William Sheafe Chase v. Franklin S. Billings
| Decision Date | 06 February 1934 |
| Citation | 170 A. 903,106 Vt. 149 |
| Parties | WILLIAM SHEAFE CHASE v. FRANKLIN S. BILLINGS ET AL |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
January Term, 1934.
Certiorari---Practice Regarding Petitions for Certiorari---Purpose of Writ---Unavailable To Review Acts Not Judicial or Quasi Judicial---Constitutional Law---Issuance of Writ of Certiorari as Matter of Discretion---Not To Be Issued When Unavailing---Evidence---Judicial Notice---Presumptions---Conclusiveness on United States Secretary of State of Notice by State of Ratification of Amendment to Federal Constitution---Consummation of Ratification of Amendment to Federal Constitution Repealing Eighteenth Amendment---Conclusiveness on Courts of Proclamation of United States Secretary of State That Proposed Amendment to Federal Constitution Has Been Ratified by Requisite Number of States---Denial of Writ of Certiorari as Matter of Discretion---Constitutionality of Act Only Passed on When Necessary to Disposition of Case---Constitutionality of Act Not Passed on When Question No Longer of Public Interest.
1. Practice regarding petitions for writ of certiorari is for Supreme Court to hear case upon petition and subsequent pleadings, and practically decide it upon granting or refusing writ.
2. Purpose of writ of certiorari is to review judicial or quasi judicial acts, and in no case can it be extended to review acts that are ministerial, legislative, or executive.
3. Certiorari held unavailable to review action of State convention held pursuant to Acts 1933, No. 6, in ratifying amendment to federal Constitution, and acts of chairman and secretary of such convention in making and transmitting to Secretary of State of United States certificate showing in detail action of such convention, acts not being judicial or quasi judicial.
4. Issuance of writ of certiorari is largely matter of discretion.
5. Certiorari should not issue when it will be unavailing.
6. Supreme Court will take judicial notice of proclamation of Secretary of State of United States that requisite number of states had ratified proposed amendment to federal Constitution.
7. Supreme Court will presume, in considering application for writ of certiorari to review action of State convention held pursuant to Acts 1933, No. 6, in ratifying amendment to federal Constitution, and acts of chairman and secretary thereof in certifying its action to Secretary of State of United States, that latter's proclamation that such amendment had been ratified by requisite number of states was based upon duly authenticated notices from several states.
8. Official notice, duly authenticated, to Secretary of State of United States, that State convention had ratified amendment repealing Eighteenth Amendment to federal Constitution, was conclusive upon him.
9. When Secretary of State of the United States received official notice, duly authenticated, from requisite number of states that such states had ratified amendment repealing Eighteenth Amendment to federal Constitution, ratification of proposed amendment was consummated, and became part of federal Constitution.
10. Proclamation of Secretary of State of United States certifying that requisite number of states had ratified proposed amendment repealing Eighteenth Amendment to federal Constitution is conclusive upon courts.
11. Ratification of proposed amendment repealing Eighteenth Amendment to federal Constitution having been consummated and such proposed amendment having become part of federal Consti-
tution, writ of certiorari to review action of State convention in ratifying proposed amendment and transmitting to Secretary of State of United States certification showing action of such convention, should be denied as matter of discretion.
12. Ordinarily, constitutionality of act will not be considered unless disposition of case requires it.
13. Supreme Court, in considering petition for certiorari to review action of State convention held pursuant to Acts 1933 No. 6, providing for calling of conventions for adoption or rejection of amendment repealing Eighteenth Amendment to federal Constitution, will not, on ground of its importance and public interest, pass upon constitutionality of act where Secretary of State of United States has proclaimed that proposed amendment has been ratified by requisite number of states, since question is no longer of public interest.
PETITION to Supreme Court for writ of certiorari. Demurrer by petitionees. Heard at the January Term, 1934, Supreme Court, Rutland County. The opinion states the case.
Petition dismissed.
William Scoville for the petitioner.
Lawrence C. Jones, Attorney General, for the petitionees.
Present: SLACK, MOULTON, THOMPSON, and GRAHAM, JJ., and STURTEVANT, Supr. J.
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the action of a convention held pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 6 of the Acts of 1933, which is entitled "An Act to provide for the calling of conventions for the adoption or rejection of proposed amendments to the Constitution of the United States, submitted by Congress to conventions."
The petitioner is a resident of the city of Brooklyn, New York, and brings this petition on behalf of himself and various named organizations and societies which it is alleged that he represents.
The petition is dated November 8, 1933. It appears therefrom that a convention was held in accordance with the provisions of the act above mentioned on September 26, 1933, to act upon the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the repeal of the Eighteenth amend- ment to such Constitution; that the petitionee, Billings, was the chairman, and the petitionee, Myrick, was the secretary of the convention; that the convention adopted a resolution ratifying the proposed amendment; that on the same day, "in conformity with the statute" and a resolution adopted by the convention, the petitionees made and transmitted to the Secretary of State of the United States a certificate showing in detail the action of such convention, and that the facts appearing in such certificate are now a matter of record in the office of the petitionee, Myrick, as Secretary of this State. The prayer of the petition is that the petitionees be ordered to certify and return said record to this Court, and that, that being done, we review and quash the same because such statute does not conform to article 5 of the Constitution of the United States or to section 8, chapter 1, and section 5, chapter 2, of the Constitution of this State, and consequently said statute and all acts done under it are void. The petition is challenged by demurrer on several grounds.
Our practice regarding petitions of this nature is clearly pointed out in Davidson v. Whitehill et al., 87 Vt. 499, 89 A. 1081. We hear the case upon the petition and subsequent pleadings, and practically decide it upon the granting or refusing of the writ. Passing over the question of whether the petition discloses such an interest in the petitioner as enables him to maintain these proceedings, we take up the question of whether the acts of the petitionees, or either of them, or of the convention, were judicial or quasi judicial in character. If they were not, the writ must be denied, since practically all of the courts of the country follow the common-law rule and hold that the purpose of the writ is to review such acts only, and that it can in no case extend to reviewing acts that are ministerial, legislative, or executive. Davidson v. Whitehill et al., supra. The petitioner in his brief admits that such is the general rule. If there are any exceptions to it, he has not called them to our attention.
He contends that United States Code,...
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