William G., In re

• Decision Date: 05 December 1985
• Citation: 221 Cal.Rptr. 118,40 Cal.3d 550,709 P.2d 1287
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 709 P.2d 1287, 29 Ed. Law Rep. 394 In re WILLIAM G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM G., Defendant and Appellant. Crim. 22945.

Page 118

221 Cal.Rptr. 118

40 Cal.3d 550, 709 P.2d 1287, 29 Ed. Law Rep. 394

In re WILLIAM G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM G., Defendant and Appellant.

Crim. 22945.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Dec. 5, 1985.

Wilbur F. Littlefield, Public Defender, Laurence M. Sarnoff, Paul James, Allan C. Oberstein, Eugene Moutes, Edward Rucker, William A. Misener, David Carlton and Henry J. Hall, Deputy Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant.

George Deukmejian and John K. Van de Kamp, Attys. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Howard J. Schwab, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Susan Lee Frierson and Donald J. Oeser, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

Robert H. Philibosian, Dist. Atty. (Los Angeles), Harry B. Sondheim and Donald J. Kaplan, Deputy Dist. Attys., as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

REYNOSO, Justice.

William G. appeals from an order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. This order was based on the court's finding that William unlawfully possessed marijuana for purposes of sale in violation of section 11359 of the Health and Safety Code. William was placed on probation for a period of three years.

The issue presented is one of first impression for this court: What standard is required under article I, section 13, of the California Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to determine the legality of a search by a public school official of a minor student? Given the unique characteristics of the school setting and the important responsibilities that school officials have to all students, we conclude that the applicable standard is reasonable suspicion. We further conclude that the instant search did not meet the reasonable suspicion standard, requiring reversal of the trial court's judgment.

I.

On the date of the alleged offense, October 1, 1979, William was 16 years of age and a student at Chatsworth High School in Los Angeles. At approximately 1:10 p.m., Reno Lorenz, the assistant principal at Chatsworth, noticed William and two other male students walking through the center of campus. The assistant principal was at that time approximately 35 yards away from the students. As Lorenz proceeded toward the students, he noticed that William was carrying a small black bag, later identified as a vinyl calculator case, to which the students' attention was momentarily drawn. The case had what Lorenz thought was an odd-looking bulge.

Upon reaching the students, Lorenz asked where they were heading and why they were late for class. William did not have any classes after 12 noon. As Lorenz spoke, William placed the case in a palmlike gesture to his side and then behind his back. Lorenz asked William what he had in his hand, to which William replied, "Nothing." When Lorenz attempted to see the case, William said "You can't search me," and then, "You need a warrant for this." Following more discussion, Lorenz took William by the arm and escorted him to the assistant principal's office.

Lorenz sought a noon recreational aide to act as a witness. After repeated unsuccessful efforts to convince William to hand over the case, Lorenz forcefully took and unzipped it. Inside were four baggies of marijuana weighing a total of less than one-half ounce, a small metal gram weight scale, and some Zigzag cigarette papers. William stated that he was holding the contents of the case for someone else.

Lorenz immediately telephoned the police. Los Angeles Police Officer Stephen Henderson responded and placed William under arrest. The officer conducted a pat-down search for weapons and any additional contraband, and found $135 in William's pockets. This money was never introduced into evidence.

At the adjudication hearing William, through his attorney, moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his calculator case on the ground that the search was conducted illegally. William argued that public school officials should be subject to the constitutional proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures and that there was no reasonable basis for the instant search.

At the hearing Lorenz testified that he was employed by the Los Angeles City Board of Education and that his duties as assistant principal included assisting the school security agent, whom he supervised, in arresting juveniles for narcotics violations. He testified that it was usual for him to call in the police after making such arrests. While Lorenz had no prior information which led him to believe that William was in possession of marijuana, or that William had otherwise violated the law or a school rule, it was his standard procedure to question students who were not in class during regular class periods. Lorenz further testified that he would have called the school security agent, rather than the recreational aide, to assist him in searching William but the agent was not on duty that day. Officer Henderson testified that he had previously arrested many Chatsworth students for narcotics violations who had been turned over by Lorenz and the school security agent.

The juvenile court denied William's motion to suppress, based on a finding that the search conducted by Lorenz was reasonable under the circumstances, and that Lorenz would have been derelict in his duties had he not "done what he did." On appeal, William contends this ruling is reversible error.

William claims that Lorenz is a government agent to whom the constitutional limitations on searches and seizures should apply; that while searches conducted solely for school purposes may be subject to a reasonable suspicion standard, searches which are conducted for the purpose of juvenile adjudication or criminal prosecution must be based on probable cause; that the search conducted by Lorenz was not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion; and, therefore, that the evidence obtained by Lorenz is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. The People argue that searches of students on public school grounds need be supported by only a "reasonable suspicion," even if conducted for law enforcement purposes, and that the search conducted by Lorenz met this standard.

II.

It is well settled that minor students are "persons" under our state and federal Constitutions and therefore possess fundamental constitutional rights which the state must respect. (Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. (1969) 393 U.S. 503, 511, 89 S.Ct. 733, 739, 21 L.Ed.2d 731.) "Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights." ¹ (Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth (1976) 428 U.S. 52, 74, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 2843, 49 L.Ed.2d 788.)

Among these rights is the guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 13, of the California Constitution. (In re Scott K. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 395, 400-403, 155 Cal.Rptr. 671, 595 P.2d 105, cert. den., 444 U.S. 973, 100 S.Ct. 468, 62 L.Ed.2d 388.) As we have previously noted, this guarantee is inferable from minors' constitutional rights to privacy, ² and their guarantee under the Fourteenth Amendment against deprivation of liberty without due process of law. ³ (In re Scott K., supra, 24 Cal.3d 395, 401, 402, 155 Cal.Rptr. 671, 595 P.2d 105.) ⁴

As noted above, this court has not previously considered the scope of Fourth Amendment ⁵ protections that should be accorded minors subject to searches by public school officials. While we recognize that the constitutional rights of minors need not always be coextensive with those of adults, ⁶ it is well established that public school students do not shed their constitutional rights upon reaching the schoolhouse door. (Tinker v. Des Moines School District, supra, 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736.) "The authority possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce standards of conduct in its schools, although concededly very broad, must be exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards." (Goss v. Lopez, supra, 419 U.S. 565, 574, 95 S.Ct. 729, 736.)

III.

The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies only to governmental action. (Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 487, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2048, 29 L.Ed.2d 564.) The origin and history of the Fourth Amendment "clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies...." (Burdeau v. McDowell (1921) 256 U.S. 465, 475, 41 S.Ct. 574, 576, 65 L.Ed. 1048; see also Stapleton v. Superior Court (1968) 70 Cal.2d 97, 100, 73 Cal.Rptr. 575, 447 P.2d 967.) Thus, while the protection of the Fourth Amendment is not limited to action by law enforcement, but extends to all governmental action (see New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 740, 83 L.Ed.2d 720), it does not extend to searches conducted by private persons.

Our initial determination is therefore whether public school officials such as Lorenz are agents of the government to whom the constitutional proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures apply. Consistent with the United States Supreme Court's recent ruling in New Jersey v. T.L.O., supra, that public school officials are subject to the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, we conclude that California public school officials are further subject to this proscription under article I, section 13, of the California Constitution.

The state Court of Appeal to first consider this issue concluded that public school officials are private persons and therefore outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment. In the...