Williams Pipe Line Co. v. MOUNDS VIEW, MINN.

• Decision Date: 07 January 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 4-86-648,4-86-651 and 4-86-656.
• Citation: 651 F. Supp. 551
• Parties: WILLIAMS PIPE LINE CO., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MOUNDS VIEW, MINNESOTA, an incorporated municipality, Jerome W. Linke, its Mayor, Donald F. Pauley, its Clerk-Administrator, Barbara A. Haake, Susan Hankner, Phyllis I. Blanchard, and Gary C. Quick, members of the Mounds View City Council, Defendants. COUNTY OF RAMSEY, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAMS PIPE LINE COMPANY, Defendant. CITY OF MOUNDS VIEW, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAMS PIPE LINE COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

651 F. Supp. 551

WILLIAMS PIPE LINE CO., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MOUNDS VIEW, MINNESOTA, an incorporated municipality, Jerome W. Linke, its Mayor, Donald F. Pauley, its Clerk-Administrator, Barbara A. Haake, Susan Hankner, Phyllis I. Blanchard, and Gary C. Quick, members of the Mounds View City Council, Defendants.

COUNTY OF RAMSEY, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAMS PIPE LINE COMPANY, Defendant.

CITY OF MOUNDS VIEW, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAMS PIPE LINE COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. Nos. 4-86-648, 4-86-651 and 4-86-656.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Fourth Division.

January 7, 1987.

William E. Flynn, and Lawrence E. Meuwissen, O'Connor & Hannan, Minneapolis, Minn., and Mark K. Blongewicz, Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Collingsworth & Nelson, Tulsa, Okl., for Williams Pipe Line.

Michele L. Timmons, Chief, Civ. Div., Ramsey County Attorney's Office, St. Paul, Minn., Ramsey County.

Richard Meyers, and Eric W. Valen, St. Paul, Minn., for City of Mounds View.

Alan R. Mitchell, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Minn., for amicus curiae State of Minn.

DIANA E. MURPHY, District Judge.

On July 8, 1986, a portion of a petroleum pipeline owned by Williams Pipe Line Company (Williams) failed. A resulting explosion and fire killed two people and badly injured a third. The accident also caused property and environmental damage. These related law suits are only part of ongoing proceedings relating to the accident and operation of the pipeline.

By order dated August 22, 1986, 651 F.Supp. 544, this court denied motions of the County of Ramsey and the City of Mounds View for orders restraining Williams from testing or restarting the pipeline.¹ The court granted Williams a limited temporary restraining order barring the other parties from interfering with preparation for testing the pipeline. Subsequently, the parties reached agreements permitting Williams to test the pipeline. See Stipulations and Orders of September 16 and 17, 1986. The matter is now before the court on motions by all parties for preliminary injunctions. Williams asks that the court enjoin the other parties from interfering with the reopening and operation of the line.² Ramsey County and Mounds View seek to enjoin operation of the pipeline. The county's proposed injunction would bar resumption of operations without its permission. Mounds View's proposed injunction would prevent reopening of the pipeline during the pendency of this litigation.

Background

These preliminary findings of fact are drawn from a number of sources. There have been two evidentiary hearings in this court. The parties have also submitted substantial other materials, including affidavits, scientific papers, photographs, volumes of testimony taken in other settings, graphs, charts, press releases, and numerous letters. Many of the material facts are uncontested, but others are vigorously disputed. The parties' positions are unfortunately not always clear.

A. History of the Pipeline

Williams operates hazardous liquid pipelines in 12 states. It acquired Line 2N from the Great Lakes Pipeline Company in 1966. This line runs from the Roseville Terminal, in or near Minneapolis, Minnesota to Duluth, Minnesota and Superior, Wisconsin. In 1957, prior to Williams' acquisition of the line, Ramsey County and several private land owners had granted permission to the predecessor company to construct approximately ten miles of the pipeline through their property.³ The county resolution granting permission to lay two and one-half to three miles of pipe through a county right-of-way along Long Lake Road contained certain conditions: the company was to "remove, reinstall, or repair such pipe when in the opinion of the County Engineer or the Board of County Commissioners such removal, installation or replacement shall be advantageous to the people of this County." The company was also to give notice of any intended excavation, maintenance or removal and to perform such work under the supervision of the county engineer. The county engineer had the right to "make all rules with respect to possible hazards as he shall deem necessary and advisable."

The pipe comprising Line 2N is electric resistance weld (ERW) pipeline manufactured by Jones and Laughlin Co. in the late 1950's. Such ERW pipeline was made from flat steel. The steel was formed into pipe and then welded at a seam, first by use of an electric current and then by use of heat. These seam welds make ERW pipe different from other line pipe materials manufactured in past decades.⁴ See J. Kiefner, Evaluating Pipeline Integrity-Flaw Behavior During and Following High Pressure Testing (1986). While most pipes are "tough, ductile materials," id., the weld zones of some ERW materials are not. As a result, failure in ERW pipes differs from that in most pipes. While extension of a defect "may take the form of slow stretching and tearing if the material is relatively tough and ductile, ... it may take the form of sudden short burst of cracking if the material is not particularly tough and ductile, possibly leading to complete failure." Id. Some have questioned the integrity of these pipes. Federal law does not forbid their use.

The record contains little evidence of Williams past leak and safety record in Minnesota. The company has publicly stated that it has experienced 55 pipeline leaks and 34 station or terminal leaks in its Minnesota pipeline during the last 10 years. Of the pipeline leaks, 24 involved coated pipeline, such as those at issue here. These leaks apparently had a variety of causes, some wholly outside Williams' control. Two previous failures—one on Line 2N and one on the Newport Villas line, involved weld seam splits in ERW pipe. In both cases, Williams concluded that the failures resulted from manufacturing defects. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that any of the leaks prior to July 1986 caused serious injury or loss of life.

Williams tested Line 2N in 1984. Seventeen sections of the pipeline failed, most of them as a result of seam failures. Only a limited investigation of those failures was made. After replacing the failed sections, Williams successfully hydrostatically tested the line at approximately 1900 p.s.i.g.⁵

B. Federal Regulation

Interstate hazardous liquid pipeline safety is regulated by the United States Department of Transportation (DOT). Under the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 (HLPSA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2014 which was enacted in 1979, the Secretary of DOT (the Secretary) must establish and enforce safety regulations for construction of new pipelines and the operation and maintenance of existing pipelines. The Secretary regulates pipeline safety under HLPSA and its companion statute, the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (NGPSA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1686 (enacted 1968), through the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) which is part of the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA). OPS has direct responsibility for enforcement of HLPSA and the safety regulations promulgated under it. See generally 49 C.F.R. §§ 190.1-195.440. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which also plays an important role in this case, is not a regulatory agency. NTSB is "an independent Government Agency located with the Department of Transportation established to promote transportation safety by conducting independent accident investigations and by formulating safety improvement recommendations." 49 U.S.C. § 1901(1).

There is very little evidence about past contact between Williams and OPS. Only two OPS investigators are responsible for inspecting 113 pipeline operators in 10 states, including Minnesota, for compliance with safety regulations and for the investigation of most accidents. The last non-accident-related inspection of Williams' locations in Minnesota apparently took place in August 1984.

A General Accounting Office chart apparently prepared for Congressman Bruce Vento, submitted here by Mounds View, identifies 20 OPS inspections of Williams' locations in at least 7 states since 1980. Seven of these inspections are characterized as "routine," two as visits to "witness a test," and the remainder as accident investigations. In six cases, including one accident investigation, no violation was noted. In four cases, including two accident investigations, warning letters were issued and cases closed. The violations in these cases involved failure to mark a Kansas pipeline route with warning signs, use of a pump without pre-testing in Minnesota, the need for protective covering for exposed pipe in "various locations," and lack of operating procedures concerning pressure in Owatonna, Minnesota.

In eight other inspections, including the one at issue here, OPS found probable violations. A compliance order was issued after OPS found that a Roseville, Minnesota terminal manifold had been installed "without 100 percent testing." OPS imposed a fine of $1000 against Williams for failure to report a Superior, Wisconsin rupture,⁶ and issued a proposed hazard order in response to a Maplewood, Minnesota accident. Seven follow-up inspections were made over a ten-month period, and it was eventually agreed that Williams would recondition the pipeline. In two cases, OPS charged that Williams was operating above maximum pressure: in Iowa, this resulted in a follow-up inspection and compliance orders; the Kansas case was withdrawn due to "new data". Two cases involved failures of pipe seams: OPS issued notices of probable hazardous condition in both cases and "action is pending." Finally, in two 1986 cases, "inspection results have not been resolved."

Both OPS Central Region Chief Edward Ondak and OPS Director Robert Paullin have stated that they do not believe that fines are appropriate responses to ongoing safety problems. Rather, they believe that operators should spend their money correcting the problems. Paullin has stated, however, that if OPS orders were ignored, he would...