William Christy, Plaintiff In Error v. Lodovick Alford, Administrator of Henry Bullard, Deceased

• Decision Date: 01 December 1854
• Parties: WILLIAM CHRISTY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. LODOVICK P. ALFORD, ADMINISTRATOR OF HENRY D. BULLARD, DECEASED
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

58 U.S. 601

17 How. 601

15 L.Ed. 256

WILLIAM CHRISTY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. LODOVICK P. ALFORD, ADMINISTRATOR OF HENRY D.

BULLARD, DECEASED.

December Term, 1854

THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the district court of the United States for the district of Texas.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

It was submitted upon printed arguments, by Mr. Crittenden, Mr. Hughes, and Mr. Lawrence, for the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. Hill and Mr. Henderson, for the defendant.

Mr. Justice CURTIS delivered the opinion of the court.

This case comes before us by a writ of error to the district court for the district of Texas. It was an action of trespass, to try the title to a tract of land. On the trial, the defendant relied on the 15th section of the statute of limitations, passed in 1841, by the congress of the then Republic of Texas, which is in the following words: 'Every suit to be instituted to recover real estate, as against him, her, or them, in possession, under title or color of title, shall be instituted within three years next after cause of action shall have accrued, and not afterwards, saving,' &c.

In reference to this defence the district judge instructed the jury, that a possession under the said 15th section might be in two or more, holding in privity, one under another; and if the possession of both so holding will make out the term prescribed by said section, and he sued has title or color of title, then the bar will be effectual.

The plaintiff excepted to this instruction, and the jury found a verdict for the defendant.

Several objections to this instruction have been relied on in this court. The first is, that a holding by two persons, for the space of three years, one claiming and holding in privity with the other, does not satisfy the statute; that the person who is sued must himself have held for the space of three years. The argument is, that the period of three years begins to run when

'cause of action shall have accrued;' that the statute does not say when a cause of action, or the first cause of action accrued, but, when cause of action accrued; that cause of action accrues against each tenant, in succession, when he enters, whether he come into the land in privity with the preceding occupant or not; for each is a trespasser by an unlawful entry; that the statute refers, not to the cause of action which first accrues to the plaintiff by reason of an unlawful entry, but to the cause of action which accrues to him by reason of the entry of the particular person sued. It is conceded that this construction of the statute is not in conformity with the put upon the 21 Jac. I. ch. 16, and its re enactments in this country; but it is insisted that the particular terms of the statute in question call for a different interpretation, bacause the bar therein provided for is confined to certain cases therein enumerated, and is not applicable to all cases of adverse holding for the space of three years.

It must be admitted that the bar afforded by the 15th section of the statute is confined to the particular cases therein described; but the question is, whether that description excludes cases where there has been an adverse holding for three years, by different persons holding in privity with each other; and we are of opinion that such cases are included in the 15th section. We think both the language of the law and its subject-matter, as well as the...