Will v. Hallock, No. 04-1332.

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Citation126 S. Ct. 952,163 L. Ed. 2d 836,546 U.S. 345
Decision Date18 January 2006
PartiesWILL ET AL. <I>v.</I> HALLOCK ET AL.
Docket NumberNo. 04-1332.
546 U.S. 345
126 S. Ct. 952
163 L. Ed. 2d 836
WILL ET AL.
v.
HALLOCK ET AL.
No. 04-1332.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued November 28, 2005.
Decided January 18, 2006

In a warranted search of Susan and Richard Hallocks' residence, Customs Service agents seized computer equipment, software, and disk drives. No criminal charges were ever brought, but the equipment was returned damaged, with all of the stored data lost, forcing Susan to close her computer software business. She sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, invoking the waiver of sovereign immunity, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, and alleging negligence by the customs agents in executing the search. While that suit was pending, Susan also filed this action against the individual agents under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, alleging that the damage they caused to her computers deprived her of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. After the District Court dismissed the first suit on the ground that the agents' activities fell within an exception to the Tort Claims Act's waiver of sovereign immunity, § 2680(e), the agents moved for judgment in the Bivens action. They relied on the Tort Claims Act's judgment bar, §2676, which provides that "the judgment in an action under [§] 1346(b) . . . constitute[s] a complete bar to any action . . . against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim." The District Court denied the motion, holding that dismissal of the Tort Claims Act suit against the Government failed to raise the Act's judgment bar. The Second Circuit affirmed, after first ruling in favor of jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. Under this doctrine, appellate authority to review "all final decisions of the district courts," § 1291, includes jurisdiction over "a narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the litigation," but are sufficiently important and collateral to the merits that they should "nonetheless be treated as `final,'" Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867.

Held: A refusal to apply the Federal Tort Claims Act's judgment bar is not open to collateral appeal. Pp. 350-355.

(a) Three conditions are required for collateral appeal: the order must "`[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits . . ., and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.'" Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144. Those

[546 U.S. 346]

conditions are "stringent." Digital Equipment, supra, at 868. Unless they are kept so, the underlying doctrine will overpower the substantial finality interests § 1291 is meant to further. Pp. 349-350.

(b) Among the "small class" of orders this Court has held to be collaterally appealable are those rejecting absolute immunity, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742, qualified immunity, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, and a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity claim, Puerto Rico Aqueduct, supra, at 144-145. In each of these cases, the collaterally appealing party was vindicating or claiming a right to avoid trial, in satisfaction of the third condition: unless the order to stand trial was immediately appealable the right would be effectively lost. However, to accept the generalization that any order denying a claim of right to prevail without trial satisfies the third condition would leave § 1291's final order requirement in tatters. See Digital Equipment, supra, at 872-873. Pp. 350-351.

(c) Thus, only some orders denying an asserted right to avoid the burdens of trial qualify as orders that cannot be reviewed "effectively" after a conventional final judgment. The further characteristic that merits collateral appealability is "a judgment about the value of the interests that would be lost through rigorous application of the final judgment requirement." Digital Equipment, supra, at 878-879. In each case finding appealability, some particular value of a high order was marshaled in support of the interest in avoiding trial, e. g., honoring the separation of powers, Nixon, supra, at 749, 758, preserving the efficiency of government and the initiative of its officials, Mitchell, supra, at 526, and respecting a State's dignitary interests, Puerto Rico Aqueduct, supra, at 146. It is not mere avoidance of a trial, but avoidance of a trial that would imperil a substantial public interest that counts. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468. Pp. 351-353.

(d) The customs agents' claim here does not serve a weighty public objective. This case must be distinguished from qualified immunity cases. The nub of such immunity is the need to induce government officials to show reasonable initiative when the relevant law is not "clearly established," Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817; a quick resolution of a qualified immunity claim is essential. There is, however, no such public interest at stake simply because the judgment bar is said to be applicable. It is the avoidance of litigation for its own sake that supports the bar, and if simply abbreviating litigation troublesome to Government employees were important enough, § 1291 would fade out whenever the Government or an official lost in an early round. Another difference between qualified immunity and the judgment bar lies in the bar's essential procedural element. While a qualified immunity claim is timely from the moment an official is served with a complaint, the

[546 U.S. 347]

judgment bar can be raised only after a case under the Tort Claims Act has been resolved in the Government's favor. The closer analogy to the judgment bar is the defense of res judicata. Both are grounded in the perceived need to avoid duplicative litigation, not in a policy of freeing a defendant from any liability. But this rule of respecting a prior judgment by giving a defense against relitigation has not been thought to protect values so important that only immediate appeal can effectively vindicate them. See Digital Equipment, supra, at 873. Pp. 353-355.

387 F.3d 147, vacated and remanded.

SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and Barbara L. Herwig.

Allison M. Zieve argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Brian Wolfman and Scott L. Nelson.

JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.


The authority of the Courts of Appeals to review "all final decisions of the district courts," 28 U.S.C. § 1291, includes appellate jurisdiction over "a narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the litigation," but are sufficiently important and collateral to the merits that they should "nonetheless be treated as final," Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The issue here is whether a refusal to apply the judgment bar of the Federal Tort Claims Act is open to collateral appeal. We hold it is not.

I

The complaint alleges that Susan Hallock owned a computer software business that she and her husband, Richard, operated from home. After information about Richard Hallock's credit card was stolen and used to pay the subscription fee for a child pornography Web site, agents of the United States Customs Service, investigating the Web site, traced

546 U.S. 348

the payment to Richard Hallock's card and got a warrant to search the Hallocks' residence. With that authority, they seized the Hallocks' computer equipment, software, and disk drives. No criminal charges were ever brought, but the Government's actions produced a different disaster. When the computer equipment was returned, several of the disk drives were damaged, all of the stored data (including trade secrets and account files) were lost, and the Hallocks were forced out of business.

In July 2002, Susan Hallock and her company brought an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, invoking the waiver of sovereign immunity, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, and alleging negligence by the customs agents in executing the search. The merits of the claim were never addressed, for the District Court granted the Government's motion to dismiss, holding that the agents' activities occurred in the course of detaining goods and thus fell within an exception to the Act's waiver of sovereign immunity, § 2680(e). Hallock v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 2d 361 (NDNY 2003).

While the suit against the Government was still pending,...

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388 practice notes
  • Lake Eugenie Land Dev., Inc. v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc. (In re Deepwater Horizon), No. 14–30823.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • July 16, 2015
    ...1528 (1949) —is “best understood not as an exception” to this finality rule, “but as a practical construction of it.” Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The doctrine supplies jurisdiction for a “ ‘small......
  • Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, No. 08–678.
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • December 8, 2009
    ...final judgment “would imperil a substantial public interest” or “some [558 U.S. 101] particular value of a high order.” Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352–353, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836. In making this determination, the Court does not engage in an “individualized jurisdictional inquir......
  • Shimari v. Caci Int'l, No. 09–1335.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • September 21, 2011
    ...on the ground of derivative sovereign immunity, was not “conclusively determined” by the district court as required by Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006). The denials of dismissal based on the political question doctrine and on Boyle preemption, as app......
  • SmileDirectClub, LLC v. Battle, No. 19-12227
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
    • July 20, 2021
    ...omitted). In its more recent decisions regarding the doctrine, the Court has repeatedly "emphasiz[ed] its modest scope." Will v. Hallock , 546 U.S. 345, 350, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006). "[A]lthough the Court has been asked many times to expand the ‘small class’ of collaterally ap......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
388 cases
  • Lake Eugenie Land Dev., Inc. v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc. (In re Deepwater Horizon), No. 14–30823.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • July 16, 2015
    ...1528 (1949) —is “best understood not as an exception” to this finality rule, “but as a practical construction of it.” Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The doctrine supplies jurisdiction for a “ ‘small......
  • Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, No. 08–678.
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • December 8, 2009
    ...final judgment “would imperil a substantial public interest” or “some [558 U.S. 101] particular value of a high order.” Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352–353, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836. In making this determination, the Court does not engage in an “individualized jurisdictional inquir......
  • Shimari v. Caci Int'l, No. 09–1335.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • September 21, 2011
    ...on the ground of derivative sovereign immunity, was not “conclusively determined” by the district court as required by Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006). The denials of dismissal based on the political question doctrine and on Boyle preemption, as app......
  • SmileDirectClub, LLC v. Battle, No. 19-12227
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
    • July 20, 2021
    ...omitted). In its more recent decisions regarding the doctrine, the Court has repeatedly "emphasiz[ed] its modest scope." Will v. Hallock , 546 U.S. 345, 350, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006). "[A]lthough the Court has been asked many times to expand the ‘small class’ of collaterally ap......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 firm's commentaries
  • This Week At The Ninth: Wait Until Next Time
    • United States
    • Mondaq United States
    • January 25, 2022
    ...the action," and (3) "be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Under the Supreme Court's decision in Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006), the third prong is satisfied if denying immediate appeal would "imperil a substantial public interest," such as "honoring the ......
  • This Week At The Ninth: Wait Until Next Time
    • United States
    • Mondaq United States
    • January 25, 2022
    ...the action," and (3) "be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Under the Supreme Court's decision in Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006), the third prong is satisfied if denying immediate appeal would "imperil a substantial public interest," such as "honoring the ......

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