Williams, Scott & Assocs., LLC v. United States
| Decision Date | 03 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | 19-CV-837 (CM) |
| Parties | WILLIAMS, SCOTT & ASSOCIATES, LLC, WSA WILLIAMS, SCOTT & ASSOCIATES; WSA, LLC; SUPREME IMPORTS, LLC; JOHN T. WILLIAMS, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff John T. Williams, a Georgia resident, paid the fee to bring this pro se action alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights.1 Also listed as Plaintiffs are Williams, Scott & Associates, LLC; WSA Williams, Scott & Associates, LLC; WSA, LLC; and Supreme Imports, LLC (the "business Plaintiffs"). This action arises out of a Federal Trade Commission enforcement action in Georgia, and a criminal proceeding in this District. For the reasons set forth below, the amended complaint is dismissed.
The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh TenantsCorp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). But the Court need not accept "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action," which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
The following facts are gleaned from the amended complaint and public records.2 In 2014, the Federal Trade Commission brought a civil action in Georgia against Plaintiff, ChrisLenyszyn, and two businesses (Williams, Scott & Assocs., LLC, and WSA, LLC) for debt collection activity that allegedly violated the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. See FTC v. Lenyszyn, No. 14-CV-1599 (N.D. Ga. filed May 27, 2014) (the "FTC case").3 The Georgia court appointed a receiver, and issued an injunction that authorized the receiver to take control over Plaintiff's businesses and assets. (ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 1, 3, 6, 32.)
Also in 2014, Plaintiff, Lenyszyn, other individuals, and Williams, Scott, and Associates, LLC (WSA, LLC), were indicted on charges of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, arising out of debt collection activity occurring within this District.4 See United States v. Williams, No.14-CR-784-2 (S.D.N.Y.) (ECF Nos. 1-3.) Defense counsel moved to dismiss the indictment on a number of grounds, and also moved to suppress evidence on the ground that the affidavit in support of the search warrant 5 (Id., No. 128 at 6.)
Judge Torres denied the suppression motion on June 6, 2016, and the matter was reassigned to Judge Sullivan on June 28, 2016. (Id., ECF No. 173.) A jury found Plaintiff guilty on July 12, 2016, and he was sentenced to five years in prison and three years of postrelease supervision, credited with time served, and ordered to pay restitution. The Second Circuit affirmed Plaintiff's conviction. See No. 16-4186-cr (2d Cir. July 9, 2018) (See 14-CR-784-2, ECF Nos. 215, 217.)6
Plaintiff's original complaint is dated January 15, 2019. Plaintiff's amended complaint, filed on April 9, 2019, is 113 pages long with attachments, and names 41 defendants, including the United States; employees at the FTC, the FBI, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and the probation department; the Clerks of Court of the Second Circuit, this Court, and the Northern District of Georgia; and the court-appointed receiver in the FTC case and the law firm representing him.7The gravamen of Plaintiff's amended complaint is that Defendants, motivated by racial animus, conspired to violate his constitutional rights. Following is a summary of Plaintiff's allegations.
In the summer of 2012, FBI Agent Timothy Brody came to Plaintiff's Georgia home brandishing a firearm. Brody told Plaintiff that "they had been by his office and heard through the door how his employees were talking to their customers." Plaintiff asserts that:
this matter was something to be handled by the civil courts, so if the customers wanted to sue they had every right to under the FDCPA. The plaintiff then told the FBI to leave his property, this incident started an illegal investigation into the plaintiff's personal life.
On May 28, 2014, the FBI raided the WSA, LLC office. A district judge in Georgia granted the FTC an injunction authorizing a court-appointed receiver (Fuqua), and the law firm representing him (Bryan Cave LLP) to seize Plaintiff's businesses and funds without giving him an opportunity to respond. (Id. ¶¶ 46-47.) The FTC "altered and manipulated documents using white out" to seize $25,000 from WSA Williams, Scott & Associates LLC, a business to which the injunction did not apply. (Id. at 49.) According to Plaintiff, "a legitimate and legal search warrant was never obtained by the government." (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff asserts that the warrant was unlawful because it was issued in a Georgia miscellaneous case (14-MC-500 (JFK)) that was "not connected to" the criminal case in this Court, that the magistrate judge "never gave consent," and that Plaintiff was not arrested until November 18, 2014.
After the "defendant Supervisors" learned that Plaintiff had "exercised his constitutional right" to open "a few new businesses," they conspired to manufacture a criminal case againsthim, and they arrested Plaintiff on November 18, 2014, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause "at 5:00 a.m. with a marshals [sic] knee in his back as if he were a slave." (Id. ¶¶ 51, 61.)
The FBI conspired with the FTC "by simultaneously attacking him causing confusion, illegally searching and seizing his property with a fake search warrant so he couldn't retain adequate counsel, then manufacturing a criminal and civil case against him." (Id. ¶ 48.)
Plaintiff attaches to the amended complaint copies of "fraudulent," "facially invalid," and "fake" documents from the FTC case, the criminal matter before the Georgia magistrate judge, and the criminal case here. (Id. at 43-55.) According to Plaintiff, these documents are suspect because they contain blank spaces or are lacking either a signature page or a raised seal. (Id. at 62-67.) Plaintiff asserts that his signature was forged on an injunction-related document that was filed in the FTC case, that Northern District of Georgia Judge Janet E. King's signature on various documents is inconsistent and therefore forged, and that Defendants altered the docket sheets of his cases in Georgia, this Court, and the Second Circuit. (Id. at 59, 61, 62, 65, 83-94.)
Plaintiff invokes the Court's federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his rights, and conspired to violate his rights, under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff asserts claims of false imprisonment, wrongful confinement, loss of liberty, abuse of process, cruel and unusual punishment, excessive fines, wrongful pretrial detention with no bail, illegal search and seizure, violations of "warrant order," violations of his right to a speedy trial, the Due Process Clause, and the Double Jeopardy Clause, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and "fraud and deceit tort." Plaintiff alleges that Defendants caused him embarrassment, humiliation, mental pain, and suffering. Plaintiff alsoclaims that Defendants violated criminal statutes — 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1001 — and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.
In addition, Plaintiff advances an equal protection claim. He asserts that the government arrested him for conduct that was not criminal, and that he was punished more harshly than his co-defendant, Lenyszyn and other similarly situated debt collectors because he is African American and of a different "class." (Id. at 79.) He also cites to cases that the FTC filed in this Circuit against white-owned debt collectors, and notes that those cases did not lead to criminal charges. (Id. at 11.)
Attached to the original complaint, but not the amended complaint, is an August 2, 2018 letter from the United States Department of Justice denying Plaintiff's request for reconsideration of an administrative tort claim.
We have reviewed your request for reconsideration of the denial of the administrative tort claim you submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice on May 25, 2018, relative to the alleged acts or...
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