Willacy v. Sec'y

• Decision Date: 18 July 2014
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 6:08-cv-619-Orl-31KRS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
• Parties: CHADWICK WILLACY, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

CHADWICK WILLACY, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

CASE NO. 6:08-cv-619-Orl-31KRS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION

Dated: July 18, 2014

ORDER

In 1991, Chadwick Willacy was convicted and sentenced to death for the brutal murder of Marlys Sather. Following several appeals, collateral proceedings and a re-sentencing in 1995, Willacy is now before this Court seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Having reviewed the Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief (Doc. No. 69) and supporting memorandum of law (Doc. No. 70), the Response (Doc. No. 75) to the Petition, and Petitioner's Reply (Doc. No. 80), the Court finds the Petition to be without merit.

I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The facts adduced at trial, as set forth by the Supreme Court of Florida, are as follows:

On September 5, 1990, Marlys Sather returned home unexpectedly to find Willacy, her next-door neighbor, burglarizing her house. Willacy bludgeoned Sather and bound her ankles with wire and duct tape. Hechoked and strangled her with a cord with a force so intense that a portion of her skull was dislodged. Willacy then obtained Sather's ATM pin number, her ATM card, and the keys to her car; drove to her bank; and withdrew money out of her account. Willacy hid Sather's car around the block while he made trips to and from the house. He placed stolen items on Sather's porch for later retrieval, took a significant amount of property from Sather's house to his house, and then drove the car to Lynbrook Plaza where he left it and jogged back to Sather's home. Upon his return, Willacy disabled the smoke detectors, doused Sather with gasoline he had taken from the garage, placed a fan from the guest room at her feet to provide more oxygen for the fire, and struck several matches as he set her on fire.

When Sather failed to return to work after lunch, her employer notified the Sather family of her absence. Sather's son-in-law went to her home and found a shotgun and several electronic items lying on the back porch. Inside the home, he found Sather's body. Medical testimony established that her death was caused by inhalation of smoke from her burning body.

Law enforcement officers conducted an investigation into Sather's murder, uncovering a large amount of evidence linking Willacy to the murder. Willacy's fingerprints were found on the fan at Sather's feet, the gas can, and a tape rewinder at Sather's house. Witnesses reported seeing a man matching Willacy's description near Sather's house and driving Sather's car on the day of the murder. Further, Willacy's girlfriend, Marisa Walcott, telephoned law enforcement officers after discovering a woman's check register in Willacy's wastebasket. Law enforcement officers recognized the check register as belonging to Sather and subsequently arrested Willacy. While executing a search warrant on Willacy's home, law enforcement agents uncovered some of Sather's property, as well as several articles of clothing containing blood consistent with Sather's blood type.

Willacy v. State, 967 So. 2d 131, 135 (Fla. 2007).

II. Procedural History

Petitioner was charged by indictment with first degree murder from a premeditateddesign, burglary, robbery, and arson. See Ex. A-20 at 3251.¹ Judge Theron Yawn presided over the trial. On October 17, 1991, the jury convicted Petitioner on all four counts. See Ex. A-21 at 3355-58. Following the penalty phase, the jury recommended death by a vote of nine to three. Id. at 3411. Judge Yawn sentenced Petitioner to death as to the murder count² and to imprisonment for a term of thirty years as to each of the remaining counts, with the sentences to run consecutively. Id. at 3461-76.

On direct appeal, Petitioner raised eight claims.³ See Ex. B. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the convictions but vacated the death sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing proceeding based on Petitioner's claim that the trial court did not give defense counsel an opportunity to rehabilitate a juror who said she was opposed to the death penalty. Willacy v. State, 640 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1994).

At re-sentencing, Petitioner was represented by new counsel, and Judge Yawn again presided. The jury subsequently entered an Advisory Verdict, recommending by a vote of eleven to one that Petitioner be sentenced to death. See Ex. G-3 at 491. Judge Yawn followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Petitioner to death.⁴ See Ex. G-4 at 614-24.

On direct appeal after re-sentencing, Petitioner raised eleven claims. See Ex. H. The Supreme Court of Florida denied each of the claims and affirmed Petitioner's death sentence. Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1997). Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was denied. See Willacy v. Florida, 522 U.S. 970 (1997). See Ex. L-3.

On May 11, 1998, Petitioner filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 with a special request for leave to amend. On March 18, 2002, he filed an amended motion for postconviction relief in which he raised thirty-one claims. The trial court summarily denied seventeen claims on September 24, 2003, and granted an evidentiary hearing as to the remaining claims. See Ex. M-17 at 2294-2313. An evidentiary hearing was held, and the trial court entered an order on November 19, 2004, denying the remaining claims. See Ex. M-19 at 2545-2586.

Petitioner appealed the denial, raising seven claims, and also submitted a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Ex. N. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the denial of the motion for postconviction relief and denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Willacy v. State, 967 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 2007). Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States, which was denied. See Willacy v. Florida, 552 U.S. 1265 (2008); Ex. U-3.

On September 29, 2009, Petitioner filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Florida, which was denied on March 19, 2010. See Ex. U-3 and Ex. Y.

On November 10, 2010, Petitioner filed a second motion for postconviction relief. See Ex. AA-2. The trial court entered an order on December 13, 2010, denying the motion as successive. See Ex. AA-5. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed per curiam on April 26, 2012. See Willacy v. State, 90 So. 3d 822 (Fla. 2012); Ex. AA-9. The Supreme Court of the United States denied Petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari. See Willacy v. State, 133 S. Ct. 998 (2013); Ex. AA-12. This case was initiated on April 22, 2008, but was stayed on May 13, 2011 (Doc. No. 45) so Petitioner could exhaust a claim in the state courts.

III. GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 889-90 (11^th Cir. 2003). The AEDPA "establishes a more deferential standard of review ofstate habeas judgments," Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11^th Cir. 2001), in order to "prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002); see also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (recognizing that the federal habeas court's evaluation of state-court rulings is highly deferential and that state-court decisions must be given the benefit of the doubt).

A. Standard of Review Under the AEDPA

Pursuant to the AEDPA, habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The phrase "clearly established Federal law," encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).

"[S]ection 2254(d)(1) provides two separate bases for reviewing state court decisions; the 'contrary to' and 'unreasonable application' clauses articulate independent considerations a federal court must consider." Maharaj v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005). The meaning of the clauses was discussed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 835 (11th Cir. 2001):

Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the United States Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the United States Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

If the federal court concludes that the state court applied federal law incorrectly, habeas relief is appropriate only if that application was "objectively unreasonable." Id.

Finally, under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the state court's decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." A determination of a factual issue made by a state court, however, shall be presumed correct, and the habeas petitioner shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of...