Williams v. Alabama

Decision Date12 April 2012
Docket NumberCivil Action Number 1:07-cv-1276-KOB-TMP
PartiesMARCUS BERNARD WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. STATE OF ALABAMA, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This action, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeks habeas corpus relief with respect to Petitioner Marcus Williams' state court conviction and death sentence on a charge of capital murder.

Procedural History

On February 24, 1999, following a jury trial, Marcus Williams was convicted of capital murder by intentionally causing the death of Melanie Rowell during a rape or attempted rape that occurred on November 6, 1996, in violation of Alabama Code § 13A-5-40 (1975). The next day, during the penalty phase of the trial, the jury voted 11 to 1 to recommend a sentence of death. The trial court conducted a formal sentencing hearing on April 6, 1999, and, in accordance with the jury's recommendation, sentenced the Petitioner to death. Petitioner was represented at trial by attorneys Erskine Funderburg and Tommie Wilson.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction and death sentence on December 10, 1999. See Williams v. State, 795 So. 2d 753 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). Rehearing was denied on January 28, 2000. The Supreme Court of Alabama subsequently granted Petitioner's application for certiorari and, on January 12, 2001, affirmed his conviction and sentence. See Ex parte Williams, 795 So. 2d 785 (2001). Rehearing was denied on March 30, 2001. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review on October 1, 2001. See Williams v. Alabama, 534 U.S. 900 (2001). Petitioner was represented by Joe Morgan, III, in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner was represented by Joe Morgan, III and Dennis Rushing on petition for writ of certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court. Petitioner was represented by LaJuana Davis on petition for writ of certiorari review to the United States Supreme Court.

On September 20, 2002, Petitioner filed a Rule 32 petition. (Tab R. 43). On October 17, 2003, Williams filed an amended Rule 32 petition. In response to a motion by the State, the trial court dismissed the petitions as untimely on January 14, 2004, pursuant to Davis v. State, 890 So. 2d 193 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003). (Tab R. 37, p. 9). On March 4, 2004, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the dismissal of the petitions based on Ex parte Davis, 890 So. 2d 199 (Ala. 2004), which overruled Davis v. State. (Tab R. 37, p. 11). On remand, the trial court summarily dismissed the Rule 32 petition and amended petition on March 12, 2004, finding them time-barred by the two-year limitations period that Rule 32.2(c) established. (Tab R. 37; pp. 24-25); see Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c).

On August 10, 2004, Petitioner filed his second amended Rule 32 petition. (Tab R. 40). In response to the state's motion to dismiss (Tab. R. 41), the court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing on December 13, 2004. (Tab R. 59). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of Rule 32 relief in an unpublished opinion on December 16, 2006. (Tab R. 60). Rehearing was denied on January 12, 2007, and the Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 29, 2007. (Tab R. 61). The present § 2254 petition was filed on July 6, 2007, with the assistance of Leslie Smith.1

The Offense

The evidence presented at the 1999 trial was summarized by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals as follows:

On November 6th, 1996, the defendant had been out with friends, drinking and smoking marijuana. Upon returning home that evening, the defendant's thoughts turned to a young female neighbor of his, Melanie Dawn Rowell, and his desire to have sexual relations with her.
At approximately 1:00 a.m. that night, Williams attempted to enter Rowell's back door, but the door was locked. He then noticed a kitchen window beside the door. He removed the screen from the window and found that the window was not locked. It was through that window that Williams obtained entrance to the apartment.
Williams proceeded through the kitchen to the stairs leading to the upstairs bedroom. Before exiting the kitchen, Williams removed a knife from a set of knives in a holder on a kitchen countertop. Part way up the stairs, knife in hand,

Williams removed his pants. Upon reaching the upstairs area, Williams crossed over a 'baby gate' which protected Rowell's two children, ages 15 months and 2 years, from the stairs. Williams looked into the children's room and found them both asleep.
Williams then entered the room of Melanie Rowell. He climbed in bed on top of her. When he began removing Rowell's clothes, a struggle ensued. Rowell fought Williams and began screaming despite [his] being armed with a knife. Williams placed his hand over her mouth to silence her and once again attempted to remove her clothes. As Rowell continued to struggle, Williams placed his hands around her neck. Eventually Rowell ceased to struggle as Williams continued to strangle her. When she was motionless, Williams proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her for 15 to 20 minutes. Prior to ejaculation, Williams pulled out and ejaculated on Rowell's stomach. There was a small cut inflicted upon Rowell's throat that was determined to be post-mortem. The cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation.
As he left Rowell's apartment, Williams took her purse. According to his statement, he threw the purse and the knife into a dumpster outside the apartment, although a search of the dumpster the next day by law enforcement failed to find either.
The defendant was subsequently arrested after being identified by the elderly female victim in a subsequent break-in in the Ashville area. Upon being taken into custody for that offense, the defendant gave a statement admitting his involvement in the death of Melanie Rowell.

Williams v. State, 795 So. 2d 753, 761-62 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (Tab R. 27 at 105).

The Claims

The § 2254 petition alleges multiple grounds for granting habeas corpus relief. Listed below are the claims asserted by Petitioner.2

I. The State denied Petitioner's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by discriminating in the exercise of peremptory strikes. (Doc. 5, p. 4).
II. Trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase of Petitioner's trial, thereby depriving Petitioner of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Doc. 5, p. 8).
i. Introductory claim - Trial counsel were ineffective due to inadequate compensation. (Doc. 5, p. 10).
A. Trial counsel prejudiced Petitioner before the first witness took the stand by making numerous unreasonable decisions during voir dire. (Doc. 5, p. 11).
i. Trial counsel failed to request individual voir dire. (Doc. 5, p. 12).
ii. Trial counsel failed to request voir dire on racial attitudes. (Doc. 5, p. 13).
iii. Trial counsel failed to object to the prosecution's discriminatory use of its peremptory strikes. (Doc. 5, p. 16).
iv. Trial counsel failed to pursue questioning about the death penalty attitudes of a juror who signaled an extraordinary willingness to impose death. (Doc. 5, p. 18).
B. Trial counsel prejudiced Petitioner by failing to put before the jury the fact that a hair not matching Petitioner's was found on Ms. Rowell's shoulder during the crime scene investigation. (Doc. 5, p. 19)
C. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by not retaining necessary defense experts. (Doc. 5, p. 22).
i. Trial counsel were ineffective for not retaining DNA experts to rebut the prosecution's evidence about the alleged DNA match found on the victim and to test the State's accuracy regarding the unidentified hair found on Rowell. (Doc. 5, p. 23)
ii. Trial counsel failed to retain a forensic medical expert to testify that Rowell's autopsy revealed no signs of rape. (Doc. 5, p. 23).iii. Trial counsel were ineffective for failing to retain an expert to evaluate combined effects of intoxicating substances used by Williams on the day of the crime. (Doc. 5, p. 23).
D. Trial counsel prejudiced Petitioner by failing to object to improper testimony and physical evidence presented by the State. (Doc. 5, p. 24).
i. Trial counsel allowed the State to violate Petitioner's right to due process by admitting and commenting on a highly prejudicial knife block set without requiring the State to lay a legally sufficient evidentiary foundation. (Doc. 5, p. 24).
ii. Trial counsel allowed three State witnesses to indulge in rambling narratives in lieu of testimony. (Doc. 5, p. 26).
iii. Trial counsel were ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's using leading questions during the trial. (Doc. 5, p. 27).
E. Trial counsel prejudiced Petitioner by failing to object to the State's impermissible closing argument, suggesting that Petitioner had a burden to present evidence that someone else committed the crime. (Doc. 5, p. 28).
F. Trial counsel prejudiced Petitioner by presenting the jury with inconsistent and damaging theories of defense during closing argument. (Doc. 5, p. 30).
G. Trial counsel were ineffective to abandon plea and defense of mental defect or disease. (Doc. 5, p. 35).
H. Trial counsel's many errors resulted in a verdict so unreliable as to violate due process and created a reasonable probability that, but for the errors, the result of Petitioner's guilt-phase trial would have been different. (Doc. 5, p. 37).

III. Trial counsel were ineffective during the penalty phase of Petitioner's trial, thereby depriving him of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and resulting in the unjust and unconstitutional imposition of the death penalty. (Doc. 5, p. 38).

A. Trial counsel's numerous guilt phase errors prejudiced Petitioner in the penalty phase well before the penalty phase had even started. (Doc. 5, p. 38).
B. Trial counsel's
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