Williams v. Ahlin, 1:11-cv-0004 9-SKO-HC

Decision Date21 April 2011
Docket Number1:11-cv-0004 9-SKO-HC
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
PartiesMICHAEL B. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. PAM AHLIN, Executive Director of the Coalinga State Hospital, Respondent.
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Petitioner is a civil detainee who proceeded pro se and in forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Petitioner consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings in the case, including the entry of final judgment, by manifesting consent in a signed writing filed by Petitioner on January 18, 2011 (doc. 4).

On February 4, 2011, the Court dismissed the petition because it did not state a claim that would entitle Petitioner torelief in a proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the Court is Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition, filed on February 17, 2011. Plaintiff states that he is proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which he contends confers jurisdiction over the petition.

I. Jurisdiction to Consider the Motion for Reconsideration

On February 11, 2011, after the judgment of dismissal was entered but before the motion for reconsideration was filed, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal.1

A motion for reconsideration is generally treated as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) if it is filed within the time limit set by Rule 59(e). United States v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1992). Otherwise, it is treated as a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from a judgment or order. American Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. North American Const. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 98999 (9th Cir. 2001).

A motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) "must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Depending on the grounds for the motion, a motion for relief from a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) must be filed within a reasonable time or within a year. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). Petitioner's motion was filed thirteen (13) days after the judgment of dismissal was entered. It is therefore timely under either category ofmotions.

Fed. R. App. P. 4, which sets time limits for filing a notice of appeal, provides that if a party files either a Rule 59(e) motion or a Rule 60(b) motion no later than twenty-eight (28) days after judgment, the time to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of the motion. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv), (vi). Either motion thus tolls the time for filing an appeal.

Here, the motion was filed after Petitioner filed his notice of appeal. However, it is established that a district court retains subject matter jurisdiction to rule on a tolling motion even though a notice of appeal has been previously filed. Tripati v. Henman, 845 F.2d 205, 206 (9th Cir. 1988).

The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

II. Motion for Reconsideration
A. Motion pursuant to Rule 59(e)

In an abundance of caution, the Court will consider the motion under both Rules 59(e) and 60(b). See, United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2001).

Petitioner does not appear to state grounds sufficient to warrant relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), which is appropriate when there are highly unusual circumstances, the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, the district court committed clear error, or a change in controlling law intervenes. School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Oregon v. Acands, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). To avoid being frivolous, such a motion must provide a valid ground forreconsideration. See, MCIC Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986). Here, there is no claim of new evidence, highly unusual circumstances, or a change in controlling law. Further, Petitioner has not demonstrated clear error.

In the petition, Petitioner, a patient and civil detainee who is involuntarily confined at the Coalinga State Hospital, sued the hospital and two individual supervisors for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief, including wages and overtime compensation for labor that Petitioner alleged he was forced to perform in the hospital. (Pet. 1, 4.) Petitioner sought to have the Court certify his lawsuit as a class action. (Pet. 25.) Petitioner alleged that his rights under the Thirteenth Amendment were violated, and he further proceeded under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201. (Pet. 4, 8.)

The Court concluded that Petitioner's allegations concerned his conditions of confinement, and not the legality or duration of his confinement. Thus, the petition was dismissed as not stating a claim warranting relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Petitioner argues that he proceeded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and that § 2241 confers upon this Court jurisdiction over his petition.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides in pertinent part:

(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-
1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States of is committed for trial before some court thereof; or
2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or
3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or
4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, order, or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law of nations; or
5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial.

28 U.S.C. § 2241(c).

The only possible category for the claim or claims of Petitioner is pursuant to § 2241(c) because Petitioner is not confined under federal process, a citizen of a foreign state, or needed for purposes of testimony or trial.

Petitioner alleges that the court which entered the judgment in question was the San Francisco Superior Court. (Pet. 1.) Petitioner also alleges that he need not exhaust his administrative remedies because a detainee who is civilly committed pursuant to California's Sexually Violent Predators Act (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) after completing a prison term need not exhaust administrative remedies. (Pet. 5.) Although Petitioner does not directly allege the basis for his confinement, it thus appears that Petitioner has been involuntarily committed as a sexually violent predator after completing a prison term.

A review of California's statutes shows that the procedures for commitment of an allegedly violent, sexual predator include evaluation of the prisoner by experts, referral of the matter toa county attorney to file a petition for commitment in the superior court of the county where the prisoner was convicted, consideration by the court of the petition, trial by the court or jury, and commitment pursuant to the superior court's order of commitment. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 6601(d) and (h), 6601.5, 6603-6604.1, 6602.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) extends subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts over applications on behalf of persons in custody pursuant to state court judgments on the ground that the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

Custody stemming from an involuntary civil commitment is sufficient to constitute "custody" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001). Further, it is established in this circuit that a state civil detainee under an involuntary civil commitment scheme appropriately uses a § 2254 habeas petition to challenge the legality of a term of confinement. Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2005).

Additionally, a person detained as a result of a state court judgment who files a federal habeas petition must proceed pursuant to § 2254. In White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds in Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (2010), a state prisoner challenged an administrative decision of prison authorities concerning transfer of the prisoner to a private prison. The prisoner argued that he could proceed pursuant to § 2241. The court held that a petitioner who at the time the petition is filed is in custodypursuant to a state court judgment must proceed pursuant to § 2254 instead of § 2241 even if the challenge is to an allegedly unconstitutional administrative decision of prison authorities. White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004). In the course of a review of the pertinent case authority and the legislative history of the habeas statutes, the court described the interaction between § 2254 and § 2241 as follows:

The plain text of the two statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 2254, both appear to apply to White's petition. Section 2241 confers jurisdiction on a district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus when a federal or state prisoner establishes that he "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)
and (c)(3). The relevant sub-section of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 confers jurisdiction on a district court to issue "a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court... on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added).
Although the text of either statute would appear to confer jurisdiction, a proper understanding of the interaction between 28 U.S.C. § 2241 a
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