Williams v. Alfred N. Koplin & Co.

• Decision Date: 03 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-607,82-607
• Citation: 114 Ill.App.3d 482,70 Ill.Dec. 164,448 N.E.2d 1042
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Parties: , 70 Ill.Dec. 164 Patricia Ann WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALFRED N. KOPLIN & COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation; and Hinsdale Management Company, an Illinois Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

Page 1042

448 N.E.2d 1042

114 Ill.App.3d 482, 70 Ill.Dec. 164

Patricia Ann WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALFRED N. KOPLIN & COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation; and Hinsdale Management Company, an Illinois Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 82-607.

Appellate Court of Illinois Second District.

May 3, 1983.

Steven J. Rosenberg, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Jacobs, Williams & Montgomery, Ltd., Barry L. Kroll, Jean Christie Harris, Thomas H. Neuckranz, Lloyd E. Williams, Chicago, for defendants-appellees.

REINHARD, Justice:

Plaintiff, Patricia Ann Williams, appeals from an order which granted the motion for summary judgment of the defendants, Alfred N. Koplin & Company and Hinsdale Management Company. The only issue raised on appeal by plaintiff is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment where a genuine issue of material fact existed.

Plaintiff's second amended complaint alleged in count I that on February 21, 1979, at approximately 6 p.m. and prior thereto, defendants owned the building in which plaintiff's employer was a tenant and where plaintiff worked; that it was defendants' duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the stairway and entrance in a reasonably safe condition; that defendants negligently shoveled ice and snow from the entrance and stairway leaving more than one-half of the entrance and stairway covered with ice and snow without any lighting; that defendants had notice of the dangerous condition, or by the exercise of ordinary care should have had such notice; and that plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell while attempting to walk down the stairway.

Count II alleged substantially the same facts as in count I, but pleaded the wilful and wanton conduct of defendants or their agents in shoveling the ice and snow. This count further alleged defendants' recklessness in employing unfit agents and defendants' ratification of the acts of those agents. Subsequent to filing their answer, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and, attached thereto, a copy of climatological data for February 1979 and excerpts from plaintiff's deposition. Plaintiff, in response, filed her affidavit stating that "on February 21, 1979, she began to walk down the narrow path shoveled down the middle of the stairway of the premises * * * and that at said time and place, the handrails alongside the stairway were inaccessible to individuals walking down the shoveled, narrow path." She also filed excerpts from her deposition.

The excerpts from plaintiff's deposition reveal that at the time of the accident there were 16 inches of snow accumulated on the ground in the Chicago area and that there had been additional snowfall the morning of the accident. The stairway upon which plaintiff fell was normally wide enough to accommodate three persons walking abreast. Although defendants had shoveled snow from the stairway, they did so only in the center of the stairs, creating a path about the width of a shovel. The stairs were not cleanly shoveled, and contained patches of impacted snow, on the shoveled portions of the stairs, caused by pedestrian traffic. Toward the sides of the stairway, in its unshoveled portions, the snow was approximately one foot deep. Plaintiff, who was walking down the shoveled portion of the stairs, slipped on the top step of the stairway and fell down the remaining steps. Plaintiff saw snow on the stair on which she slipped.

The thrust of plaintiff's argument on appeal is that defendants were negligent by shoveling a narrow, slippery path down the center of a stairway, from which handrails were inaccessible, and which gave plaintiff the unreasonable choice of either taking the shoveled path, from which handrails were inaccessible, or walking down the stairs through the deep snow next to the handrails.

We first point out certain circumstances which are not disputed by the plaintiff on appeal. While plaintiff alleged in her complaint inadequate lighting, there are no facts in either plaintiff's affidavit or the excerpts from her deposition to support that allegation. Further, there is no evidence that the unshoveled portion of the stairway was in any way altered from its natural state by the addition of snow shoveled from the middle of the stairway. Finally, plaintiff did not allege in her complaint or contend on appeal that the patch of snow she slipped on was an unnatural or artificial accumulation of snow and ice resulting from defendants' conduct which caused her injury.

Summary judgment should be granted only where there is no genuine issue of material fact. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 110, par. 57, recodified as Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 110, par. 2-1005.) The court is to determine the existence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact from the affidavits, depositions, admissions, exhibits, and pleadings in the case. (Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher & Co. (1974), 57 Ill.2d 376, 380, 313 N.E.2d 457.) A motion for summary judgment and its supporting documents must be strictly construed and must leave no question of the movant's right to summary judgment. Bak v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (1981), 93 Ill.App.3d 269, 272, 48 Ill.Dec. 746, 417 N.E.2d 148.

A landlord's duty to his tenants pertinent to the issue raised here is as follows. Where only a portion of the premises is rented and the landlord retains control of other parts of the same such as stairways, passageways, or cellarways, or where he rents the premises to several tenants, retaining control over a part of the same for the common use of the several tenants, he has the duty of exercising reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and he is liable for an injury from failure to perform such duty. (Murphy v. Illinois State Trust Co. (1941), 375 Ill. 310, 313-14, 31 N.E.2d 305; Hiller v. Harsh (1981), 100 Ill.App.3d 332, 336, 55 Ill.Dec. 635, 426 N.E.2d 960; Seago v. Roy (1981), 97 Ill.App.3d 6, 8, 53 Ill.Dec. 849, 424 N.E.2d 640; Gilbreath v. Greenwalt (1980), 88 Ill.App.3d 308, 310, 43 Ill.Dec. 539, 410 N.E.2d 539.) The status of the injured person on such premises is important only to the extent that that person is lawfully on the premises since the duty of reasonable care has been imposed upon the landlord whether the injured person was a tenant, an employee of a tenant, a business invitee of a tenant, or a social guest of a tenant. (Hiller v. Harsh (1981), 100 Ill.App.3d 332, 336, 55 Ill.Dec. 635, 426 N.E.2d 960.) The landlord's duty is not to insure the safety of his tenants, but to exercise reasonable care. Murphy v. Messerschmidt (1976), 41 Ill.App.3d 659, 663, 355 N.E.2d 78, aff'd and rem'd (1977), 68 Ill.2d 79, 11 Ill.Dec. 553, 368 N.E.2d 1299.

Generally, a property owner is under no obligation to clear the snow from sidewalks adjoining his premises (Riccitelli v. Sternfeld (1953), 1 Ill.2d 133, 115 N.E.2d 288), or sidewalks maintained by the property owner. (Kittle v. Liss (1982), 108 Ill.App.3d 922, 924, 64 Ill.Dec. 307, 439 N.E.2d 972.) It is the general rule that in the absence of a special agreement, a landlord owes no duty to his tenants to remove natural accumulations of snow and ice from common areas which remain under his control. (Chisolm v. Stephens (1977), 47 Ill.App.3d 999, 1004, 7 Ill.Dec. 795, 365 N.E.2d 80; Gehrman v. Zajac (1975), 34 Ill.App.3d 164, 340 N.E.2d 184; see also Erasmus v. Chicago Housing Authority (1980) 86 Ill.App.3d 142, 145, 41 Ill.Dec. 533, 407 N.E.2d 1031.) A landlord incurs no liability for injuries to his tenants by the natural accumulation of ice and snow on his property. (Erasmus v. Chicago Housing Authority (1980), 86 Ill.App.3d 142, 144-45, 41 Ill.Dec. 533, 407 N.E.2d 1031.) The mere removal of snow, which leaves a natural accumulation of ice on the surface, does not of itself constitute negligence. (Timmons v....