William Ventress Et Al Executors of Lovic Ventress, Deceased Plaintiffs In Error v. Neal Smith, Administrator of John Clark, Deceased
Decision Date | 01 January 1836 |
Citation | 35 U.S. 161,9 L.Ed. 382,10 Pet. 161 |
Parties | WILLIAM C. S. VENTRESS ET AL., EXECUTORS OF LOVIC VENTRESS, DECEASED, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. NEAL SMITH, ADMINISTRATOR OF JOHN CLARK, DECEASED |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
IN error to the district court of the United States for the district of Mississippi.
John Clark, of the state of Alabama, died in 1818, owning and possessed of certain slaves; and after his decease, administration of his estate was granted to his widow. She afterwards intermarried with John Farrington, and an inventory of the estate was filed, the slaves being included in the same. On the first day of November, 1819, Neal Smith, and his co-security for the administratrix, by an application to the proper court, had the letters of administration revoked, on the ground that the administratrix and her husband were embezzling the estate of John Clark; and they stated that the negroes had been sold. Administration was granted to Neal Smith. The slaves were carried from the state of Alabama to the state of Mississippi, and were there sold. The county court of Clark county, in the state of Alabama, in August, 1819, authorized the administratrix of John Clark to sell all the personal property of the intestate, except the slaves; and it did not appear that any order to sell the slaves had ever been obtained. Neal Smith, sometime after he had been appointed administrator of the estate of John Clark, in Alabama, procured letters of administration, ad colligendum, from the probate court of Wilkinson county, in the state of Mississippi. They were in the following terms:
court of the county of Wilkinson. Witness, the honorable Thomas H. Prosser, judge of probates of Wilkinson county.
[No seal of office.]
C. C. WEST, Reg. W. C. P.'
Neal Smith, under the authority of the letters of administration ad colligendum, on the 5th of April, 1822, instituted, in the district court of the United States for Mississippi, an action of trover against Lovic Ventress, for the recovery of the slaves which had belonged to his intestate; and with the declaration in trover, a copy of the letters of administration ad colligendum was filed. The defendant appeared and pleaded to the suit, and it was continued to April term 1823, when the death of the defendant was suggested, the case continued, and a scire facias was issued to Elizabeth Ventress, his administratrix. The administratrix appeared, by her attorney, at the succeeding October term, and the cause was 'legally continued' until April term, 1825; when the death of the administratrix was suggested, and the cause again continued. On the 21st day of February, 1827, a scire facias was issued to William C. S. Ventress and others, the plaintiffs in error, executors of the last will and testament of Lovic Ventress, and at January term of the district court, they appeared, and the case was tried by a jury; and a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, on which judgment was entered by the district court.
On the trial, the defendant offered no evidence other than a bill of sale for the slaves, made by James McDonald to Lovic Ventress, in consideration of $1,900; with proof that the same was paid at the time of sale, and that it was deemed a fair value for the slaves.
The plaintiffs offered in evidence the deposition of Neil McNair, and the defendant objected to the admission of a part of the same.
The court overruled the objection, and the following bill of exceptions was sealed:
Upon the submission of the cause to the jury, the plaintiff's counsel requested the court to charge the jury——
1. That it must appear in evidence to the jury, that Abigail Clark was authorized, by an order of the court in Alabama, to sell the slaves, or she could convey no legal title to the defendant.
2. That it must also appear by evidence to the jury, that James McDonald was authorized, either by a legal purchase or by a power from the administratrix, to sell the slaves, or his conveyance could not divest the estate of Clark of the legal title in his representatives.
3. That unless both of the above facts appeared, to wit, the authority of the administratrix to sell, and the authority of McDonald, either by a legal purchase or power of attorney from the administratrix, that the title to the slaves still remained in the legal representatives of John Clark, deceased.
4. That if the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, they were entitled to the value of the hire of the slaves, by way of damages, from the time the slaves came into the possession of Ventress.
The defendants' counsel also presented the court with the following points in writing, which they requested the court to give in charge to the jury:
1. That if the jury shall believe, from the evidence before them, that Abigail Clark became the administratrix of the estate John Clark, deceased, in the state of Alabama, and, as such administratrix, held and possessed the slaves sued for, till her intermarriage with John Farrington, and that said Farrington and wife, in virtue of the administration of said Abigail, were also possessed of the slaves sued for; and that the possession of these defendants, or their testator, of the slaves sued for, was acquired by, through, or from the said Farrington and wife, either directly or indirectly; then the plaintiff, as administrator to collect the estate of John Clark, deceased, has no right to recover in this action against these defendants.
2. Will charge the jury—if they shall believe, from the evidence, that the slaves sued for in this action were, since the death of said John Clark, held and possessed by Abigail Clark, his administratrix, in the state of Alabama, and that during her administration, she intermarried with John Farrington, and that Farrington and wife possessing said slaves by virtue of the administration of said Abigail, eloigned, wasted, embezzled, sold, or otherwise converted or disposed of them, in violation of their duties as administrators of said Clark's estate, by which devastavit of said administrators, the slaves sued for passed to the possession of one James McDonald, who brought them to this state and sold them for a full and bona fide consideration, to Lovic Ventress, defendants' testator, who purchased in good faith, and without notice of such devastavit of said administrator; then the testator, Lovic Ventress, acquired a good title as against the plaintiff, and the verdict should be for the defendants.
3. Will charge the jury—that if they believe, from the evidence, the slaves sued for belonged to the estate of John Clark, deceased, at the time of his death, and passed into the possession of his administrators, in the state of Alabama, who embezzled and disposed of the same, in disregard of their duties as administrators; but that defendants' testator, Lovic Ventress, became an innocent purchaser of said slaves, (in this state,) for a valuable consideration, without notice of the mal-administration of said Clark's estate in Alabama; then they should find their verdict for the defendants.
The court refused to instruct the jury in all or either of the several points as sought for and requested by the defendants' counsel, as aforesaid; but did charge the jury as requested by the plaintiff, except upon the fourth point; in which the court was of opinion that hire, as damages, could be recovered only from the commencement of the suit.
The counsel of the defendants excepted to the opinion of the court in charging as requested by the counsel for the plaintiff, and refusing to charge the jury as requested by them, on behalf of the defendants.
The defendants prosecuted this writ of error.
The case was argued by Mr. Jones for the plaintiffs, and by Mr. Key for the defendant in error.
Mr. Jones, for the plaintiff, maintained——
1. That the letters ad coll egendum from the court of probates in Mississippi vested not in the plaintiff below, but in terms excluded, any title to the possession of, or to maintain any possessory action for the property in question, under the peculiar circumstances and relations of that property and of these...
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