Wilkinson v. Walker
Decision Date | 15 September 1923 |
Docket Number | 986.,985 |
Citation | 292 F. 395 |
Parties | WILKINSON v. WALKER et al. SAME v. MASSACHUSETTS BONDING & INS. CO. et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Stanley Boykin, of Forth Worth, Tex., for plaintiff.
J. A Templeton and Clay Cooke, both of Fort Worth, Tex., for defendants.
The plaintiff sues as the trustee of the Walker Grain Company bankrupt, for recovery on a $25,000 bond in the first suit and for recovery on a $40,000 bond in the second suit. The plaintiff and the defendant in the first suit are residents of Tarrant county, Tex.; the plaintiff and the defendant J L. Walker, in the second suit, are residents of Tarrant county, Tex., and the defendant Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company is a foreign corporation having an office and an agent in Tarrant county, Tex.
On the 7th day of October, 1918, the referee, upon an involuntary petition in bankruptcy against the Walker Grain Company, filed on August 16, 1918, appointed the plaintiff receiver for the said Walker Grain Company pending adjudication. Wilkinson qualified as such receiver, and was ordered by the referee to take charge of all of the assets and property of the said Walker Grain Company and administer its affairs under the orders of the referee, pending such adjudication in bankruptcy. Before the receiver could take charge of such property and assets, the bankrupt filed a petition for a review of the said order appointing said receiver, by the District Court, and pending the review of said order by said court the referee, upon petition of the Walker Grain Company, granted a stay of said receivership proceedings, conditioned upon the giving by the said Walker Grain Company of a good and sufficient forthcoming bond. In compliance with said order bond was given, reading as follows:
'In the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas,
at Fort Worth.
'
'The condition of this obligation is such that whereas, a petition for the appointment of a receiver of the Walker Grain Company has been filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, by the petitioning creditors herein, and the said matter having been referred to Hon. W. B. Paddock, referee, he, the said referee, on the 7th day of October, 1918, made and entered his order nominating and appointing W. W. Wilkinson, Esq., as receiver of the estate of the said Walker Grain Company; and whereas, the said Walker Grain Company has applied for a stay of the proceedings in said matter until the matter can be finally passed upon by the honorable District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas; and whereas, said stay has been granted by Hon. W. B. Paddock, upon the filing and approval of this bond:
Before such adjudication, however, and after the affirmance by the District Court, the bankrupt filed a petition to superintend and revise the order of the District Court by the Circuit Court of Appeals (260 F. 1022, 171 C.C.A. 669), and also applied to that court for a stay of the receivership proceedings pending the determination of such petition. The Circuit Court of Appeals granted the stay upon the giving of a bond in the sum of $40,000 by the Walker Grain Company. Such bond was executed and is as follows:
The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the action of the District Court. Thereafter, on the 22d day of November, 1919, the Walker Grain Company was adjudicated a bankrupt as of the 16th day of August, 1918, the date of the filing of the petition against it, and the receiver was made the trustee, and he is the plaintiff in these two suits.
The sum of $37,027.21 represents money and property that came into and was in the possession of the bankrupt as its own property at the time of the execution of this bond, and it is claimed that the bankrupt has wholly dissipated said sum of money and said property, and is unable to restore same or any part thereof, and has refused to restore same or any part thereof to the trustee, and that under the terms of the bond the defendants are liable for said breach.
The plaintiff has a second count in cause No. 985, wherein he declares upon the bond as a common-law right; there is no such second count in No. 986. In neither one of the petitions is there any allegation that the suit is one arising under the laws of the United States.
There is no apparent reason for the filing of two suits, since it appears that the same property was converted and kept from the rightful possession of the trustee; but these matters may be remedied by a consolidation of the actions and an amendment of the pleadings, if the plaintiff's counsel sees fit. There is no such diversity of citizenship as would give this court jurisdiction.
The defendants maintain that the bonds declared upon are mere voluntary obligations, neither authorized, required, nor provided for by any law or statute of the United States, and that therefore the suits are not suits arising under that provision of section 24 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. Sec. 991), which gives this court jurisdiction of suits arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.
The question presented is not without its difficulty. This difficulty is increased by the apparent, but not real similarity of the case under consideration with Lovell v. Newman, 227 U.S. 412, 33 Sup.Ct. 375, 57 L.Ed. 577. In that case Lovell, the trustee, brought suit to recover on a bond which had been given, not by the bankrupt, but by a third party, for the possession of certain cotton which the third party claimed. The third party challenged from the beginning the ownership and right of the trustee. In fact, the trustee was compelled to seek summary writs from the court for the taking of the property in question into his possession. The claimant executed bond for the property, which it claimed belonged to it. It was contended in that case, for...
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