Wilkinson v. Johnson City Shale Brick Corporation

• Citation: 299 S.W. 1056
• Parties: WILKINSON v. JOHNSON CITY SHALE BRICK CORPORATION.
• Decision Date: 03 December 1927
• Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee

Page 1056

299 S.W. 1056

WILKINSON v. JOHNSON CITY SHALE BRICK CORPORATION.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

December 3, 1927.

Appeal from law Court of Johnson City; D. A. Vines, Judge.

Suit by R. E. Wilkinson against the Johnson City Shale Brick Corporation for compensation for injuries received while in the employ of the defendant. From the decree, both parties appeal. Affirmed and remanded.

Barnes & Lewis and Cox & Taylor, all of Johnson City, for plaintiff in error.

Miller, Depew & Lee, of Johnson City, for defendant in error.

McKINNEY, J.

By his petition filed herein, on February 17, 1927, R. E. Wilkinson sought a decree for compensation for injuries received while in the employ of the defendant.

The trial court, after detailing the facts, said:

"From the above findings the court is of opinion that the petitioner is permanently and partially disabled; that is, he had suffered a 50 per cent. impairment or loss of use of both eyes, as well as his mind, as a result of said accident and the injuries resulting therefrom, and that his disability is permanent and one-half total, and that under subsections (c), (d), and (e) of section 28 of chapter 123 of the Acts of 1919, as amended by chapter 84 of the Acts of 1923, petitioner is entitled to recover of the defendant the sum of $15 per week as compensation for and during 275 weeks from the date of said accident, amounting to $4,125, said recovery to be credited with the amount already paid petitioner of $180, and payable as hereinafter ordered, and it is accordingly so ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court."

The injury occurred on March 29, 1926. The defendant had petitioner removed to a hospital and given proper medical attention, and paid him $12 per week for 15 weeks. About the 14th of July, 1926, defendant advised petitioner that he could return to work, and had him to execute a release, in writing, in which it was recited that the consideration therefor was the $180 paid, medical services, etc. This release and compromise settlement was also executed by the defendant and it was presented to the circuit judge who wrote on same under his signature, "Approved." The petitioner testified that he did not know that he was executing a release, that the instrument was not read over to him, and that he knew nothing about its presentation to the trial judge for approval.

In the settlement the petitioner was not represented by counsel.

Three or four days after returning to work for the defendant, petitioner was discharged.

The trial judge found that the instrument referred to was read over to petitioner, but that he did not comprehend or understand same, and that the consideration paid was so inadequate as to fall short of a valid settlement, and that it was shocking to the conscience of the court, and was fraudulent in law.

Both parties appealed to this court. With respect to the effect and extent of the injury, counsel are as far apart as the poles.

For the petitioner it is insisted that his injury is due alone to the accident of March 29th; that he is totally permanently injured, and should be compensated accordingly.

For the defendant it is said that petitioner's mind is not affected at all, and that any impairment to his mind or his eyes is chargeable to his indulgence in alcoholic beverages.

There is some evidence to support both theories; and, without undertaking to detail the evidence, it is sufficient to say that we have carefully considered same, and, in our opinion, the trial judge most likely reached the merits of the case. We find there is some evidence to sustain his findings, and under the rule, in such circumstances, we cannot interfere with his decree.

With respect to the compromise settlement, such an agreement is not binding until approved by the judge of the circuit court. Vester Gas Range & Mfg. Co. v. Leonard, 148 Tenn. 672, 257 S. W. 395; Mangrum v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 153 Tenn. 209, 280 S. W. 1011.

Section 27 of the act is as follows:

"That the interested parties shall have the right to settle all matters of compensation between themselves, but all settlements, before the same are binding on either ...