly demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his . . . counsel's failure" to demand a bench trial. Ashburn v. Korte, 761 F.3d 741,751 (7th Cir. 2014). Therefore Ground Three is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.
Wilkins argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he incorrectly advised him that the maximum sentence possible was 50 years. Wilkins argues that if he had known that the maximum sentence was only 30 years, he might have taken the State's 16 year guilty plea offer. However, as the Court of Appeals of Indiana explained, "fifty years was the maximum penalty he faced for the charges against him." Wilkins v. State, 2013 WL 5777074, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), DE 17-12 at 7 (emphasis in original). A misstatement by the trial judge at sentencing did not change that fact. Moreover, even if the maximum sentence had been shorter than he was advised, such an error would not have made it more likely that he would have decided to plead guilty. Rather it would have made it less likely. Because his trial counsel was not wrong and Wilkins would not have been prejudiced even if he had been, Ground Four presents no basis for habeas corpus relief.
Wilkins argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not object to the testimony of two eye witnesses whoidentified him at trial. He argues that "[i]n determining whether an identification is reliable despite suggestive pre-trial identification procedures, courts" must apply a five factor test. Cossel v. Miller, 229 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 2000). He argues that because the State could not meet that test, the objection would have been sustained and the testimony excluded. However, "Cossel is readily distinguishable [because] there is no allegation of any prior impermissibly suggestive identification procedure here." United States v. Miller, 795 F.3d 619, 628 (7th Cir. 2015). As such, it was not unreasonable for the Court of Appeals of Indiana to have found that "Wilkins cannot prove either substandard performance or prejudice." Wilkins v. State, 2013 WL 5777074, at *5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), DE 17-12 at 9. Therefore Ground Five presents no basis for habeas corpus relief.
Id. at 645, overruled on other grounds by Com. v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87, 987 N.E.2d 558 (2013).
However, no such testimony was admitted during Wilkins' trial. There is no mention of using the Simultaneous Latent Print Impressions method. Eric Black testified, "In the comparison of latent fingerprint evidence, we use a scientific method called ACE-V, and that's an acronym for A-C-E dash V, and it stands for analysis, comparison, evaluation, and then verification." Trial Transcript at 299.
David Young did testify that "Three (3) fingers placed on there appear to be placed in - in - in an order that appeared to me to be a simultaneous impression, in other words close enough together that they appeared to be laid down at the same time when an item was picked up, the spacing between 'em and just the...
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