William ex rel. Ricard v. Humphreys, IP 00-1090-C H/G.

Decision Date05 December 2000
Docket NumberNo. IP 00-1090-C H/G.,IP 00-1090-C H/G.
Citation125 F.Supp.2d 881
PartiesCameron WILLIAMS, by his mother and next friend, Ky'Sha RICARD, and Taneele Tidey, by her mother and next friend, Dawn Tidey, on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Katherine HUMPHREYS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

Jacquelyn E. Bowie, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiff.

Frances Barrow, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, IN, for defendant.

ENTRY ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HAMILTON, District Judge.

Indiana provides public assistance benefits to needy families under the federal Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program. As under the old Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, a state that receives TANF funds must require TANF recipients to assign their child support rights to the state to help offset state and federal government costs for benefits paid. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3) (TANF); see also 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. III) (AFDC — repealed 1996). In general, such assignments have been upheld against constitutional challenges with respect to children receiving public assistance benefits. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 107 S.Ct. 3008, 97 L.Ed.2d 485 (1987).

In Indiana, however, not all children in needy families actually receive TANF benefits. Through a policy called the "family benefit cap," when Indiana determines families' needs and calculates TANF cash benefits, it excludes most children born ten or more months after their families became eligible for TANF benefits from those determinations. See Ind.Code § 12-14-2-5.3(b). (The family benefit cap statute includes certain exceptions which are not at issue in this case.)

The issue in this case is whether Indiana may require such excluded children to assign to the State their right to receive payments of child support from a non-custodial parent. As explained below, Indiana's policy of requiring assignments of child support payments for "excluded" children effects an unconstitutional taking of private property for public use without compensation. The court will enter a permanent injunction against enforcement of the policy.

Background

In administering the TANF program, Indiana has required that all children who live with a family that receives TANF assistance assign their child support to the State. Indiana applies this requirement to children born subject to the family benefit cap established by Ind.Code § 12-14-2-5.3(b). Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties in this case and Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2), the court certified a plaintiff class defined as follows:

all past, present and future Indiana children whose non-custodial parent is ordered to pay child support for them, and whose custodial parent or guardian receives, has received or will receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Facilities ("TANF") benefits but whose custodial parent or guardian does not receive additional cash benefits as a result of the child being a part of the TANF family unit, due to the family benefit cap rule.

Order of August 7, 2000. Indiana, acting through its Family and Social Services Administration (FSSA), of which named defendant Katherine Humphreys serves as the Secretary in her official capacity, has required the plaintiffs to assign their child support rights to the State.

Plaintiffs do not challenge in this case the lawfulness of the Indiana family benefit cap itself. The Indiana Court of Appeals recently upheld the cap against constitutional challenges. See N.B. v. Sybinski, 724 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind.App.2000) (Indiana family benefit cap does not violate principles of equal protection or substantive due process). Instead, plaintiffs contend that Indiana's assignment policy violates the federal TANF statute and takes their private property without compensation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court heard oral argument on October 6, 2000. The court indicated that it intended to grant plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and to deny defendant's summary judgment motion with this written entry to follow. In addition, plaintiffs renewed their motion for preliminary injunction, which they had previously withdrawn. The court granted plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion and enjoined Indiana officials from applying the child support assignment requirement to the class of excluded children. The court now grants plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denies defendant's motion.

Summary Judgment Standard

The purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court should grant summary judgment if and only if the record shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Pafford v. Herman, 148 F.3d 658, 665 (7th Cir.1998). The parties have submitted this case on stipulated facts, and the case turns on questions of law. There are no material factual disputes.

Undisputed Facts

In general, except under the family benefit cap described below, TANF cash benefit grants are determined by assessing a family's "standard of need." The standard of need is calculated by taking $155 per month for the initial dependent child (or $255 for the child and his parent) and adding to that amount $65 for each additional family member who receives TANF assistance. See Ind.Code § 12-24-2-5; Indiana Client Eligibility System ("ICES") Manual § 3010.10.00.1 By accounting for each family member, the standard of need for the household takes into consideration the minimum subsistence level required for a family of that size to live in Indiana. See id. The family is then given 90 percent of that household standard of need in cash assistance. See 470 I.A.C. § 10.1-3-3.1; ICES Manual § 3050.10.00.

TANF cash benefit grants are calculated differently under the family benefit cap. There is no family benefit cap under federal law. Instead, the Indiana family benefit cap exists pursuant to waivers that Indiana received from the federal government in 1994 and 1996. Indiana obtained the waivers on the theory that it would conduct an experiment with the family benefit cap and other limits on benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (states may receive waivers from federal TANF requirements by seeking approval of experimental, pilot, or demonstration projects that are likely to further TANF's objectives). Under Indiana's waivers, all TANF recipients and applicants are divided into two groups, a "treatment group" and a "control group." See 470 I.A.C. § 14-1-2. Families in the "treatment group" are subject to the family benefit cap. All plaintiffs are members of the "treatment group."

The family benefit cap establishes an exception to the standard of need considerations described above in the calculation of TANF cash grants. A parent or guardian in the "treatment group" does not receive additional TANF cash benefits upon the birth of a dependent child who is born at least ten months after the parent began receiving TANF benefits. Ind.Code § 12-14-2-5.3(b); 470 I.A.C. § 14-1-2. The family's TANF cash benefit grant amount is determined without taking into consideration the income or needs of the excluded child. The Indiana regulation that implements the family cap provides:

Sec. 2. (a) No additional AFDC [TANF] cash benefit shall be issued due to the birth of a child when the birth occurs more than ten (10) calendar months after the date of authorization for AFDC [TANF], except as specified in this section.

* * *

(c) The additional child and any additional individuals who are required to be included in the assistance unit under Section 402(a)(38) of the Social Security Act shall be included in the need standard for purposes of determining AFDC [TANF] eligibility and shall be considered an AFDC [TANF] recipient and eligible for Medicaid. In determining the AFDC [TANF] payment for a family, the needs and income of the additional child and any additional individuals who were not in the assistance unit at the time of the additional child's birth and would not have been included in the assistance unit at the time of the child's birth had the child not been born will not be considered.

470 I.A.C. § 14-2-2;2 accord, ICES Manual § 2225.15.00. Children born subject to the family cap are still required, however, to assign their child support rights to the State. See ICES Manual § 2436.05.05. The State asserts it is entitled to keep assigned child support payments until such time as the amount of child support collected equals or exceeds the amount of benefits the State has paid to the child's family. See Ind.Code. § 12-17-2-21(e).

Named plaintiffs Cameron Williams and Taneele Tidey were born ten or more months after their mothers, who are in the "treatment group," began receiving TANF benefits. Stip. ¶ 11. Cameron's and Taneele's families did not receive any additional cash benefits after their births. Id.

Child support orders from courts are in effect for both Cameron and Taneele. Stip. ¶¶ 12-13. Indiana required Cameron's mother to assign Cameron's child support to the State. Stip. ¶ 14. Indiana also required Taneele's mother to assign Taneele's child support to the State. Stip. ¶ 16. As of July 31, 2000, the State had collected $2,132 of Cameron's child support, of which the State has disbursed $1,243 to his mother. Stip. ¶ 15.3 As of July 31, 2000, the State had collected $1,010 of Taneele's child support, of which the State has disbursed $400...

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  • Williams v. Martin
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • September 22, 2003
    ...but the provision also does not affirmatively prohibit Georgia from imposing the requirement. See Williams ex rel. Ricard v. Humphreys, 125 F.Supp.2d 881, 885 (S.D.Ind.2000). The statute contains no explicit prohibition, and the Court sees no statutory or other basis for implying one. Id. a......

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