William v. Deal
| Decision Date | 23 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | CV 212-175 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
| Parties | WILLIAM LILL, as permanent administrator of the Estate of Robert Lill, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. NATHAN DEAL, Governor of the State of Georgia, THE STATE OF GEORGIA, and SHERIFF STEVE JESSUP, Defendants. |
Presently before the Court are Defendants' motions to dismiss, as supplemented by additional briefing by the parties. Dkt. Nos. 6; 8; 20; 21; 22. Upon due consideration, the Court revises a portion of its prior Order. Dkt. No. 17. Despite this amendment, Defendants Nathan Deal and the State of Georgia's Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Dkt. No. 6, and Defendant Sheriff Steve Jessup's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, Dkt. No. 8, are GRANTED.
In the present suit, Plaintiff William Lill, Administrator of the Estate of Robert Lill (the "Deceased"), seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages against the State of Georgia, Governor Nathan Deal, and the Sheriff of Mcintosh County, Steve Jessup. See Dkt. No. 1.
The Complaint alleges that on July 11, 2009, "Mcintosh County deputy sheriffs working under the direction of Sheriff Steven Jessup came to the residence of [the Deceased]." Id. ¶ 8. The deputy sheriffs arrested and hand-cuffed the Deceased and transported him to the Mcintosh County Detention Center. Id. ¶ 9. After the Deceased was incarcerated, "[t]he Mcintosh County Sheriff's Department conducted a search of the residence" and seized various items of personal property. Id. ¶ 10-11.1
"On or about July 24, 2009, the Mcintosh Sheriff's Office reported to the District Attorney for the Atlantic Judicial Circuit the seizure of property from the residence of [the Deceased] . . . ." Id. ¶ 12. Later, on September 20, 2009, "the Prosecuting Attorneys' Council of Georgia, acting on behalf of the District Attorneys office of the Atlantic Judicial Circuit, sent a certified letter addressed to [the Deceased'shome], which included" a Notice of Seizure of Personal Property." Id. ¶ 13.
The Complaint alleges that this Notice was sent pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(n), which is the code provision concerning forfeitures. That code section states:
O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(n). Plaintiff contends that the Notice given in this case was statutorily deficient because the Notice did not contain an adequate description of "the violation of law alleged." In addition to sending the Notice to the Deceased's residence, notice was published in The Darien News, the legal organ of Mcintosh County. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 21, 38. The Complaintalleges that "the Prosecuting Attorneys of the State of Georgia advised the Mcintosh County Sheriff's Department" to publish a notice of seizure at the Mcintosh County Courthouse; however, the Complaint does not specify whether a notice was actually posted at the courthouse. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff also contends the notice provided by the State through these various methods was a violation of due process because, due to the Deceased's circumstances, he never received actual notice.
The Deceased was unable to receive the Notice sent to his residence because he was incarcerated at the Mcintosh County Detention Center at the time and therefore did not have access to the residence. Id. ¶ 17. While the Notice was purportedly delivered to Joy Bridges2 at the residence, Bridges could not communicate with the Deceased because, as a part of the terms and conditions of Bridges's bond, Bridges was forbidden from having contact with inmates at the Mcintosh County Jail. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges that, when the Notice was mailed to the Deceased's residence, Sheriff Jessup "had actual knowledge that the [Deceased] was incarcerated in the Mcintosh County Detention Center, which is in the same building in which [the Sheriff] maintains his official offices." Id. ¶ 20.
Additionally, the Complaint alleges that the Deceased was incapable of receiving the notice by publication because, pursuant to a policy of the Mcintosh County Sheriff, The Darien News is not permitted in the Deceased's cell block. Id. ¶ 21.
On November 3, 2009, the State of Georgia filed a civil forfeiture action in the Superior Court of Mcintosh County. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. In that action, "the State of Georgia alleged that it had initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings to the subject property, and that more than thirty days had elapsed since the second publication of notice of seizures, and further alleg[ed] that no claim had been filed by any owner or interest holder in the defendant property." Id. ¶ 23. In this forfeiture proceeding, the superior court issued an Order of Disposition that provided that the property seized from the Deceased was forfeited to the State of Georgia and issued an Order of Distribution, which distributed the seized property to the Mcintosh County Sheriff's Office. Id. at Ex. 7. The property subject to the Order of Disposition included various firearms and ammunition. Id. at Ex. 1.
The Complaint alleges that "until [the Deceased] was released from custody many months later [the Deceased] was never provided with actual notice that the State of Georgia was seeking to have his property forfeited to the state, nor was[the Deceased] given actual notice of the seizure of his property." Id. ¶ 26.
In October 2012, Plaintiff William Lill, as Administrator of Robert Lill's Estate, filed suit against Governor Nathan Deal, the State of Georgia, and Sheriff Steve Jessup. Dkt. No. 1. The Complaint asserted three claims: denial of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, conversion, and declaratory or injunctive relief. Id. ¶¶ 34-44. By January 2013, all defendants had moved to dismiss the Complaint. Dkt. Nos. 6; 8.
On August 30, 2013, Defendants' motions to dismiss were granted in part and stayed in part. Dkt. No. 17. All claims were dismissed except for the due process claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which seeks to force, through an injunction, Governor Deal and Sheriff Jessup to return seized property. Id. at 7. The filings had failed to address potentially important issues encompassed in the claim, namely:
(1) the application of various types of immunities to a claim for injunctive relief, (2) the appropriateness of a federal district court ordering state actors to return property seized pursuant to a state court's Order of Distribution, and (3) which defendant in which capacity would be the appropriate party to direct such an order, if warranted.
Id. at 20-21; see also id. at 21-22 (). Thus, the Court afforded the parties the opportunity to advance and clarify their positions. Id. at 21. In turn, all parties have filed supplemental briefs. Dkt. Nos. 18; 20; 21; 22.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court must construe the plaintiff's complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint as true. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain sufficient factual material "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). At a minimum, a complaint should "contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001)) .
Before addressing the due process and conversion claims, the Court first notes issues raised by Plaintiff. In effect, Plaintiff is asking for reconsideration of the August 30, 2013 Order. Dkt. Nos. 18; 20.
A motion for reconsideration of a non-final order is reviewed under Rule 54(b) for abuse of discretion. Maldonado v. Snead, 168 F. App'x 373, 386-87 (11th Cir. 2006). "Reconsideration is appropriate only if [the moving party] demonstrates: (1) an intervening change of law; (2) the availability of new evidence; [or] (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice." Whitesell Corp. v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., No. CV 103-050, 2010 WL 4025943, at *7 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 13, 2010). "In considering a motion for reconsideration, a court must balance the need for finality and judicial economy against the need to render just decisions." Id. Motions for reconsideration "should not be used to relitigate issues which have already been found lacking." Id. "The reconsideration of a previous order is an extraordinary remedy and must set forth...
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