Willard v. Williams

• Decision Date: 13 September 1897
• Parties: WILLARD v. WILLIAMS.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

50 P. 207

10 Colo.App. 140

WILLARD v. WILLIAMS.

Court of Appeals of Colorado

September 13, 1897

Appeal from Arapahoe county court.

Action by Wilber F. Williams against William B. Willard. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

N.Q. Tanquary, for appellant.

H.J Hersey, for appellee.

BISSELL J.

This suit was brought against the appellant, Willard, to recover the value of services performed partly by the appellee Williams, and partly by H.J. Hersey, as attorney for Willard in sundry and divers suits. The whole case is in a nutshell. Hersey and Willard had a good many dealings, which included the organization of the Denver, Lakewood & Golden Railway Company, and the Bennett Electric Placer Mining Company. In the furtherance of their common interests in the organization of those two corporations, there seems to have been an arrangement between them by which Hersey was to receive a considerable stock interest in each company for his services and later he was employed as the attorney for the railroad company and the secretary of the placer company, on a compensation which is not involved and need not be stated. Willard became the holder of a large number of bonds of the railroad company, on which the company defaulted in the payment of interest. Willard, as the holder of the unpaid interest coupons, employed Hersey to bring suit to enforce the collection. Under this employment, Hersey brought several suits before a justice, in one of them collected some money, and in another he seized money on garnishment; but the railroad company brought suit to enjoin further proceedings in that matter, procured an injunction, and the case was taken to this court, where it was ultimately heard and decided. There was no dispute respecting Hersey's employment to carry on the litigation, and practically none respecting what he did, and its value. There was no evidence respecting the extent and character of the service, or respecting its value, save what was given in behalf of the plaintiff; for the defense was rested on the contention that Willard was not liable for the fees, because Hersey had agreed to do the work for the compensation coming to him in the stock interest and in the salaries which he received after the organization of the railroad and the placer companies. The case was first tried before a justice, where the plaintiff had judgment; and on appeal to the county court it was tried de novo before a jury, which found against the appellant. We are therefore at liberty to accept the verdict as conclusive on all matters of fact. We therefore assume for the purposes of this decision that Hersey was employed to do the work, that its value was the amount found by the jury, and that Willard's contention that he was to do it for the benefits he derived from the organization of the two companies was totally unfounded. With this premise, the disposition of the appeal is simple. There are quite a number of errors urged respecting the rulings of the court in the admission and rejection of testimony, but we are unable to discover any which form a substantial basis for a reversal.

The appellant attempted to put a question to Hersey respecting the number of cases involving injunctive relief which he had had in the court of appeals, but the question was objected to, and he was not permitted to put it to the witness. We discover no error in this ruling, nor can we see that the rule of law invoked against it is at all applicable or decisive. We are not disposed to disagree with counsel respecting the right to show the extent and character of the services and experience of an attorney, and his status in the profession, when he sues for fees, and that these matters may, to a greater or less extent, be considered in determining what he ought to charge for a given service. The question which was put can hardly be said to bear on this inquiry. It may easily be true that a lawyer may have had very extended and large experience in litigations of the gravest character, and yet never had a suit of that particular description in that particular court. If counsel had pursued their inquiry, and put other questions tending in the same direction, whereby he had sought to elicit facts which would exhibit the limits of counsel's experience, and he had not been permitted to pursue it, a different question would have been presented. We do not think, however, that the rejection of this particular query, there being no attempt to follow up the examination, constitutes reversible error.

The letter written by Hersey, and marked "Exhibit No. 3," was admitted in evidence, and appears in the record, so that the error assigned on the ruling of the court respecting it is unavailable. There are one or two other assignments of error based on the rulings of the court respecting the admission of testimony, but we are unable to see that the testimony which was excluded was so entirely relevant as to make it error to reject it. Of course, this conclusion is very much controlled by the consideration that the only defense was an alleged agreement to do the work for nothing, and the evidence did not even tend to substantiate the making of any such contract.

All the other errors...