Willhauck v. Town of Mansfield

• Citation: 164 F.Supp.2d 127
• Decision Date: 05 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-CV-11291-PBS.,99-CV-11291-PBS.
• Parties: Wendy WILLHAUCK, Paul Willhauck, and Paul and Wendy Willhauck, as parents and next best friends of Bryan Willhauck, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF MANSFIELD, Town of Mansfield School Committee, all of its members in their capacity as school committee members, Ray Hurley, individually and in his capacity as Town of Mansfield School Psychologist, Karin Randolph, individually and in her capacity as Town of Mansfield Special Education Director, Edward Rosa, individually and in his capacity as principal of Mansfield High School, Richard Linney, Robert V. Linney, father of defendant Richard Linney, Nancy C. Linney, mother of defendant Richard Linney, and Paul Medeiros, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

164 F.Supp.2d 127

Wendy WILLHAUCK, Paul Willhauck, and Paul and Wendy Willhauck, as parents and next best friends of Bryan Willhauck, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF MANSFIELD, Town of Mansfield School Committee, all of its members in their capacity as school committee members, Ray Hurley, individually and in his capacity as Town of Mansfield School Psychologist, Karin Randolph, individually and in her capacity as Town of Mansfield Special Education Director, Edward Rosa, individually and in his capacity as principal of Mansfield High School, Richard Linney, Robert V. Linney, father of defendant Richard Linney, Nancy C. Linney, mother of defendant Richard Linney, and Paul Medeiros, Defendants.

No. 99-CV-11291-PBS.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

September 5, 2001.

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Laurence E. Sweeney, Palmisano & Sweeney, Allston, MA, Silva C. Fido Rudman, Law Office of Michael A. Rudman, P.C., Fall River, MA, Frank H. Spillane, Spillane & Mrowka, South Easton, MA, for plaintiffs.

Wendy Willhauck, Mansfield, MA, pro se.

Leonard H. Keston, Kurt B. Fliegauf, Katherine R. Bowden, Brody, Hardoon, Perkins & Keston, Boston, MA, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SARIS, District Judge.

This sad case arises out of a brutal attack by a student with severe behavioral problems on plaintiff, another student, after school on a nearby field behind the high school. Having suffered severe brain damage, the plaintiff, together with his parents, sued the school committee members, the school psychiatrist, the special education director, the principal, and the municipality, alleging that they violated his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and acted negligently in failing to supervise the assailant who had a past history of violence. Defendants have moved for partial summary judgment.

For the reasons stated below, the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment is ALLOWED.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts set forth below are undisputed, unless otherwise noted.

During the 1995-96 school term, plaintiff Bryan Willhauck ("Bryan") was a fourteen-year-old student at Mansfield Middle School. Bryan was enrolled in the middle school's program for students with special needs.

Richard Linney ("Linney") was a student at Mansfield High School. Upon arriving at Mansfield High School during the 1995-96 term, Linney was placed in restrictive program designed for students with serious behavioral disorders. Under the terms of the Students Preparing for Re-Integration ("SPRINT") program, Linney was required to be "100% supervised," which included restroom visits, lunches, and use of school hallways between classes. The terms of the SPRINT program do not expressly require Linney to be supervised during after-school activities, nor is there any evidence that school officials made a practice of extending the 100% supervision requirement to such activities. However, there are instances where students (not necessarily those in the SPRINT program) have been disciplined for conduct occurring at dances and other non-mandatory after-school activities.

Linney's placement in the SPRINT program was evaluated and approved by a team of school personnel which included defendant Ray Hurley ("Hurley"), the school psychologist. During the evaluation and approval process, Hurley and the other team members learned of an incident at King Philip High School where Linney had allegedly threatened another student with some kind of weapon, possibly a knife. Hurley stated in his deposition that the team considered the incident during their evaluation, but found that it was not serious enough to warrant Linney's exclusion from the SPRINT program. There is no evidence in the record that, prior to January 6, 1996, Linney's conduct in the SPRINT program was marked by any threatening or violent behavior.

On January 6, 1996, after the end of the regular school day, Linney and another student in the SPRINT program, Paul Medeiros ("Medeiros"), were supposed to board a school bus for a hockey game. At some point, however, the two older boys left the supervision of school employees and caught up with Bryan in a field behind the high school.¹ Then, as Medeiros looked on, Linney attacked Bryan, knocking him to the ground and repeatedly kicking him in the forehead. It is not clear from the record what provoked this attack; what is clear from the record, however, is that Bryan was brutally assaulted and sustained serious injuries. As a result of the blows to the head, Bryan's frontal sinus wall was badly fractured. He was forced to undergo surgery in which portions of his scalp were peeled back and metal plates and screws were inserted in his skull to replace the obliterated sinus wall. Bryan now has a permanent closed head injury, a large scar from ear to ear, and chronic headaches.

Following the attack, Linney was apparently found delinquent in the juvenile justice system for the attack on Bryan. There is some dispute whether Linney was merely placed on probation or whether he was required to serve a term of incarceration in the custody of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services. In any event, Linney returned to Mansfield High School and (remarkably) was never disciplined by school officials.

The plaintiffs, Bryan and his parents, filed a ten-count complaint in state court against defendants Town of Mansfield, Town of Mansfield School Committee, Ray Hurley (the Mansfield school psychologist), Karin Randolph (the Mansfield Special Education Director), Edward Rosa (the principal of Mansfield High School), Richard Linney, Robert and Nancy Linney (Richard Linney's parents), and Paul Medeiros.² The case was subsequently removed to federal court pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1441(b). The public defendants —the Town of Mansfield, Town of Mansfield School Committee, Ray Hurley, Karin Randolph, and Edward Rosa—have brought the present motion for summary judgment on Counts I (violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and III (negligence) of the complaint.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Summary judgment standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter or law." Barbour v. Dynamics Research Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir.1995) (quoting Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)). To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's position. See Rogers v. Fair, 902 F.2d 140, 143 (1st Cir.1990); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies this requirement, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish the existence of at least one factual issue that is both genuine and material. See LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To successfully oppose summary judgment, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading," but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 841 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505). If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Rogers, 902 F.2d at 143 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505) (citations omitted). The Court must "view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Barbour, 63 F.3d at 36.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The plaintiffs assert a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated Bryan's substantive due process rights by placing Linney in the SPRINT program and failing to supervise him. As the plaintiffs acknowledge, the availability of a § 1983 claim arising from injuries caused by the intentional tortious conduct of third parties is greatly curtailed by the Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989).

As the Court in DeShaney stated, "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation." Id. at 202, 109 S.Ct. 998. "[T]he Due Process Clause ... was intended to prevent government `from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression.'" Id. at 196, 109 S.Ct. 998 (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986)). "Its purpose was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other." Id. It follows from this that the government is under no general constitutional duty to protect individuals from the harmful conduct of third parties. See id. at 197, 109 S.Ct. 998

There are, however, two exceptions to the general rule which must be addressed here. The first exception applies where the state has assumed custody over an individual and, by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, the individual is unable to care for himself. Id. at 199, 109 S.Ct. 998. In such instances, the State assumes an affirmative duty to care for the individual. See id. at 198-99, 109 S.Ct. 998 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), and Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-25, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982)). The second exception applies where the government affirmatively acts to increase the threat of harm to the injured party. See id. at 201-02, 109 S.Ct. 998.

1. Special relationship doctrine

The defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the...