Williams, In re
Decision Date | 18 August 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 20082,20082 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | In re Wyman WILLIAMS and Gregory Alvin Jenkins, children under the age of seventeen years. Gregory Alvin JENKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent. |
William T. Toal, Columbia, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Asst. Atty. Gen. Joseph R. Barker and Staff Atty. Sidney S. Riggs, III, Columbia, for respondent.
Appellant, a minor, was arrested and charged on April 15, 1974, with delinquency based upon charges of breaking and entering and theft from a place of business in Columbia, South Carolina. He was subsequently found guilty of the charges, adjudged a delinquent by the Family Court of Richland County, and placed on probation for twelve (12) months. A statement signed by appellant following his arrest was introduced into evidence over his objection. The admissibility of that statement is the sole issue in this appeal.
Appellant, age 15, and his cousin Wyman Williams, age 14, spent the night of April 14, 1974 at the home of their grandmother. They were awakened at about 3:00 a.m. on Monday, April 15, 1974, by appellant's father who carried them with him to the premises of Pearce-Young-Angel Co., a wholesale food distributor. They entered the premises where appellant and his cousin were shortly thereafter arrested by an officer of the Richland County Sheriff's Department, who was investigating a report from the night manager of the business that a man was in the meat freezer. When the officer approached and someone shouted: 'Police,' appellant and his cousin ran but were unable to escape. The officer testified that they stopped after he fired a warning shot. Appellant testified that he ran only after a shot was fired and not because he thought he was doing anything illegal.
At the time of appellant's arrest, meat of the approximate value of $1100.00 had been removed from the freezer and placed on the loading platform.
Appellant was carried to the premises by his father and it is clearly inferable that the father escaped when the officers arrived. Therefore, the conclusion is inescapable that the father knew of the plight of his son without being notified by the officers. Following his arrest about 3:30 a.m., appellant was taken to the Richland County jail and held until about 9:00 a.m. when he was put under the custody of a juvenile investigator of the Sheriff's Department. Shortly thereafter this investigator read to him the Miranda warnings, after which he signed a waiver form. Appellant then made an inculpatory statement which was reduced to writing on a form containing the requirements of Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and signed. Appellant and his co-defendant testified that the statement was signed because he was told that he could go home when he did so.
The statement signed by appellant was admitted into evidence, over objection. The exceptions challenge the admissibility of the statement upon the grounds (1) that the statement was made while appellant was in illegal custody in violation of Code (Supplement) Section 15--1095.17 and (2), since appellant was a juvenile, he could not make an intelligent waiver of his constitutional right against self-incrimination in the absence of a parent or a friendly adult.
Appellant's first contention is that his statement was made during a period of illegal custody because his parents were not notified of his arrest 'as soon as possible' as required by Code Section 15--1095.17. This section is a part of the Family Code Act and provides that when a child is taken into custody for violation of any law the 'officers shall notify the parent, guardian or custodian of the child as soon as possible.'
Appellant and his cousin were taken into custody about 3:30 a.m. on the premises of Pearce-Young-Angel Company where the father of appellant was also present but apparently escaped. Since the father was aware of the plight of his son, we assume that the claim of failure to notify the parents has reference to appellant's mother. While the officers could not specifically recall whether the parents were notified that night, appellant's brief concedes that the mother of appellant appeared at the jail 'around 8 or 9 a.m.,' about five (5) hours after the arrest, to see about her son. She evidently received information of the arrest at some time prior to her appearance at the jail. It is most significant that neither the father nor mother of appellant, witnesses peculiarly available to him, were called to testify that they had received no notice of the arrest of their son.
In view of the presence of the father on the premises when appellant was arrested and the appearance of the mother at the jail within about five (5) hours of the arrest which occurred in the early morning hours (about 3:30 a.m.), we conclude that the record fails to sustain the claim that the parents of appellant were not notified of his arrest 'as soon as possible' within the meaning of Section 15--1095.17.
Assuming however that appellant was held in illegal custody, such fact alone does not render his inculpatory statement inadmissible. We have held that every statement or confession made by a person in illegal custody is not involuntary and...
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