Willett v. State of Kan.

• Decision Date: 27 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-4052-SAC.,95-4052-SAC.
• Parties: Julianne E. WILLETT, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF KANSAS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

Page 1387

942 F.Supp. 1387

Julianne E. WILLETT, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF KANSAS, Defendant.

No. 95-4052-SAC.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

September 27, 1996.

Kirk W. Lowry, Palmer & Lowry, Topeka, KS, for plaintiff.

Jane Kelly Coates, Social & Rehabilitation Services, Office of the General Counsel, Topeka, KS, Deborah Purce-Jones, Jones & Jones, Topeka, KS, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CROW, District Judge.

Julianne E. Willett brings this employment discrimination action against her former employer, the Kansas Neurological Institute (KNI), an agency of the State of Kansas, for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et. seq. Specifically, Willett claims that Kansas failed to reasonably accommodate her disability, systemic lupus erythematosus (lupus). According to Willett, lupus limits her major life activities of walking, grasping, pushing, pulling, going to the bathroom and working.

Willett worked as a licensed practical nurse (LPN) for KNI from January 25, 1989, until her termination on May 23, 1994. Willett claims that she was able to perform all of the essential job functions of an LPN at KNI with reasonable accommodation. The reasonable accommodation sought by Willett was (1) a lighter cart for dispensing medicine to patients and (2) to work at the Cottonwood facility, or a place with fewer ramps and requiring less walking when her lupus "flared up." KNI denies liability, arguing, inter alia, that it in fact provided Willett with the lighter medicine cart she requested and it offered her the opportunity to work at another unit, Honeybee North, a facility that contained no ramps and generally entailed less walking. KNI claims that Willett was fired because she could not perform the essential job functions of being present at work in a predictable fashion and not because of her disability.

This case comes before the court upon KNI's motion for summary judgment (Dk. 42). Willett has filed a response and KNI has filed a reply. The court, having considered the briefs of the parties and the applicable law, grants KNI's motion.

Summary Judgment Standards

A court grants a motion for summary judgment if a genuine issue of material fact does not exist and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The substantive law governing the suit dictates which facts are material or not. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will ... preclude summary judgment." Id. There are no genuine issues for trial if the record taken as a whole would not persuade a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "[T]here are cases where the evidence is so weak that the case does not raise a genuine issue of fact." Burnette v. Dow Chemical Co., 849 F.2d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir.1988).

The movant's burden under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to lay out the basis of its motion and to "point to those portions of the record that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact given the relevant substantive law." Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1013, 113 S.Ct. 635, 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992). "A movant is not required to provide evidence negating an opponent's claim." Committee for First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1521 (10th Cir.1992) (citation omitted).

If the moving party meets its burden, then it becomes the nonmoving party's burden to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Bacchus Industries, Inc. v Arvin Industries, Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991); see Martin v. Nannie and the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1993) ("If the moving party meets this burden, the non-moving party then has the burden to come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to elements essential to the non-moving party's case."). When the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial, "`Rule 56(e)' ... [then] requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Mares v. ConAgra Poultry Co., Inc., 971 F.2d 492, 494 (10th Cir.1992) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). "Unsubstantiated allegations carry no probative weight in summary judgment proceedings." Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 951 (10th Cir.1992) (citations omitted); see Martin, 3 F.3d at 1414 (non-moving party cannot rest on the mere allegations in the pleadings). "Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact; instead, it creates a false issue, the demolition of which is a primary goal of summary judgment." Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 928, 929 (7th Cir. 1995); see Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 3 F.3d 476, 479 (1st Cir.1993) ("Optimistic conjecture, unbridled speculation, or hopeful surmise will not suffice."). The court views the evidence of record and draws inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Burnette v. Dow Chemical Co., 849 F.2d at 1273.

More than a "disfavored procedural shortcut," summary judgment is an important procedure "designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' Fed.R.Civ.P. 1." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). At the same time, a summary judgment motion is not the chance for a court to act as the jury and determine witness credibility, weigh the evidence, or decide upon competing inferences. Windon Third Oil and Gas v. Federal Deposit Ins., 805 F.2d 342, 346 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947, 107 S.Ct. 1605, 94 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987).

Uncontroverted Facts

Although the court has read and reviewed all of the materials submitted by the parties and has considered all of the arguments each side has advanced, the court will make no effort to systematically address all of the points urged by the parties. In its reply brief, KNI correctly concedes that some of the uncontroverted facts that it set forth in its opening brief are immaterial to the disposition of this case. Based upon the stipulations of the parties and the relevant uncontroverted facts, the court believes it unnecessary to painstakingly sift through every aspect of the parties' respective positions. In an effort to conserve judicial resources, the court has condensed the statement of uncontroverted facts to the following and will only address the primary points necessary to its decision.

KNI is an Immediate Care Facility for mental retardation clients (ICF/MR). KNI provides residential care and treatment to approximately 300 clients. KNI employs over 700 persons, 40 of whom are Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs). As an ICF/MR, KNI is surveyed annually for compliance with state and federal regulations. Portions of the review include a determination of whether there is a sufficient client-to-staff ratio, whether there is sufficient nursing staff to meet the medical needs of the clients and a review of medical records and monitoring of staff to determine whether there have been errors in the administration of medication to clients. Deficiencies in those areas can affect KNI's accreditation and the funding of the facility.

Willett was employed as an LPN by KNI from January 1989 until her termination in May 1994. Willett worked her first six months at the Cottonwood Building until the LPN positions at that location were transferred to other units. Willett's transfer, effective February 18, 1992, was due to a low patient census and the implementation of a strategic plan to close Cottonwood and better utilize staff elsewhere. The administration transferred all four LPN positions at Cottonwood to other buildings. Willett was transferred to the Honeybee Building where she worked the day shift from 6:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m.

Willett's job duties at Cottonwood included passing medications to clients, dressing client wounds, charting, noting physicians' orders, communicating orders, assisting physicians and cleaning the treatment room. After her transfer to Honeybee her job duties remained the same except that she had the additional duty of administering tube feedings to clients.

An LPN position operates independently of other staff. Therefore, an LPN must be able to read, write and communicate effectively with clients and other team staff. An LPN must have mobility skills to be able to deliver and administer medications, treatments, first aid and/or life support services to clients wherever the clients are located. An LPN must have the physical capability to perform basic first aid and basic life support services as needed.

One of the essential functions of all LPN positions at KNI was to maintain a regular work schedule with few unplanned absences to assure the provision of client services. Frequent unpredictable, unscheduled absences of LPN's at KNI imposed hardships on KNI clients and staff. The absence of a scheduled LPN required reassignment of the nursing staff to attend to the medical needs of KNI clients. An unscheduled absence required the facility to work short-staffed, to call in other staff who were scheduled to be off, or to require staff already on duty to work overtime.

Although regular attendance was expected, during her tenure with KNI, Willett was repeatedly disciplined for absenteeism under KNI's progressive disciplinary policy.¹ In 1990, Willett was counseled by her supervisor on three occasions regarding her work attendance problems. Willett...