Willey, In re, 1856
| Decision Date | 05 March 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 1856,1856 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | In re Jed WILLEY. |
Joseph W. Foti, Montpelier, for plaintiff (Charles J. Adams, Waterbury, of counsel).
W. Edson McKee, Montpelier, for defendant.
Before CLEARY, HULBURD and HOLDEN, JJ., and BARNEY and SMITH, Superior judges.
The case is here on the exceptions of the petitionee to the Washington County Court's failure to affirm the decision of the Board of Adjustment of the city of Montpelier.
The question submitted to this court is whether a house trailer, attached to the land, is a single family house under the Zoning Ordinance of the city of Montpelier. The appellant to this court, Jed Willey, appeals from the decree of the Washington County Court overruling the ruling of the Board of Adjustment of Montpelier which held that his house trailer was a single family house under the Montpelier Zoning Ordinance.
A proper consideration of the question here presented requires a brief review of the pertinent provisions of the Montpelier Zoning Ordinance. The ordinance, enacted under the provisions of V.S. 47, of the permissive type, sets forth in detail the kinds of buildings or structures that can be erected, constructed, altered, enlarged, reconstructed or used in each of the three zones who which the ordinance divides the city of Montpelier. The ordinance forbids the use of land for any purpose except the various specified uses in each particular zone.
The three zones, as set forth in the Montpelier Zoning Ordinance, are Residence Zone, (Section 3), Business Zone, (Section 4) and Industrial Zone, (Section 5). The permit granted to Jed Willey was to locate his house trailer in the Residential Zone of Montpelier so it is only as to the permissive uses of the land allowed under the ordinance, in that particular zone, that we must examine. Because the findings of fact state that the Board of Adjustment ruled that Mr. Willey's trailer was a one family house under the Zoning Ordinance it is necessary for us to construe only this one section of the permitted use in the Residence Zone.
No definition of a single family house is given in the ordinance. The definition of a multi-family house as contained in Section 1, 'a building used or designed as a residence of two or more families or households living independently of each other,' is of no aid to us because it does not define 'building' or 'house' as used in the ordinance. Where no definition of a word is given in an ordinance words must be given their commonly accepted use.
This court stated in the case of St. Albans Hospital v. City of St. Albans, 107 Vt. 59, 62, 176 A. 302, 303, 'by the 'speech of people' the word 'house' includes every form of structure designed for human habitation', and in County of Addison v. Blackmer, 101 Vt. 384, 389, 143 A. 700, 702, this court held that a building 'in its broadest sense it may include most any kind of structure, according to the connection in which it is used and the purpose sought to be affected by its use.' Adding on pages 390 and 702, respectively of the same case, 'the words 'building' and 'structure' mean the same thing'.
The findings of the court, which were made upon an agreed statement of facts, and to which no exceptions were taken disclose the following material facts:
The land upon which the trailer is located is in the residential zone of the city of Montpelier and is leased by Jed Willey from a Mr. and Mrs. Hartshorn. The records of the Administrative Officer, appointed pursuant to the provisions of the Montpelier Zoning Ordinance indicate that Mr. Willey applied for permission to locate his trailer on the above described land on Sunset Avenue, Montpelier, on July 23, 1955. This application was approved by the Administrative Officer on the same date, and on August 2, 1955, Albert E. Slayton and E. Mae Slayton, his wife, appealed to the Board of Adjustment from the granting of the permit.
Notice of a hearing on the appeal was duly published in the Montpelier Argus and the Board of Adjustment met at the Montpelier City Hall on August 12, 1955. After ordering various amendments to the permit of Willey, which amendments were agreed to by the Slaytons, the Board of Adjustment upheld the application granted by the Administrative Officer.
The Willey trailer is of metal and wood construction, has no foundation, but is mounted on cinder blocks and 2 X 4 timbers. It is connected with city sewer and water lines. The interior of the Willey trailer consists of two bedrooms, living room and bath. No argument is advanced that the interior of the trailer, so arranged, does not contain at least the essential living space of many one family houses. The decision of the Board of Adjustment, certified to this court, states that the trailer was occupied by Mr. Willey and his family as their home in July, 1955 and it appears that it is still being so occupied and used.
The findings state that the trailer can be rendered mobile by disconnecting the various utility connections, removing the cinder blocks and timbers that support it, and letting down the wheels attached to the trailer. It is this feature, that is, the trailer's potential mobility, which the appellee, Mr. Slayton, relies upon to uphold the reversal of the decision of the Board of Adjustment.
It is the appellee's contention that a trailer coach of this type, by its very nature, is non-permanent with respect to the land upon which it is located. That being mobile, the granting of the permit to Mr. Willey by the Zoning Board violates the purposes for which the ordinance was enacted. And in support of his contention he calls our attention to the fact that the Listers of Montpelier have listed Mr. Willey's trailer as personal property in the Grand List.
We find no statutory provision as to the listing of such a trailer, so situated, as personal property, and so such listing was in the discretion of the Montpelier Listers. Nor is there any provision in the Montpelier Zoning Ordinance, nor in Chapter 175 V.S. 47, Municipal Zoning that any classification of property, real or personal, taken by listers in a town or city shall act as a definition under zoning regulations.
The appellee has also made reference to the provisions of the Montpelier Zoning Ordinance relative to the establishment of trailer camps only in the business and in industrial zones of that city. But running a trailer camp or park is a business enterprise. 'Merely placing one or more trailers upon a land area does not constitute a 'trailer park' or 'camp site', unless done as a 'business' in a sense of being a commercial enterprise for profit.' Morris v. Township of Elk, 40 N.J.Super. 134, 122 A.2d 15, 17. There is no finding in the...
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