Williams v. AM Lapomarda
| Decision Date | 06 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3:19cv631 (DJN) |
| Parties | LAKIA WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. AM LAPOMARDA, et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Plaintiff Lakia Williams ("Plaintiff") brings this action against A.M. Lapomarda, Inc. ("Lapomarda") and Ann Marie Fulcher ("Fulcher") (collectively the "Defendants"), alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and Va. Code § 8.01-42.1, as well as a common law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). This matter comes before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (ECF No. 28). For the following reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion (ECF No. 28).
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court will accept a plaintiff's allegations as true and view the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.2d I 130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the Court need not accept the plaintiff's legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Based on this standard, the Court accepts the following facts.
Plaintiff, an African American woman, resides in Virginia. Lapomarda, a Virginia corporation, operates as the franchisee of a 7-Eleven franchise located in Richmond, Virginia (the "Store"). (Am. Compl. ¶ 3.) Fulcher owns and operates Lapomarda. (Am. Compl. ¶ 4.) 7-Eleven, a non-party co-conspirator, operates as the franchisor of the Store. (Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) At all relevant times, Edwin H. Neely ("Neely") worked for 7-Eleven as the manager of the Store.1 (Am. Compl. ¶ 5.)
Plaintiff strictly adheres to the Islamic faith, including the traditional dress code. (Am. Compl. ¶ 12.) On or about August 30, 2017, Plaintiff entered the Store during business hours to purchase gasoline and a beverage. (Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) In strict observance of her religious beliefs and practices, Plaintiff entered the Store wearing a niqab, as well as dark sunglasses to cover her eyes. (Am. Compl. ¶ 17.) Upon entering the store, Plaintiff, "ready, willing and able" to pay for her items, immediately approached Neely at the register to purchase gasoline and a beverage. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 38.) Neely, who identified himself as the store manager, demanded that Plaintiff uncover her face to receive service. (Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff explained to Neely that her religious beliefs as a Muslim required that she keep her face covered in public. (Am. Comp. ¶ 21.) According to Plaintiff, Neely laughed in response and stated that he did not know if Plaintiff planned to rob the store and that he would need to identify Plaintiff if she did. (Am. Compl. ¶ 22.) Neely stated that he would only serve Plaintiff if she removed her sunglasses. (Am. Compl. ¶ 23.)
In an effort to avoid further confrontation, Plaintiff accommodated Neely's demand and lifted her glasses to reveal her eyes. (Am. Compl. ¶ 25.) However, even after Plaintiff complied with Neely's request, Neely still refused to serve her. (Am. Compl. ¶ 26.) In fact, Neely told her "[y]ou should not even be in our store," because "you are a security risk." (Am. Compl. ¶ 27.) Further, as Plaintiff stood at the counter, Neely stated to another customer that "glasses are not a religious garment." (Am. Compl. ¶ 30.)
Subsequently, Neely called law enforcement to have Plaintiff removed from the Store. (Am. Compl. ¶ 34.) Officers from the Richmond Police Department arrived and explained to Plaintiff and Neely that they could not intervene in a civil dispute like the one at hand. (Am. Compl. ¶ 36.) Nonetheless, the Officers asked that Plaintiff leave the store. (Am. Compl. ¶ 37.)
During the encounter, Neely and Fulcher conversed on the phone together and Plaintiff alleges that Fulcher ratified and affirmed Neely's denial of service to Plaintiff and Neely's decision to call law enforcement. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 35.) Additionally, a bystander recorded the entire encounter on his cellphone. (Am. Compl. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff also asserts that Fulcher conferred with 7-Eleven regarding the denial of service to her and that 7-Eleven directed Fulcher not to communicate with Plaintiff regarding the incident. (Am. Compl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff further contends that Fulcher informed 7-Eleven that Plaintiff was African-American and visibly dressed as a Muslim woman. (Am. Compl. ¶ 33.)
Following the encounter, Plaintiff exited the store without receiving service. (Am. Compl. ¶ 40.) Plaintiff called the 7-Eleven corporate customer service hotline to lodge a complaint. (Am. Compl. ¶ 41.) Subsequently, on or about August 31, 2017, Fulcher, after receiving a notification of Plaintiff's complaint to the 7-Eleven corporate office, telephoned Plaintiff to discuss the incident. (Am. Compl. ¶ 42.) During the call, Fulcher acknowledged thatshe had remained on the phone with Neely during the incident and could hear the encounter transpire. (Am. Compl. ¶ 43.) To justify Neely's actions, Fulcher explained to Plaintiff that Neely exhibited paranoia because of "all of the stuff that's going on." (Am. Compl. ¶ 44.)
Plaintiff alleges that neither Lapomarda nor 7-Eleven had a policy of denying service to patrons wearing sunglasses. (Am. Compl. ¶ 29.) And further, Plaintiff alleges that before, during and after this event, Neely served similarly situated non-African American and non-Muslim customers wearing dark sunglasses. (Am. Compl. ¶ 24.)
Since the incident, Plaintiff has experienced extreme emotional distress, shame and humiliation. (Am. Compl. ¶ 52.) Additionally, Plaintiff now suffers from agoraphobia. (Am. Compl. ¶ 53.) Plaintiff has since also suffered from mental anguish, resulting in difficulty sleeping, eating, consorting with her husband and carrying out otherwise daily activities. (Am. Compl. ¶ 54.) As a result, she has sought professional treatment. (Am. Compl. ¶ 52.)
Plaintiff originally filed her Complaint on August 28, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff filed her Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint on February 26, 2020 (ECF No. 23), which the Court granted in an Order issued on March 18, 2020. (ECF No. 26.) Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint on March 18, 2020. (ECF No. 27.)
In Count I, Plaintiff alleges a violation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2, which prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation on the basis of race or religion. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 58-69.) Plaintiff brings this claim against all Defendants. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 58-69.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants intentionally, willfully and without legal justification deprived Plaintiff, on the basis of her race and religion, of the full and equal enjoyment of the Store. (Am. Compl. ¶ 63-64.) Plaintiff alleges that these acts wereintentional, malicious, willful, wanton and in gross disregard of her rights. (Am. Compl. ¶ 65.) Because Title II does not allow for compensatory damages, Plaintiff seeks an injunction, permanently enjoining Defendants to comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act. (Am. Compl. ¶ 69.) Additionally, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages, costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. (Am. Compl. ¶ 69.)
In Count II, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in contractional relations. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 70-76.) Plaintiff brings Count II against all Defendants. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 70-76.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that she, a member of a protected class within the scope of § 1981, attempted to contract with Defendants for the purchase of gasoline and a beverage at the Store. (Am. Compl. ¶ 74.) By treating Plaintiff differently than similarly situated non-African-American patrons, Defendants' conduct interfered with Plaintiff's ability to contract and her equal enjoyment of a contractual relationship with Defendants. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 74-75.) Plaintiff seeks an order of injunction against each Defendant, permanently enjoining Defendants to comply with the requirements of § 1981, as well as compensatory damages. (Am. Compl. ¶ 76.) Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages, costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. (Am. Compl. ¶ 76.)
In Count III, Plaintiff asserts that all Defendants conspired to violate her civil rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 77-88.) Plaintiff alleges that each Defendant purposefully planned and conspired to deny her, on the basis of her religious beliefs, her right to exist free of discrimination in a place of public accommodation. (Am. Compl. ¶ 80.) Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants knowingly and intentionally deviated from the applicable 7-Eleven anti-discrimination policies, such that Defendants acted outside the scope of their agency relationships. (Am. Comp. ¶ 85.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants are jointly and severallyliable to her for compensatory damages and punitive damages. (Am. Compl. ¶ 88.) Plaintiff also seeks costs, attorneys' fees, and pre-and post-judgment interest. (Am. Compl. ¶ 88.)
Plaintiff brings Count IV against Fulcher, alleging a violation of Va. Code § 8.01-42, which provides, in pertinent part, civil damages for an individual subject to acts of intimidation, harassment or violence against her person, where such acts are motivated by racial, religious or ethnic animosity. (Am. Compl. ¶ 90.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Neely subjected her to intimidation and harassment, and that Fulcher joined in and ratified Neely's conduct. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 91-94.) Plaintiff contends that Fulcher and Neely intentionally, willfully and wantonly violated § 8.01-42.1. (Am. Compl. ¶ 95.) Plaintiff seeks...
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