William Stairs and Another, Plaintiffs v. Charles Peaslee

Decision Date01 December 1855
Citation15 L.Ed. 474,18 How. 521,59 U.S. 521
PartiesWILLIAM STAIRS AND ANOTHER, PLAINTIFFS, v. CHARLES H. PEASLEE
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

THIS case came up, on a certificate of division in opinion between the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Griswold, for the plaintiffs, and Mr. Gillet, for the defendant.

Mr. Griswold's first and fourth points were as follows:——

1. The tariff act of March 3, 1851, did not repeal so much of former laws as provided that merchandise, when imported from a country other than that of production or manufacture, should be appraised at the market value of similar articles at the principal markets of the country of production or manufacture, at the period of the exportation to the United States. But that the provision in the 16th section of the tariff act of 1842 is still in force. Act Aug. 30, 1842, c. 270, § 16, 5 Stats. at Large, 564; Act March 3, 1851, c. 38, § 1, 9 Ib. 629; Act July 30, 1846, c. 74, § 8, 9 Ib. 43.

(a) Because congress in passing the tariff act of March 3, 1851, did not intend to repeal or modify the proviso in the 16th section of the tariff act of August 30, 1842. But only so much of the main body of the section as provided that merchandise, when imported from the country of production or manufacture, should be liable to duty on the appraised value at the time when purchased.

And the intention, if it can be ascertained, must govern in the interpretation of these statutes. Greely v. Thompson et al. 10 How. 225; Norcross v. Greely, 1 Curtis, 116; Barnard et al. v. Morton, Ib. 409.

(b) Because the act of March 3, 1851, was passed in consequence of the decision by this court, in the case of Greely v. Thompson et al. 10 How. 225, and Maxwell v. Griswold, Ib. 242, to the effect that by the 16th section of the tariff act of August 30, 1842, merchandise, when imported from the country of production or manufacture, was liable to duty on the appraised value thereof at the time when purchased, and not at the period of the exportation, as had been claimed by the secretary of the treasury.

And the intention of congress was simply to change the time with reference to which the value should be appraised, from the time when purchased, to the period of the exportation. Greely v. Thompson et al. 10 How. 225; Maxwell v. Griswold et al. 10 Ib. 242; Norcross v. Greely, 1 Curtis, 116; Barnard et al. v. Morton, Ib. 409; 1 Kent's Com. 462; Act March 3, 1851, c. 38, § 1, 9 Stats. at Large, 629; Act July 30, 1846, c. 74, § 8, 9 Ib. 43; Act Aug. 30, 1842, c. 270, § 16, 5 Ib. 564; Act March 1, 1823, c. 21, § 5, 3 Ib. 733; Act May 19, 1828, c. 55, §§ 8, 9, 4 Ib. 274; Act July 14, 1832, c. 227, § 7, 4 Ib. 592.

(c) Because sect. 1 of the tariff act of March 3, 1851, is not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the provisio in the 16th section of the tariff act of August 30, 1842, but is cumulative, and should be construed with it, in pari materia. United States v. Sixty-seven Packages of Dry Goods, 17 How. 93; Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 364; United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 564; Daviess et al. v. Fairbairn et al. Ib. 646; Morlot v. Lawrence, 1 Blatch, 612; Saving Institution v. Makin, 23 Maine, 360.

4. If the court shall hold that the appraisements of the cutch were legally made, still the additional duty of twenty per centum under the 8th section of the act of 1846 was wrongfully exacted by the defendant.

(a) Because the additional duty provided by the 8th section of the act of 1846 applies only in cases where the importer or consignee, on entry of merchandise, has voluntarily added to the invoice value. Act 1846, c. 74, § 8, 9 Stats. at Large, 43; Kreisler v. Morton, 1 Curtis, 415.

(b) Because the 17th section of the act of 1842 is still in force, and this imposes, on merchandise which has been procured by purchase, an additional duty of fifty per cent. of the duty prescribed by law, in case the appraised value thereof exceeds by ten per cent., or more, the invoice value; and this section embraces and applies to all cases of purchased goods, where the owner, importer, or consignee has not, on entry thereof, voluntarily added to the invoice value. Kreisler v. Morton, 1 Curtis, 415; Act 1846, § 8, 9 Stats. at Large, 43.

(c) Because the 8th section of the act of 1846 secures to owners, importers, and consignees of imports which have been actually purchased, the right of making such additions to the invoices on entry thereof, as shall, in their opinion, raise the same to the true market value of such imports in the principal markets, &c., &c.—(a privilege not enjoyed under the 17th section of the act of 1842;)—and it also provides that if the owner, importer, or consignee, having availed himself of this privilege, fails to make a sufficient addition to his invoice, he shall pay an additional duty of twenty per cent. on the appraised a value—a severer penalty than is inflicted by the 17th section of the act of 1842.

(d) Because the additional duty provided by the 17th section of the act of 1842 is not inconsistent with, or repugnant to, that in the 8th section of the act of 1846; because the latter is only applicable to cases of declarations of increased values voluntarily made by the owner, consignee, or agent on entry.

(e) Because the basis of appraisement by the two sections are entirely different.

By the 17th section of the act of 1842, if the appraised value exceed by ten per cent. or more, the invoice value, then fifty per cent. of the duty prescribed by law is to be added; while by the 8th section of the act of 1846, if the appraised value exceed by ten per cent. or more, the value declared in the entry, then an additional duty of twenty per cent. on the appraised value shall be assessed.

Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court.

This case comes before the court upon a certificate of division in opinion between the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.

It is an action for money had and received, brought by the plaintiffs, who are merchants, resident and doing business at Halifax, Nova Scotia, to recover of the defendant, the collector of customs for the port of Boston, money alleged to have been illegally exacted on payment of duties on fifty bags of cutch, shipped by the plaintiffs at Halifax, consigned to Messrs. Clark, Janes, and Co., of Boston.

The invoice was dated at Halifax, November 10, 1853, and the cutch was entered at the custom-house, Boston, on the 16th of the same month, at the invoice value.

The value of the cutch, as appraised by the United States appraisers, exceeded by ten per centum the invoice value; and the plaintiff appealed, and a reappraisement was had by two merchant's appraisers, and their appraisement also exceeded by ten per centum the invoice value; whereupon the defendant assessed a duty of ten per centum ad valorem on the appraised value, and also an additional duty or penalty of twenty per centum on the same value, under the 8th section of the tariff act of July 30, 1846.

It was proved that the cutch was the product of the East Indies only, and that Calcutta was the great market of the country of production. And it appeared on the trial that this fact was known to the appraisers when the appraisement was made. It was also proved that London and Liverpool were the principal markets of Great Britain, exclusive of India, for said article; and, so far as appeared at the trial, this cargo was the only one known to have been sold in, or exported from, Halifax.

It was also proved that the appraisers appraised the cutch at its market value in London and Liverpool, and not at Halifax or Calcutta, at the period of its exportation from the port of Halifax to the United States.

The case coming on to be tried, it occurred as a question:——

1. Whether the tariff act of March 3, 1851, repealed so much of all former laws as provided that merchandise, when imported from a country other than that of production or manufacture, should be appraised at the market value of similar articles at the principal markets of the country of production or manufacture, at the period of the exportation to the United States.

On which question the opinions of the judges were opposed.

2. Whether, in estimating the dutiable value of the cutch, the appraisers should have taken the value at the market of Calcutta, or London and Liverpool, or Halifax, at the period of the exportation from Halifax.

On which question the opinions of the judges were also opposed.

3. Whether, if the appraisements were legally made, the additional duty of twenty per centum, under the 8th section of the tariff act of July 30, 1846, was rightfully exacted by the defendant.

On which question the opinions of the judges were opposed.

Wherefore, upon the motion of the plaintiffs, the points were certified to this court for final decision.

The first question certified by the circuit court depends altogether upon the construction of the act of 1851, 9 Stats. at Large, 629.

The language of this act of congress is general, and embraces all importations of goods that are subject to an ad valorem duty; and directs that their value shall be estimated and ascertained by the wholesale price at the period of exportation to the United States, in the principal markets of the country from which they are imported. The time and the place to which the appraisers are required to look, when making their appraisement, are both distinctly specified in the law—the time being the period of exportation, and the place the country from which they were imported into the United States. It makes no reference to their value in the country of production, or the time of purchase. And as there is no ambiguity in the language of the act, and it embraces all goods subject to an ad valorem duty, the court would hardly be justified in giving a construction...

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