Wilkins v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP
| Decision Date | 29 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:20-cv-54-MLB |
| Parties | Whitley Rachelle Wilkins, Plaintiff, v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Plaintiff Whitley Rachelle Wilkins sued Defendant Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, alleging a variety of claims after she was stopped at one of its stores on suspicion of shoplifting. (Dkt. 1-1 at 4-21.) Defendant moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. (Dkt. 42.) The Court grants in part and denies in part, dismissing all Plaintiff's claims except her claims for assault and slander to other customers.
The Court draws the facts largely from the parties' submissions. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Defendant filed a statement of material facts (Dkt. 42-7). See LR 56.1(B)(1), NDGa. Plaintiff responded to Defendant's statement of material facts (Dkt. 46-2).1 See LR 56.1(B)(2)(a). Plaintiff also filed a separate statement of facts that she contends are material and present genuine issues for trial (Dkt. 46-3). See LR 56.1(B)(2)(b). Defendant responded to Plaintiff's facts (Dkt. 53), as permitted by LR 56.1(B)(3). Defendant also replied to Plaintiff's response to its statement of facts (Dkt. 54), as permitted by this Court's Standing Order (Dkt. 4 ¶ r(2)).
The Court uses the parties' proposed facts and responses as follows. When a party does not dispute the other's fact, the Court accepts it for purposes of summary judgment and cites the proposed fact and corresponding response. When one side admits a proposed fact in part,the Court includes the undisputed part. When one side denies the other's proposed fact in whole or in part, the Court reviews the record and determines whether a fact dispute exists. If the denial is without merit, the Court deems the fact admitted so long as the record citation supports it. If a fact is immaterial, it is excluded.2 If a fact is stated as an issue or legal conclusion, it is excluded. See LR 56.1(B)(1)(c). Where appropriate, the Court modifies one party's fact per the other's response when the latter better reflects the record. Finally, as needed, the Court draws some facts directly from the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) ().
As a preliminary matter, the Court resolves some broad objections. Defendant broadly objects to Plaintiff's statement of facts as not in compliance with the Local Rules because it is an alternative statement offacts, rather than a statement of additional facts. (Dkt. 53 at 1-2.) The Court agrees. The Local Rules permit a respondent to submit "[a] statement of additional facts which the respondent contends are material and present a genuine issue for trial." LR 56.1(B)(2)(b) (emphasis added). Instead of filing a statement containing additional facts, Plaintiff essentially filed an alternative statement of facts. The Court excludes proposed facts in Plaintiff's statement of facts (Dkt. 46-3) that duplicate those in Defendant's statement of facts (Dkt. 42-7).
Defendant also broadly objects to Plaintiff's response to its statement of facts because it fails to comply with this Court's Standing Order. (Dkt. 54 at 2.) Defendant is correct. The Standing Order provides: "In addition to following the form instructions set out in Local Rule 56.1B, a party responding to a statement of material facts shall copy into its response document the numbered statement to which it is responding and provide its response to that statement immediately following." (Dkt. 4 ¶ r(2).)3 Plaintiff did not copy into its responsedocument the numbered statement to which she was responding. (See Dkt. 46-2.) But Defendant, too, violated the Court's Standing Order. The Standing Order also provides: "A party that chooses to reply to a response shall copy into its reply document its original numbered statement of material fact and the opposing party's response, then provide its reply to that statement immediately following." (Dkt. 4 ¶ r(2).) In its reply to Plaintiff's response to its statement of facts, Defendant did not copy into its reply document its original numbered statement of material fact and Plaintiff's response. (See Dkt. 54.) The Court admonishes both parties for violating the Standing Order. The rules are pretty clear and should be followed.
On June 2, 2019, Plaintiff was scanning merchandise from her cart at a self-check-out ("SCO") register at one of Defendant's stores in Atlanta, Georgia. (Dkts. 42-7 ¶¶ 2, 7; 46-2 ¶¶ 2, 7.) Defendant's Asset Protection Associate Charles Smith was watching Plaintiff scan merchandise on closed-circuit television ("CCTV") monitors in the Asset Protection Office ("AP office") and saw her under-ringing themerchandise. (Dkts. 42-1 ¶ 3; 42-7 ¶ 8.)4 One of Defendant's employees cancelled Plaintiff's transaction and directed her to the customer service desk. (Dkts. 42-1 ¶ 3; 42-5 at 56:18-22; 42-7 ¶ 8.)5 After checking out at the customer service desk, Plaintiff walked towards the exit. (Dkts. 42-7 ¶ 9; 46-2 ¶ 9.) Plaintiff stopped at the exit door where one of Defendant's customer service representatives, Cynthia Cohen, was checking purchase receipts. (Dkts. 42-3 ¶ 2; 42-7 ¶ 10; 46-2 ¶ 10.) Ms. Cohen asked to see Plaintiff's receipt. (Dkt. 42-3 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff testifiedshe found nothing offensive, wrongful, or unusual about Ms. Cohen doing that. (Dkts. 42-5 at 159:14-160:3; 42-7 ¶ 12; 46-2 ¶ 12.) Ms. Cohen, however, testified by declaration that Plaintiff was very nasty, angry, loud, and used a lot of profanity. (Dkt. 42-3 ¶ 3.) Video evidence shows Plaintiff gave Ms. Cohen a piece of white paper.6 (See Video 7 at 12:05:43.)
Mr. Smith testified by declaration that he was in the AP office, which is near the exit door, when he heard "a very loud voice complaining and using profanities to Ms. Cohen" so he "walked to the exit door where [he] found [Plaintiff] cursing and protesting at Ms. Cohen" as a result of her request to see Plaintiff's receipt. (Dkt. 42-1 ¶ 4; see also Dkts. 42-7 ¶ 14; 46-2 ¶ 14.) Defendant's Asset Protection Associate in training Maurya Rodriguez—who the parties sometimes refer to as the "lady inthe green shirt" or the "girl in green"—followed Mr. Smith out of the AP office to the exit door. (Video 4 at 12:06:03.) Mr. Smith asked Plaintiff for her receipt. (Dkt. 42-1 ¶ 5; see also Dkts. 42-7 ¶ 14; 46-2 ¶ 14.) Plaintiff offered to let him go through the items in her shopping cart but did not give him the receipt. (Dkts. 42-5 at 59:9-15, 67:15-21; 42-7 ¶ 19; 46-2 ¶ 19.)7 Plaintiff accused Mr. Smith—but none of Defendant's other employees—of racial discrimination and racial profiling. (Dkts. 42-1 ¶ 5; 42-5 at 163:9-164:2; 42-7 ¶¶ 17, 20; 46-2 ¶¶ 17, 20.)
Plaintiff exited the store, found a police officer outside, and asked for help. (Dkts. 42-5 at 68:5-69:19; 42-7 ¶ 21; 46-2 ¶ 21.)8 Plaintiff testified that, when she was exiting the store, Mr. Smith "put[] his hand out, at which point it inadvertently touche[d her] because that's how gravity works." (Dkts. 42-5 at 66:14-18; 42-7 ¶ 15; 46-2 ¶ 15.) She further explained: (Dkts. 42-5 at 66:18-23; 42-7 ¶ 15; 46-2 ¶ 15.) Plaintiff returned to the vestibule of the store with the police officer. (Dkts. 42-5 at 69:23-70:12; 42-7 ¶ 21; 46-2 ¶ 21.) Plaintiff followed the police officer into the AP office to look at the surveillance video. (Dkts. 42-7 ¶ 23; 46-2 ¶ 23.) No one prohibited Plaintiff from leaving the AP office in any way. (Dkts. 42-2 ¶6; 42-7 ¶ 24; 46-2 ¶ 24.)9 After watching the video, Plaintiff left the AP office and videorecorded Mr. Smith with her cell phone while in the vestibule. (Dkts. 42-5 at 150:17-21; 42-7 ¶¶ 23, 25; 46-2 ¶¶ 23, 25.) Plaintiff claims Mr. Smith pushed her as she was leaving. (Dkts. 42-5 at 74:16-76:15, 103:18-25, 140:24-141:6; 42-7 ¶ 26; 46-2 ¶ 26.) Plaintiff eventually exited the store with the shopping cart, put her items in her car, and returned to the store to return the shopping cart. (Dkts. 42-7 ¶ 28; 46-2 ¶ 28.) When Plaintiff returned to the store, she went to the customer service desk to get information about how to make a complaint. (Dkts. 42-7 ¶ 31; 46-2 ¶ 31.) Plaintiff then left. (Dkts. 42-7 ¶ 32; 46-2 ¶ 32.) She called Defendant's corporate number to complain when she got home. (Dkts. 42-7 ¶ 31; 46-2 ¶ 31.)
Defendant's Asset Protection Associate Cassandra Grandison observed the encounter and noted Plaintiff "was loudly complaining, using profanity, and accusing [Mr.] Smith of various racially motivated wrongdoing such as racially profiling her and violating her legal rightsbased on race." (Dkt. 42-2 ¶¶ 2-3; see also Dkts. 42-7 ¶ 18; 46-2 ¶ 18.) Ms. Grandison concluded Plaintiff "was angry because [Ms.] Cohen and [Mr.] Smith had asked to see her purchase receipts to confirm that she had paid for all the merchandise in her shopping cart." (Dkt. 42-2 ¶ 3; see also Dkts. 42-7 ¶ 18; 46-2 ¶ 18.) Plaintiff admitted she used profanity and became angry and irate. (Dkt. 42-5 at 161:7-163:8; see also Dkts. 42-7 ¶ 17; 46-2 ¶ 17.)
None of Defendant's employees used any profanity or abusive, rude language toward Plaintiff or in her presence. (Dkts. 42-7 ¶ 37; 46-2 ¶ 37.)10 Mr. Smith said he did not detain Plaintiff, accuse her of shoplifting, or initiate any further investigation of the incident. (Dkts. 42-1 ¶ 5; 42-7 ¶ 14; 46-2 ¶ 14.) Plaintiff testified Mr. Smith accused her of shoplifting African American hair products. (Dkt. 42-5 at 80:14-18, 106:10-23, 107:6-10.) Ms. Grandison testified by declaration that Plaintiff wasnever detained by any of Defendant's employees. (Dkts. 42-2 ¶ 9; 42-7 ¶ 34; 46-2 ¶ 34.)11
Federal Rule...
To continue reading
Request your trial