Williams ex rel. Hart v. Paint Valley Local School
| Decision Date | 09 March 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-4485.,No. 03-4106.,03-4106.,03-4485. |
| Citation | 400 F.3d 360 |
| Parties | Casey WILLIAMS, by and through his mother and next friend, Sara HART, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. PAINT VALLEY LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
ARGUED: Emily J. Lewis, Dublin, Ohio, for Appellant. John C. Albert, Crabbe, Brown & James, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Emily J. Lewis, Dublin, Ohio, for Appellant. John C. Albert, Crabbe, Brown & James, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.
Before: SILER and CLAY, Circuit Judges; BERTELSMAN, District Judge.*
This appeal involves claims arising from the alleged inappropriate touching of a student by a teacher in the Paint Valley Local School District ("Paint Valley"). Casey Williams ("Williams") alleged the following claims: 1) violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681,et seq.; 2) violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3); 3) negligent retention; 4) assault and battery; 5) negligence by defendant Arnold (not a party to this appeal); 6) negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress; 7) invasion of privacy; and 8) loss of consortium.
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over this matter because the complaint alleged violations of the Constitution and/or laws of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the final judgments of district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
This court also has jurisdiction to hear Paint Valley's cross-appeal of the district court's denial of Paint Valley's motion for reconsideration as to a specific doctrine of case law, as articulated in Middlesex Co. Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981).
This matter arises from the alleged inappropriate touching of Casey Williams by Harry E. Arnold, Jr., while Arnold was employed as a teacher by the Paint Valley Local School District. The facts underlying the case were developed during a jury trial.
Williams' claims arose out of numerous incidents of sexual molestation of him by his fourth-grade teacher, Harry E. Arnold, Jr., in September 1999. At least five other grade school boys and their parents had made complaints to school officials and school board members about Arnold's sexual molestation of the boys, including fondling their genitals in the classroom. Complaints were made by four boys in 1976 and another in 1990.
Plaintiff alleged that Paint Valley violated Title IX and his constitutional right to bodily integrity by repeatedly failing to take remedial action to prevent Arnold's sexual molestation of young male students. Plaintiff alleged that Paint Valley knew that Arnold presented a risk to student safety but, by its action or inaction, Paint Valley was deliberately indifferent to this risk.
Paint Valley filed a motion for summary judgment as to all of Williams' claims. The district court granted in part and denied in part Paint Valley's motion for summary judgment. The district court found that issues of fact remained with regard to Williams' § 1983 and Title IX claims and dismissed all other claims alleged in the complaint. Paint Valley filed a motion for reconsideration, urging the court to limit Williams to a Title IX claim, pursuant to the National Sea Clammers doctrine.1
Following the district court's denial of Paint Valley's motion for reconsideration, the remainder of Williams' claims went to a jury trial. The parties contested one another's proposed jury instructions, with the court finally reaching a resolution and issuing its own jury instructions. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Paint Valley as to all of Williams' claims, and the district court entered judgment consistent with the jury's verdict.
Williams then filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for new trial, which the district court denied. Williams timely filed a notice of appeal. Paint Valley then filed its notice of cross-appeal.2 The primary issue on appeal is the correctness of the jury instructions.
The trial court gave the following instructions on the Title IX claim. The disputed language is emphasized.
One of Plaintiff's claims arises under a federal law known as Title IX. As relevant here, Title IX provides that "No person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." It is agreed by the parties that the Defendant received federal assistance.
Under Title [IX], the School District may be liable for the sexual abuse of a student if the Plaintiff demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence each of the following elements:
(1.) Plaintiff Casey Williams was subjected to sexual abuse by the intentional conduct of Harold Arnold;
(2.) A school district official with authority to institute corrective measures had actual notice that Harold Arnold posed a substantial risk of sexual abuse to children in the school district; and
(3.) The school district was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of sexual abuse posed to the children of the school district.
In order for the School District to be liable for acting with deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the School District had actual knowledge of prior facts to which it responded unreasonably. Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that its response to the abuse, or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of known circumstances. No one particular response is required. A school district's duty to respond may be sparked once it is alerted to the possibility of a sexual abuse. If the school district takes timely measures to end a substantial risk of abuse, it is not deliberately indifferent [if] such measures are not clearly unreasonable.
Where a school district has knowledge that its remedial action is inadequate and ineffective, it is required to take reasonable action in light of those circumstances to eliminate the behavior. Where a school district has actual knowledge that its efforts to remediate are ineffective, and it continues to use those same methods to no avail, such district has failed to act reasonably in light of the known circumstances.
(emphasis added).
The trial court gave the following instructions on the § 1983 claim. Again, the disputed language is emphasized.
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiff also asserts a claim under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute provides:
Every person who, under color of statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured....
This federal civil rights act was enacted by Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In order to proceed on a Section 1983 claim, the Plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he has been deprived of a constitutional right by a person acting under color of state law. The parties agree that Harold Arnold, as a public school teacher, was acting under color of state law, as that term is used in Section 1983. The Due Process clause of the Constitution protects individuals against state intrusions on bodily security. A public student's right to personal security and to bodily integrity is protected by the Constitution. That right embraces the right to be free from sexual abuse at the hands of a public school employee. In other words, you must first find by a preponderance of the evidence that Harold Arnold violated Casey Williams' constitutional rights by sexually abusing or harassing Casey Williams.
If you find that Plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Harold Arnold deprived Casey Williams of his constitutional right, Plaintiff has not proved his claim under Section 1983.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 — CONTINUED
If you determine that Plaintiff has proved that Harold Arnold violated his constitutional rights, you must next determine whether the School District itself was responsible for that violation. The School District is not liable simply because Harold Arnold sexually abused the Plaintiff. In order to prevail on a Section 1983 claim, the Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right; and (2) that the School Board is responsible for that violation. The Plaintiff must show that the School District itself is the wrongdoer.
A school district may be liable under Section 1983 if it had an officially executed policy, or the toleration of a custom within the school district leads to, causes, or results in the deprivation of a constitutional right. A custom must reflect a course of action deliberately chosen from among various alternatives. In short, a "custom" is a practice or policy not memorialized by written law.
In this case, Plaintiff Casey Williams seeks to hold the Paint Valley Local School District liable for the acts, failure to act, or decisions of school officials. You may find the School District liable for the acts or decisions of its officials only if the Plaintiff has proven that the officials or official had the authority to establish policy for the school and that decisions, actions or failure to act caused injury to the Plaintiff. In other words, the School District can only be held liable if the officials' acts or omissions can be fairly said to represent official policy of the school.
In the present case, Plaintiff does not claim that the Paint Valley School District...
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