Williams Co. v. Hamilton, 880057

Decision Date17 August 1988
Docket NumberNo. 880057,880057
Citation427 N.W.2d 822
PartiesWILLIAMS COMPANY, a partnership, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Larry A. HAMILTON, Philip Hamilton, Margie Hamilton Ousterhout, and Judy Casper, individually and as heirs of the Estate of Finlay F. Hamilton, Defendants and Appellees. Civ.
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court

William P. Pearce, of Pearce & Durick, Bismarck, for plaintiff and appellant.

Mary E. Nordsven, of Howe, Hardy, Galloway & Maus, P.C., Dickinson, for defendants and appellees.

VANDE WALLE, Justice.

Williams Company appealed from a summary judgment determining that Larry A. Hamilton, Philip Hamilton, and Judy Casper (hereinafter referred to as the Hamilton heirs) owned the mineral interest in certain real estate, that certain deeds conveyed only a royalty interest, and that Williams Company was to provide the Hamilton heirs with an accounting as to the production of all oil and gas on the subject property. Because the record contains no order complying with Rule 54(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., we dismiss the appeal.

On March 10, 1952, Finlay F. Hamilton acquired an 84/480 undivided interest in all of the oil, gas, and other minerals in and under certain land in Bowman County. On March 7, 1953, Finlay granted a 4/480 undivided mineral interest to H.M. Leighty. That mineral interest is not in dispute in this case. Thereafter, Finlay executed a series of 27 instruments, each entitled "MINERAL DEED," the effect of which is the subject of the instant dispute. In 1981 the Hamilton heirs executed an oil and gas lease in favor of Williams. Williams paid a bonus consideration of $14,005.25 based on 80.03 net mineral acres.

Alleging that the Hamilton heirs actually own only 0.4166667 mineral acres, Williams Williams Company and the Hamilton heirs submitted a written stipulation of facts to the district court. Pursuant to the court's order for summary judgment, a judgment was entered that dismissed Williams Company's complaint, determined that the 27 deeds executed by Finlay conveyed only royalty interests and not mineral interests, quieted title to the disputed mineral interests in the Hamilton heirs, determined that the lease between Williams Company and the Hamilton heirs entitled the Hamilton heirs to receive " 3/16ths of all oil and gas produced and saved from the leased premises" and ordered Williams Company to provide the Hamilton heirs with an accounting as to the production of all oil and gas on the property and of all monies paid from and after the date of production.

                sued the Hamilton heirs to recover $13,932.23, which it alleged is "the amount of the bonus consideration paid to Defendants that is attributable to the 79.6133 net mineral acres not owned by Defendants, at $175.00 per net acre."   The Hamilton heirs answered, requesting dismissal of the complaint, and asserted a counterclaim seeking to have their title to their claimed mineral interest quieted, an accounting of all oil and gas produced and sold from the premises, and a judgment for such sum as may be due them as a result of the accounting
                

Williams Company appealed, raising the following issues:

"1. WHETHER PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A REFUND OF OIL AND GAS LEASE BONUS DUE TO FAILURE OF DEFENDANTS' TITLE.

"2. WHETHER, IF CERTAIN DEEDS CONVEYED ROYALTY INTERESTS, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE QUANTUM OF INTEREST CONVEYED."

Williams Company contends that, through the 27 disputed deeds, Finlay conveyed all but 5/480 of his mineral interest in 40 acres, thus retaining 0.4166667 net mineral acres. The Hamilton heirs, on the other hand, contend that the 27 deeds:

"conveyed nonparticipating royalty interests to the grantees. The executive right, the exclusive right to lease, was retained by the Grantor. Thus, as heirs of the Grantor the Defendants have the exclusive power to lease the property in question and consequently have properly retained the entire bonus paid by the Plaintiff."

Williams Company "has appealed from a judgment that only partially disposes of an action in which 'more than one claim for relief is presented.' Rule 54(b), N.D.R.Civ.P." Anderson v. State, 344 N.W.2d 489 (N.D.1984). Because Rule 54(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., has not been complied with, "[t]he partial disposition embodied in the judgment appealed from therefore is not ripe for review" ( Id., at 490), and we dismiss the appeal. See also Gillmore v. Morelli, 425 N.W.2d 369 (N.D.1988); Martinson v. Raugutt, 346 N.W.2d 289 (N.D.1984) [counterclaims not adjudicated]. We could retain jurisdiction and remand for consideration of the propriety of issuing a Rule 54(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., order. Courchene v. Delaney Distributors, Inc., 418 N.W.2d 781 (N.D.1988). We decline to do so, however, because, as we will briefly discuss, a Rule 54(b) order would be inappropriate. See Union State Bank v. Woell, 357 N.W.2d 234 (N.D.1984).

It is apparent that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, N.D.R.Civ.P. Deeds are construed in the same manner as contracts in order to ascertain the grantor's intent:

"The primary purpose in construing a deed is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the grantor. Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d 8, 9 (N.D.1983). Section 47-09-11, N.D.C.C., provides that grants of real property 'shall be interpreted in like manner with contracts in general except so far as otherwise provided' in that chapter.

"We therefore look to the rules for interpreting contracts provided by Chapter 9-07, N.D.C.C., to aid us in construing a deed." Mueller v. Stangeland, 340 N.W.2d 450, 452 (N.D.1983).

Each of the 27 deeds was a printed form document entitled "MINERAL DEED." Each deed provided for the conveyance Furthermore, the grantees in the 27 deeds executed by Finlay have not been made parties to this action. Those grantees may have evidence of and insight into Finlay's ambiguously expressed intentions not...

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  • Dinger ex rel. Dinger v. Strata Corp.
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • March 21, 2000
    ...granting summary judgment therefore did not terminate the action against Strata and TSS and was not appealable. See Williams Co. v. Hamilton, 427 N.W.2d 822, 822 (N.D.1988) (dismissing an appeal from a summary judgment "[b]ecause the record contain[ed] no order complying with Rule 54(b), [¶......
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    • November 25, 2013
    ...in the same manner as contracts.” State Bank & Trust of Kenmare v. Brekke, 1999 ND 212, ¶ 12, 602 N.W.2d 681;see Williams Co. v. Hamilton, 427 N.W.2d 822, 823 (N.D.1988). If a deed is unambiguous, this Court determines the parties' intent from the instrument itself. See Brekke, at ¶ 12;Stra......
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    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
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    ...in the same manner as contracts.” State Bank & Trust of Kenmare v. Brekke, 1999 ND 212, ¶ 12, 602 N.W.2d 681;see Williams Co. v. Hamilton, 427 N.W.2d 822, 823 (N.D.1988). If a deed is unambiguous, this Court determines the parties' intent from the instrument itself. See Brekke, at ¶ 12;Stra......
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    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • March 1, 1994
    ...of jurisdiction is not meant to reflect negatively on the validity of Landowners' substantive issues on appeal. See Williams Co. v. Hamilton, 427 N.W.2d 822 (N.D.1988). The issues raised by Landowners may have serious consequences. If the granting of partial summary judgment by the trial co......
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1 books & journal articles
  • CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGY OF REVIEWING TITLE DATA AND PREPARING THE TITLE OPINION
    • United States
    • FNREL - Special Institute Mineral Title Examination III (FNREL)
    • Invalid date
    ...an instrument entitled "Mineral Deed" may in fact convey only a royalty interest, or vice-versa. See, e.g., Williams Co. v. Hamilton, 427 N.W.2d 822 (N.D. 1988). Similarly, an instrument labelled as a deed may in fact be a mortgage. See, e.g., Mechtle v. Topp, 52 N.W.2d 842 (N.D. 1952). [24......

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