Williams, Matter of
| Decision Date | 10 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 58562-8,58562-8 |
| Citation | 121 Wn.2d 655,853 P.2d 444 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Personal Restraint Petition of Kent Glen WILLIAMS, Petitioner. En Banc |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Leta J. Schattauer, Seattle, for petitioner.
Christine Gregoire, Atty. Gen., John M. Jones, Asst., Olympia, for respondent.
Kent Williams (Williams) appeals the dismissal of his personal restraint petition by the Court of Appeals. He asserts the method by which the Department of Corrections (Department) calculated his sentence violated its statutory mandate as well as his right to equal protection of the laws under both the federal and state constitutions. Specifically, Williams claims the Department failed to adequately account for "good-time" credits he earned during his presentence incarceration in King County Jail. We reverse and remand.
On August 16, 1989, Williams was arrested for first degree murder and held in King County Jail pending his bail hearing. On August 21, his bail was set at $500,000. Apparently, due to his indigence, Williams was unable to post this bail and remained in the county jail pending trial. On February 9 of the next year, Williams was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 280 months in prison. This sentence was well within the guidelines established by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) for Williams' offense. See RCW 9.94A.310, et seq.
On April 4, 1990, Williams was transferred from the King County Jail to the Washington State Penitentiary in Walla Walla to begin serving his sentence. In the course of that transfer, officials at the county jail provided the Department with a certification regarding Williams' time served at their facility. This certification indicated only that Williams had been incarcerated for 232 days at King County Jail and had earned 77 days of "good-time" as a result. The Department accepted this certification and granted Williams 309 days against his ultimate sentence.
Williams then filed a personal restraint petition with the Court of Appeals, asserting the Department had failed to adequately award good-time credits for his incarceration in King County Jail. The Court of Appeals dismissed Williams' petition. In doing so, the court noted that the 77 days of good-time was equal to one-third of the time Williams had spent in the county jail. The court mistakenly concluded Williams had therefore received the statutory maximum good-time allowance and was not entitled to relief. See Order Dismissing Personal Restraint Petition, at 1. After the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition, Williams filed a motion for discretionary review before this court. The court granted review on May 5, 1992.
Washington's penal law allows correctional facilities to reduce the sentences of offenders committed to their care by "earned early release time", also known as "good-time". See RCW 9.94A.150(1). 1 The amount of good-time allowed to each offender is to be determined "in accordance with procedures that shall be developed and promulgated by the correctional agency having jurisdiction in which the offender is confined." RCW 9.94A.150(1). In no case, however, "shall the aggregate earned early release time exceed one-third of the total sentence". RCW 9.94A.150(1). Thus, correctional facilities may reduce the sentences of incarcerated offenders by up to one-third of their total sentence imposed. If, for example, an offender is sentenced to eighteen years in prison his sentence may eventually be reduced by up to six years, one-third of the eighteen year sentence imposed.
For this case, the critical feature of such a calculation is that it is not based upon the amount of time the offender is incarcerated. Instead, the allowable good-time is calculated based upon one-third of the sentence imposed. In the example used above, an offender who earned his statutory maximum of good-time would serve twelve years and receive six years of good-time to fulfill his eighteen year sentence. The six years of good-time would be one-third of the eighteen year sentence imposed, not one-third of the twelve years of incarceration. Graphically:
(18 year sentence imposed )
(12 years time served)
(6 years good-time)
Notice that while the six years good-time is equal to one-third of the sentence imposed, it is one-half of the time served.
This confusion between the sentence imposed and the time served may be the source of the problem in this case. King County Jail certified to the Department that Williams had earned only 77 days of good-time. The Court of Appeals determined this amount to be equal to the statutory maximum because 77 days is one-third of the 232 days Williams spent at King County. This calculation was based on the amount of time Williams served, however, and therefore the conclusion that it is equivalent to the statutory maximum is incorrect. At oral argument, the Department conceded that if the county jail had granted the statutory maximum of good- time, Williams would have received 116 days of good-time instead of the 77 actually certified. The difference in this case is therefore 39 days.
On the record before this court, it is impossible to determine exactly why the King County Jail failed to accord Williams the statutory maximum of good-time for his presentence incarceration. The certification provided by the county jail only indicates the total number of good-time days certified, not the reason for that number. One possible explanation of the gap between the certification and the statutory maximum is simply an error of law on the part of the King County Jail. The county jail may have believed, as the Court of Appeals certainly did, that 77 days represented the statutory maximum. On the other hand, King County Jail may have affirmatively determined Williams' conduct only merited 77 days credit. On the record before us, it is possible Williams received less than the statutory maximum for prison misconduct, or for some other reason.
The grant of good-time is governed by RCW 9.94A.150. At the relevant time, the statute provided:
(1) ... the terms of the sentence of an offender committed to a county jail facility, or a correctional facility operated by the department, may be reduced by earned early release time in accordance with procedures that shall be developed and promulgated by the correctional facility in which the offender is confined. The earned early release time shall be for good behavior and good performance, as determined by the correctional facility. Any program established pursuant to this section shall allow an offender to earn early release credits for presentence incarceration. If an offender is transferred from a county jail to the department of corrections, the county jail facility shall certify to the department the amount of time spent in custody at the facility and the amount of earned early release time.
(Italics ours.) Former RCW 9.94A.150(1). Thus the statute specifically divides authority to grant good-time between the county jails and the Department. While an offender is confined in the county jail, his or her award of good-time is to be determined in "accordance with procedures ... developed and promulgated" by the jail. When the offender is confined by the Department, his or her award of good-time is to be determined in accordance with procedures ... developed and promulgated by the Department. If an offender is transferred from the jurisdiction of the county jail to the Department, the Department receives a certification from the county jail regarding the award of good-time to that offender.
Williams contends that the Department violated this statutory scheme by refusing to credit him with the statutory maximum of good-time for his incarceration in King County Jail. He argues the statute requires the Department to "allow an offender to earn early release time for presentence incarceration." The Department failed to comply with this mandate by relying upon the King County Jail's certification. In support of his claim, Williams relies upon In re Mota, 114 Wash.2d 465, 788 P.2d 538 (1990). In that case, this court held equal protection required the Department to grant full good-time credit for presentence incarceration.
Williams' reading of RCW 9.94A.150(1) runs contrary both to the language and the purpose of the statute. As noted above, the statute divides authority over the award of good-time between the county jail and the Department. Nothing in its structure or language indicates that the Department is to ignore the certification provided by the county jail and recalculate the award of good-time to a transferred offender. Indeed, the statute appears to give the various correctional authorities, both county jails and the state correctional system, plenary authority over good-time awards for offenders under their jurisdiction.
The purpose of the award or denial of good-time also belies Williams' reading of RCW 9.94A.150(1). While this court has in the past recognized that good-time may serve important rehabilitative purposes, State v. Phelan, 100 Wash.2d 508, 515, 671 P.2d 1212 (1983), we have also recognized its relation to prison discipline. See Mota, 114 Wash.2d at 476, 788 P.2d 538 () Commentators have agreed that the award or denial of good-time serves important disciplinary goals. See D. Boerner, Sentencing in Washington § 10.11, at 10-9 (1985); J. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel Good Time, 30 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 217, 258 (1982-83). The disciplinary purpose of good-time has also been recognized by the United States Supreme Court in the context of the federal correctional system. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 1062, 35 L.Ed.2d282 (1973) (...
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