William Drummond, GPGC LLC v. Robinson Twp. & Mark Dorsey
| Decision Date | 16 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 18-1127 |
| Citation | 444 F.Supp.3d 657 |
| Parties | William DRUMMOND, GPGC LLC, and Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. ROBINSON TOWNSHIP and Mark Dorsey, Robinson Township Zoning Officer, in his official and individual capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Alan Gura, Pro Hac Vice, Gura PLLC, Alexandria, VA, James H. McCune, K. Bradley Mellor, Bowles Rice LLP, Canonsburg, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Sean R. Riley, Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Cranberry Township, PA, Trisha A. Gill, Litchfield Cavo, LLP, Alan T. Shuckrow, Gretchen E. Moore, Michael P. Gaetani, Strassburger, McKenna, Gutnick & Gefsky, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.
In August 2018, PlaintiffsWilliam Drummond, GPGC LLC, and Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. filed suit against Defendants Robinson Township and Zoning Officer Mark Dorsey.(ECF No. 1).In their Complaint, Plaintiffs sought relief, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for alleged facial and as-applied violations of the Second Amendment right to bear arms, as well as various facial and as-applied violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privileges or Immunities clauses.Plaintiffs also sought a preliminary injunction.(ECF No. 17).Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety.(ECF No. 26).In January 2019, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss and denied the Motion for Preliminary Injunction as moot.(ECF No. 36).Plaintiffs appealed.(ECF No. 38).The Third Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded this Court's Order with respect to Plaintiffs' facial Second Amendment claims and the denial of the preliminary injunction, insofar as preliminary injunction relates to the facial Second Amendment claims.(ECF Nos. 41, 42);Drummond v. Twp. of Robinson , 784 Fed. App'x. 82(3d Cir.2019).The Third Circuit affirmed this Court's Order in all other respects.
Now before the Court are Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as it relates to Plaintiffs' facial Second Amendment claims and Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be granted, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction will be denied as moot.
The facts of this case are set out more fully in this Court's previous Opinion and Order at Drummond v. Robinson Twp. , 361 F. Supp. 3d 466(W.D. Pa.2019).For the purposes of this Opinion, the relevant facts are as follows.
In December 2017, Mr. Drummond entered into a ten-year lease of a 265-acre parcel within the jurisdiction of Robinson Township, Washington County, Pennsylvania.(ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 11, 30).Mr. Drummond, through his wholly owned entity, GPGC LLC, intended to open and operate a for-profit shooting range and gun club on the property.Id.at ¶¶ 30–31.Mr. Drummond planned to "sell memberships, range time, firearms, ammunition, targets, food and beverage, and other ordinary goods that might be found at any gun range, as well as shooting training and safety courses to the public."Id.at ¶ 31.
Under Robinson Township's Zoning Ordinance, Mr. Drummond's property was zoned as an Interchange Business Development District, or IBD District.Id. at ¶ 12.At the time Mr. Drummond entered the lease, the Zoning Ordinance allowed Sportsman's Clubs as permitted principal uses within IBD Districts.Id.The Zoning Ordinance, however, did not define "Sportsman's Clubs."Id.Additionally, although the Zoning Ordinance did not allow commercial outdoor shooting ranges as permitted principal uses or conditional uses in IBD Districts, it allowed them in other zones.Id.at ¶ 48;(ECFNo. 27-1, at 10, 18, 23–24, 88).
By the time Mr. Drummond submitted his zoning permit application in March 2018, the Township had proposed certain amendments to the Zoning Ordinance that regulated Sportsman's Clubs.Id.at ¶ 40.The Township enacted the pending amendments in April 2018.Id. at ¶ 47.Through the regulation of Sportsman's Clubs, the Township sought "to avoid nuisances and provide for and protect the public health, safety and welfare for the residents within the geographic limits of the Township."(ECFNo. 27-3, at 1).Accordingly, the amendments made three changes to the Zoning Ordinance, two of which are relevant here.First, the Township amended Section 601 to include a definition for "Sportsman's Club."(ECF No. 1, at ¶ 47).Under the new definition, a "Sportsman's Club" is "[a] nonprofit entity formed for conservation of wildlife or game, and to provide members with opportunities for hunting, fishing or shooting."Id.Second, the Township amended Section 311 to include paragraph (D), which limits outdoor shooting activities at Sportsman's Clubs "to pistol range, skeet shoot, trap and skeet, and rim-fire rifles."Id.at ¶ 47.According to the Complaint, Section 311(D) created a prohibition on center-fire rifles at Sportsman's Clubs, which "has significantly frustrated if not effectively barred the use of the ... property as a gun club or shooting range."Id.at ¶ 51.In short, Plaintiffs allege that there is no mechanism under the Zoning Ordinance"by which anyone might be allowed to operate a for-profit gun club or shooting range within an IBD district, or shoot center-fire rifles at a ‘Sportsman's Club.’ "Id.at ¶ 49.The Township, consequently, rejected Mr. Drummond's zoning permit application.Id.at ¶ 53.
Plaintiffs filed the present suit, in part, to challenge the constitutionality of Sections 311(D)and601.In Counts I and II of the Complaint, Plaintiffs contend that Sections 601and311(D), respectively, deprive Plaintiffs of their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.Id.at ¶¶ 61, 65.Plaintiffs also ask the Court to preliminarily enjoin the Township from enforcing Sections 311(D)and601.(ECF No. 17).The Township seeks dismissal of Counts I and II for failure to state a claim and objects to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.(ECF Nos. 26, 28).
Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to seek dismissal of a complaint against it on the ground that the complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).In deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must first "accept all factual allegations as true" and "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."Eid v. Thompson , 740 F.3d 118, 122(3d Cir.2014)(internal quotations omitted).The court then must "determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief."Id.A complaint is sufficient only when it is facially plausible, meaning that the court is able "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868(2009)(citingBell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929(2007) ).To be plausible on its face, the complaint must contain more than "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action" and "mere conclusory statements."Id.The court need not "accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences."Morrow v. Balaski , 719 F.3d 160, 165(3d Cir.2013).
Plaintiffs bring two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Sections 601and311(D) of the Township's Zoning Ordinance, each on its face, violate the Second Amendment.Section 1983 provides that a state actor who "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured."42 U.S.C. § 1983.A plaintiff bringing a claim under § 1983 therefore must allege that he was "deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law."
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan , 526 U.S. 40, 49–50, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130(1999).When a plaintiff alleges that the deprivation he suffers results from the existence of a particular statute—that is, the plaintiff alleges that the statute is unconstitutional on its face—the plaintiff" ‘must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.' "United States v. Mitchell , 652 F.3d 387, 405(3d Cir.2011)(quotingUnited States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697(1987) ).This, of course, is a difficult standard for a plaintiff to meet.Id.
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution protects "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms."U.S. Const. amend. II.To evaluate whether a deprivation of a Second Amendment right has occurred, courts use a two-pronged approach.United States v. Marzzarella , 614 F.3d 85, 89(3d Cir.2010)(citingDistrict of Columbia v. Heller , 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637(2008) ).First, courts are to "ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment's guarantee."Id.If the law does not impose a burden on conduct that falls within the Second Amendment's scope, then the inquiry is over.Id.If the challenged law does burden such conduct, courts are to move on to the second prong, under which they are to "evaluate the law under some form of means-end scrutiny."Id.
Regarding step one, the Court is tasked with determining whether Sections 311(D)and601 of the Township's Zoning Ordinance regulate conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment's protection.Specifically, the Court must determine whether the right to bear arms protects (1) the ability to shoot center-fire rifles at a gun range and (2) the operation of a for-profit gun range, which includes firearm and ammunition retail sales.To answer these questions, a textual and historical...
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