Wilkinson v. Forst

• Decision Date: 11 July 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. No. H80-755.
• Citation: 591 F. Supp. 403
• Parties: Bill WILKINSON v. Lester FORST, individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Public Safety for the State of Connecticut; Donald Long, individually and in his official capacity as Commissioner of Public Safety for the State of Connecticut; Austin McGuigan, in his official capacity as Chief State's Attorney for the State of Connecticut; and the City of Meriden.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

591 F. Supp. 403

Bill WILKINSON v. Lester FORST, individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Public Safety for the State of Connecticut; Donald Long, individually and in his official capacity as Commissioner of Public Safety for the State of Connecticut; Austin McGuigan, in his official capacity as Chief State's Attorney for the State of Connecticut; and the City of Meriden.

Civ. No. H80-755.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

July 11, 1984.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Matthew Horowitz,^* West Hartford, Conn., for plaintiff.

Richard T. Biggar, Stephen J. O'Neill, Hartford, Conn., for defendant State of Conn.

Thomas J. Hagarty, Robert J. Hebron, John W. Lemega, Halloran, Sage, Phelon & Hagarty, Hartford, Conn., for defendants Lester Forst and Donald Long.

John M. Massameno, Asst. State's Atty., Scott J. Murphy, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., Carl Schuman, Asst. State's Atty., Wallingford, Conn., for defendant Austin J. McGuigan.

Dennis A. Ceneviva, Corp. Counsel, Meriden, Conn., for defendant City of Meriden.

RULING ON DEFENDANT AUSTIN McGUIGAN'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, District Judge:

The question presented by this litigation is whether stopping and searching persons in attendance at a political rally in the absence of individualized suspicion infringes on rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff Bill Wilkinson, Imperial Wizard¹ of the Invisible Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan ("Klan"), brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983² alleging that the practice of stopping and searching all participants at Klan rallies in Connecticut violates his constitutional rights of free speech, assembly, association and privacy, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and due process of law. The constitutionality of the challenged practice turns on principles of general applicability and is in no sense a function of the personal views of the plaintiff or the values or policies of the Klan.

The Klan maintains its principal offices in Denham Springs, Louisiana, see Exhibit L ¶ 4, Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Exhibits (filed Dec. 12, 1983) ("Plaintiff's Exhibit ___"), but the organization is quite active in Connecticut. Since September 1980, the Klan has conducted fifteen rallies in the state, on both private and public property. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment and Dismissal (filed Dec. 20, 1983) at 1-3 ("Plaintiff's Memorandum"); Compliance with Order (filed June 22, 1984) at 1-2. Before twelve of the fifteen rallies, law enforcement officials obtained orders from the Connecticut Superior Court enjoining the possession of weapons within a designated area surrounding the rally site. All but the first of those orders authorized the Connecticut State Police and local police departments to stop persons approaching a rally, question them concerning their possession of weapons and, "where appropriate," search them. See Exhibits 4-8, List of Exhibits Submitted in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (filed Oct. 28, 1983) ("Defendant's Exhibit ___"); Plaintiff's Exhibits E, F & S; Compliance with Order, supra, Attachments 1-4.

The following table indicates the location of each of the fifteen rallies, the date or

                      Location              Date(s)              Property        Order
                    Scotland           Sept. 13-14, 1980          Private         No3
                    Meriden I          Mar. 21, 1981              Private         No
                    Meriden II         July 11, 1981              Private         No
                    Windham            Oct. 10-11, 1981           Private         Yes
                    Meriden III        Mar. 20, 1982              Public          Yes4
                    Danbury            Aug. 7-8, 1982             Private         Yes
                    Norwich            Aug. 11, 1982              Public          Yes
                    Canterbury         Aug. 14, 1982              Private         No5
                    Meriden IV         Apr. 30, 1983              Public          Yes
                    New Britain I      June 25, 1983              Public          Yes
                    Stratford          Sept. 10, 1983             Public          Yes
                    Wallingford        Apr. 28, 1984              Public          Yes
                    West Haven         Apr. 28, 1984              Public          Yes6
                    Groton             Apr. 29, 1984              Public          Yes
                    New Britain II     Apr. 29, 1984              Public          Yes
                

dates on which it was held, the type of property involved and whether an order permitting stops and searches was obtained.

Id.; see Plaintiff's Memorandum at 1-4.

Plaintiff contends that the practice of stopping and searching persons at Klan rallies in Connecticut "causes annoyance and embarrassment to spectators and participants," deterring members of the public from attending. As a result, plaintiff maintains, his efforts to recruit new members for the Klan and "to associate with persons of similar views so as to share ideas and maximize the impact of the organization on the political process" have been hindered. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 5.

Defendant Austin McGuigan, the Chief State's Attorney, has filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that plaintiff has no standing to maintain this action, that it is moot, and that it is not ripe for decision.⁷ In ruling on this motion, the court intimates no view on the merits of plaintiff's claims. See Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. Rather, assuming all of the material allegations of the complaint to be true, see Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174-175, 86 S.Ct. 347, 348-349, 15 L.Ed.2d 247 (1965), and construing the complaint liberally in plaintiff's favor, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236-237, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686-1687, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), the court must decide whether the complaint states any claim upon which relief may be granted, see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Only if plaintiff's claims are completely meritless can the case be dismissed at the pleading stage.

In addition, defendant McGuigan has moved for summary judgment, contending that there are no disputed issues of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In ruling on the summary judgment motion, the court will reach the merits of plaintiff's claims only if it first concludes that there are no material facts in dispute. In making that determination, the court is bound to "resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party," in this case defendant McGuigan. Schwabenbauer v. Board of Education, 667 F.2d 305, 313 (2d Cir.1981).

I.

A. Standing

To determine whether plaintiff has standing to maintain this action, it is first necessary to evaluate the nature and sufficiency of his interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Plaintiff must "allege some particularized injury that sets him apart from the man on the street." United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 194, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 2955, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12, 96 S.Ct. 612, 631, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam); see G. Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 1615 & n. 1 (1980); Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1, 19 (1984) (plaintiff must initially demonstrate "personal interest standing").⁸

The standing inquiry has several components. First, there must be a case or controversy, the "irreducible minimum" required by Article III. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 757-758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). This requires plaintiff to "show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-618, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 1148-1149, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973). The requirement that plaintiff allege a specific and concrete injury is designed to ensure that issues are framed in a factual context suitable for judicial resolution. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968); see Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2845, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2874, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (Blackmun, J.); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) (standing requirements are directed at "assuring that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends"). Allegations of subjective "chill" inhibiting the exercise of constitutional rights "are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm." Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-14, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 2325-2326, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972).

Second, plaintiff must show that the injury alleged is fairly traceable to the challenged action. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261, 97 S.Ct. 555, 561, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). Recent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that the requisite causal connection includes a showing that plaintiff's injury "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976); see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1667, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74-75 & n. 20, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2630-2632 & n. 20, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978).

In addition to these constitutional...