Wilks v. Wilks

• Decision Date: 17 February 1912
• Citation: Wilks v. Wilks, 176 Ala. 151, 57 So. 776 (Ala. 1912)
• Parties: WILKS v. WILKS ET AL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

57 So. 776

176 Ala. 151

WILKS v. WILKS ET AL.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 17, 1912

Appeal from Chancery Court, Covington County; L. D. Gardner Chancellor.

Bill by Mrs. Bobbie C. Wilks against John R. Wilks, administrator and others. Demurrer to bill overruled, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Reid &amp Prestwood and W. L. Parks, for appellants.

Albritton & Albritton and Foster, Samford & Carroll, for appellee.

SAYRE J.

After the administrator, defendant John R. Wilks, had filed his inventory and an appraisement of the estate of his intestate but before any further steps had been taken for the administration of the estate, appellee, widow of the deceased and mother of all the defendants, who are children also of deceased, filed her bill in chancery alleging that she was interested in the estate and its administration, but that, by the false and fraudulent misrepresentations of her sons W. W. Wilks and John R. Wilks, as to the value of the estate and her interest therein, she had been induced to accept from them a sum greatly less than the real value of her interest and on consideration thereof to execute a conveyance to all the children of her entire interest in the real and personal property of the deceased. Shortly afterwards John R. was appointed administrator. The bill prays that the conveyance be set aside and annulled for the fraud alleged and that the administration of the estate be removed from the probate into the chancery court. The chancellor overruled a demurrer to the bill, and this appeal is prosecuted from that decree.

The bill is said to be multifarious, in that it would complicate the administration of the estate of decedent by the introduction into the cause of a controversy about the validity of the conveyance in which the estate and those interested in its administration, except John R. and W. W., personally are not concerned, and about which they ought not to be put to trouble and expense. But it needs only a cursory reading of the bill, disclosing the status above stated, to show that all the parties to this cause are interested in the administration of the estate and that the quantum of their respective interests is affected by the controversy as to the validity of the conveyance in question. Not all the parties defendant are charged with participation in the fraud, but it is charged that the alleged fraud, unless annulled by the decree of chancery, has inured or will inure to the benefit of all the defendants. Thus it appears that the administrator is not only affected in his personal rights, but the administration of his trust for the other distributees is affected also. Such being the case, the chancery court may with obvious convenience and propriety take jurisdiction of the administration and the controversy as to the conveyance in one cause. This court has heretofore sanctioned the conjunction in one suit of more distantly related controversies where all the parties were jointly interested in both controversies. Noble v. Tate, 119 Ala. 399, 24 So. 438; Baker v. Mitchell, 109 Ala. 490, 20 So. 40.

Siglin v. Smith, 168 Ala. 398, 53 So. 260, presented a different question. On the facts averred in the original bill in that case complainant was entitled to remove the administration into chancery. But she averred in her supplemental bill that she had been fraudulently induced to convey her interest in decedent's estate to persons whom she averred had no interest in the estate--to strangers, and this subsequent to the filing of the original bill. On these facts it seemed clear to the majority of the court that all other distributees, whose rights and interests were not questioned, ought not to be drawn into, and the ascertainment and distribution of their shares embarrassed and delayed by, a litigation with strangers to the estate about a conveyance in which they had no part or interest. It was thought that she might protect her interests by a separate, though perhaps more difficult, bill in chancery impounding the separate interest involved without affecting primarily the settlement of the estate or at all the shares of distributees. And so might the complainant in the case at bar; but no consideration of multifariousness requiring her to do so is found in the bill.

True, it may be determined after a while that complainant must be bound by her conveyance, that she has no interest in the estate, and that, therefore, she is not entitled to a removal of the administration; but in that event no harm will have been done, for the administration will have progressed in a court of ample powers without risk to the contested interest and without entangling any party in foreign difficulties. And in that event, also, the court of chancery, having acquired a lawful jurisdiction in the beginning of a proper subject-matter, will proceed to a final disposition of all equities and rights.

In the next place, the sufficiency of the charges of fraud in the procurement of the conveyance is questioned. It is said that for aught appearing in the bill, the representations made by W. W. and John R. Wilks were mere expressions of opinion made in regard to the value of the estate. It is said that it is not shown that they knew their representations were false, that doubtless complainant was as familiar with the affairs of her deceased husband as were her sons, the defendants alleged to have made the misrepresentations, and that, at least, she might have informed herself by inquiry. In large part these objections are answered by...