Willard v. Willard

• Decision Date: 02 May 1892
• Citation: 12 S.Ct. 818,145 U.S. 116,36 L.Ed. 644
• Parties: WILLARD v. WILLARD
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

145 U.S. 116

12 S.Ct. 818

36 L.Ed. 644

WILLARD v. WILLARD.

May 2, 1892.

Petition by Henry K. Willard against Joseph C. Willard for partition of real estate. A decree was rendered at the special term, ordering a sale of the premises, which decree was affirmed by the general term. 6 Mackey, 559. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

STATEMENT BY MR. JUSTICE GRAY.

This was a bill in equity filed January 3, 1888, by Henry K. Willard against Joseph C. Willard, under the act of August 15, 1876, c. 297, (which is copied in the margin,¹) for partition of land in Washington, bounded on Pennsylvania avenue on the south, Fourteenth street on the east, and F street on the north, containing more than 33,000 square feet, and with the building thereon known as 'Willard's Hotel.'

The allegations of the bill were that the plaintiff and the defendant were the owners of the land in fee simple, as tenants in common, and each the owner of an undivided half; that the plaintiff became and was the owner of his half under a deed from Henry A. Willard, dated December 1, 1887, and duly recorded; and that the plaintiff desired to have partition of the land, and to have his share thereof set apart to him in severalty, or, if in the opinion of the court the land could not be specially divided between the parties without loss and injury to them, and to the purposes for which the land was used, that, for the purposes of partition, it might be sold, and the proceeds divided between him and the defendant; and he prayed for partition accordingly.

The answer, filed March 6, 1888, alleged that the plaintiff's father, Henry A. Willard, and the defendant, were the owners in fee simple, as tenants in common, of the land, and that it was of great value, and for the past 25 years and upwards had been leased by Henry A. Willard and the defendant to different persons for hotel purposes, and was now under lease and used as an hotel at a remunerative rental; that the defendant had no knowledge of the conveyance to the plaintiff, and required proof thereof; and denied that the defendant should be compelled to make or suffer partition of the land, or that it was within the power of the court od deprive him, against his will and without his consent, of his interest and estate in the whole land, either by a partition in severalty or by a sale thereof.

A general replication was filed, and proofs taken, which showed the following facts: The defendant and Henry A. Willard made a lease of the land for five years and four months from January 1, 1884, at an annual rent of $20,500, to Phoebe D. Cook, which was afterwards assigned, with the lessors' consent, to Orrin G. Staples. On December 1, 1887, Henry A. Willard conveyed to the plaintiff an undivided half of the land, in fee simple, by deed duly recorded. The property was peculiarly adapted to hotel purposes, and was worth in its present condition more than $600,000, and could not be divided without serious loss.

The court in special term, on July 7, 1888, ordered a sale in accordance with the provisions of the act of congress, and appointed trustees to make a sale and conveyance, and to pay the proceeds into court. The decree was affirmed in general term, on October 22, 1888. 6 Mackey, 559.

The defendant appealed to this court, and assigned the following errors in the decree:

'(1) The property was under lease for a term of years at the time the bill was filed, and the plaintiff not entitled to possession.

'(2) Under the act of congress of August 15, 1876, a tenant in common has not an absolute right to partition, but it is discretionary with the court; and something besides the existence of the tenancy must be averred and shown in order to call such discretion into exercise, which was not done in this case."

Wm. F. Mattingly, for appellant.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 118-120 intentionally omitted] M. F. Moiris and G. E. Hamilton, for appellee.

Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

In a court having general jurisdiction in equity to grant partition, as in a court of law, a tenant in common, whose title in an undivided share of the land is clear, is entitled to partition, as a matter of right, so that he may hold and enjoy his property in severalty. Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 653, 656; Parker v. Gerard, Ambler, 236; Calmady v. Calmady, 2 Ves. Jr. 568; Wiseley v. Findlay, 3 Rand. (Va.) 361; Smith v. Smith, Hoff. Ch. 506, and 10 Paige, 470; Donnell v. Mateer, 7 Ired. Eq. 94; Campbell v. Lowe, 9 Md. 500.

Under the English statutes of 31 Hen. VIII. c. 1, and 32 Hen. VIII. c. 32, in force in the state of Maryland before 1801, and therefore in the District of Columbia, any tenant in common in fee might compel partition at law by division of the estate held in common. Alex. Br. St. 311, 312, 332; Lloyd v. Gordon, 2 Har. & McH. 254; Rev. St. D. C. § 92. It is unnecessary to consider how far the supreme court of the District of Columbia had equity jurisdiction in cases of partition before the act of congress of August 15, 1876, c. 297, because this act expressly empowers the court, exercising general jurisdiction in equity, in its discretion, to compel all tenants in common of any estate, legal or equitable, to make or suffer partition, either by division of the estate, or, if it satisfactorily appears that the estate cannot be divided without loss or injury to the parties interested, then by sale of the estate and division of the proceeds among the parties, according to their respective rights and interests. 19 St. p. 202. This statute, while it authorizes the court to compel a partition by division or by sale, at its discretion, as the facts appearing at the hearing may require, does not affect the general rule governing every court of law or equity having jurisdiction to grant partition, that partition is of right, and not to be defeated by the mere unwillingness of one party to have each enjoy his own in severalty.

In equity, as at law, a pending lease for years is no obstacle to partition between...