Williams Printing Co v. Saunders

• Decision Date: 18 January 1912
• Parties: WILLIAMS PRINTING CO. et al. v. SAUNDERS.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

73 S.E. 472

(113 Va. 156)

WILLIAMS PRINTING CO. et al.

v.SAUNDERS.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Jan. 18, 1912.

1. Libel and Slander (§ 104^*)—Evidence-Malice—Other Publications.

Libels other than those declared on, whether published before or after the bringing of suit, including libels on third parties, are admissible to show malice, and the general character of the publication issued by defendant.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. §§ 284-291; Dec. Dig. § 104.*]

2. Libel and Slander (§§ 6, 33*)—Libel per 8E—Charging Offenses.

The declaration in libel alleged that defendant published an article headed "S. and L. —Boss and Lieutenant, " S. being plaintiff, and also an article stating that a certain person, a saloonkeeper, was plaintiff's partner, the article being entitled "G., Policy King—Partner of S. in Stock Farm, " and also an article, entitled "Buying Votes in M. and R., " which charged by innuendo that plaintiff would buy votes to get re-elected to the Democratic executive committee of the city. Held, that the charge must have been injurious to plaintiff's reputation, and was actionable per se.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. §§ 3-16, 112; Dec. Dig. §§ 6, 33.*]

3. Libel and Slander (§ 32*) — General Damages—Loss of Business or Profits.

Evidence of general loss of customers or profits is general, not special, damage, and is admissible in proof of general damages, where the words charged are actionable per se.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Dec. Dig. § 32.*]

4. Libel and Slander (§ 100*) — Actions— Issues—Proof—Truth.

Under Code 1904, § 3375, providing that defendant may justify by "alleging and proving" that the words written were true, and, after notice of intent to do so, may show in mitigation an apology offered to plaintiff before the action, the truth cannot be shown under a plea of not guilty, but only under a special plea of justification.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. §§ 249 1/2, 251; Dec. Dig. § 100.*]

5. Libel and Slander (§ 48*) — Privileged Communications — Discussing Political Candidates.

A publication in good faith of the truth as to the qualifications of a candidate for public office is not libel, being qualifiedly privileged.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. § 146; Dec. Dig. § 48.*]

6. Libel and Slander (§ 34*)—"Privileged Communication."

"Privileged communications" are of four classes, to wit, where the publisher of the slander acted in the bona fide discharge of a public or private, legal or moral, duty, or in the prosecution of his own interests; second, statements by an employer with reference to the character of a servant who has been in his employment; third, words used in, the course of a legal or judicial proceeding; and, fourth, publications duly made in the course of parliamentary proceedings.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. § 113; Dec. Dig. § 34.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 6, pp. 5591-5598; vol. 8, p. 7764.]

7. Libel and Slander (§ 48*)—Privileged Communications — Qualified Privilege-Candidate for Office.

While the privileged character of a publication may be such as to absolutely bar an action, as where it is absolutely privileged, as in the case of words used in legal, judicial, or parliamentary proceedings, the right to comment on the character and qualifications of a candidate for public office is only qualifiedly privileged.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. § 146; Dec. Dig. § 48.*]

8.. Libel and Slander (§ 101*) — Malice-Presumption — Privileged Communications.

There is no presumption of malice if the publication is even qualifiedly privileged, so that plaintiff must prove malice in order to recover.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. § 278; Dec. Dig. § 101.*]

9. Libel and Slander (§ 123*) — Actions-Jury Question—Privileged Communications.

Whether a communication is privileged is for the court to determine, leaving it for the jury to deterrhine whether it is malicious, so as to abuse the privilege.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. §§ 362, 363; Dec. Dig. § 123.*]

10. Libel and Slander (§ 48*)—Words Libelous— Criticism of Political Candidate.

While publications of the truth as to the character and qualifications of a political candidate, made in good faith to inform the public, are not libelous, the publication of falsehood and calumny against candidates is libelous.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. § 146; Dec. Dig. § 48.*]

11. Libel and Slander (§ 49*) — Constitutional Law (§ 90*)—Privileged Communications—Privilege of Press—"Liberty of the Press."

The press has only the same privilege as to publications as private individuals; the phrase "liberty of the press" merely meaning that newspaper publications shall not be subject to censorship, and, in the language of the Bill of Rights, that any citizen may write or publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible only for the abuse of that right.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. § 148; Dec. Dig. § 49;* Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 172; Dec Dig. § 90.*

For other definitions, see Words and Fhrases, vol. 5, pp. 4131-4133; vol. 8, p. 7706.]

12. Trial (§ 285^3-*) —Instructions. Instructions should be considered fa the light of the evidence.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 699; Dec. Dig. § 285.*]

13. Courts (§ 89*)—Precedents.

The value of a case as a precedent depends on whether the precise point for which it is relied upon as authority was presented in argument and considered by the court.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Courts, Dec. Dig. § 89.*]

14. Trial (§ 260*)—Instructions—Requests —Instructions Already Given.

A requested instruction was properly refused, where it was sufficiently covered by another instruction.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 651; Dec. Dig. § 260.*]

15. Libel and Slander (§ 124*)—Instructions.

A requested charge in a libel case, which left it to the jury to determine whether the publications were true, when there was no plea of justification, so that they were conclusively presumed to be false, was properly refused.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. § 367; Dec. Dig. § 124.*]

16. Libel and Slander (§ 50*)—Privileged Communications.

A publication falsely imputing moral delinquency to a political candidate is libelous per se, though the publisher had good reason to and did believe the publication true.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. § 149; Dec. Dig. § 50.*]

Error to Law and Equity Court of City of Richmond.

Action by Clyde Saunders against the Williams Printing Company and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Affirmed.

The declaration contained three counts, The first count set forth as a libel a publication headed "Saunders and Leaman—Boss and Lieutenant." The second count set forth as libel another publication, entitled "Andy Griffith, Policy King—Partner of Clyde Saunders in Stock Farm." The third count was under the statute for insulting words, and set forth the two publications above mentioned and a third publication, entitled "Buying Votes in Manchester and Richmond."

In said declaration it was stated, and was also proven by the evidence, that the plaintiff was, at the time of the publication, and had been for several years prior thereto, a member of the Democratic executive committee from Clay ward, in the city of Richmond, and was, at the time of said publication, a candidate for re-election upon said committee. Each of said articles was published in a certain periodical, entitled "The Idea, " issued weekly by the said defendant A. A. Yoder, and was printed by the said Williams Printing Company in the ordinary course of business. It was alleged that they were so published to injure the plaintiff, and "to prevent him, the said plaintiff, from being chosen by the voters of his ward as a mem ber of said Democratic executive committee at an election" soon thereafter to be held.

Meredith & Cocke, for plaintiffs in error.

Scott, Buchanan & Cardwell and David H. Leake, for defendant in error.

KEITH, P. This is a writ of error to a judgment of the law and equity court of the city of Richmond, rendered in an action for libel brought by Clyde Saunders against Rufus C. Williams and Roy H. Williams, partners doing business as the Williams Printing Company, and Adon A. Yoder. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $1,600.

During the progress of the trial, the defendants reserved a number of exceptions to the rulings of the court, the propriety of which will be the subject of inquiry.

The declaration contains three counts. The first two set forth as libels certain publications which were printed and published by the Williams Printing Company, and of which Yoder was the author. The third count is under the statute for insulting words, and sets forth the publications mentioned in the first and second counts and one peculiar to itself, entitled "Buying Votes in Manchester and Richmond."

There was no demurrer to the declaration, and the only plea was that of not guilty; but the defendants, at the request of the plaintiff, stated their grounds of defense as follows: (1) Not guilty; (2) privileged communication; (3) fair or proper criticism or comment upon the plaintiff when running for public office or position; (4) no malice; and (5) erroneous construction of the words of the publication. No plea of justification was filed; the defendants deeming it unnecessary so to do.

Numerous exceptions were taken to the introduction of evidence offered by the defendant in error and admitted by the court, despite the objection of plaintiffs in error. They may be considered under three heads:

(1) Articles published in the Idea of and concerning ...