Williams v. Am. Lumpers Servs.
| Decision Date | 22 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. GLR-20-1342 |
| Parties | TERRENCE L. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN LUMPERS SERVICES, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Solo Cup Operating Corporation's ("Solo")1 Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18), and Defendant American Lumpers Services, LLC's ("American Lumpers") Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19). The Motions are ripe for disposition and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2018). For the reasons outlined below, the Court will grant the Motions, which it construes as motions to dismiss.
Plaintiff Terrence L. Williams alleges that he began working for American Lumpers, a business providing freight handling and staffing services, on April 29, 2019. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 1). American Lumpers assigned Williams to work for Solo as a forklift driver. (Id. ¶ 3). Shortly thereafter, on May 9, 2019, Williams injured his wrist while working at Solo. (Id. ¶ 4). Williams does not provide additional detail regarding the nature or severity of his injury except to say that: (a) it "is a physical impairment within the meaning of" Md. Code Ann., State Gov't ("SG") § 20-601(b); and (b) it "limited one or more of Plaintiff's major life activities, within the meaning of" Md. Code Regs. ("COMAR") 14.03.02.02(B)(6)(b), "such as, but not limited to, performing manual tasks, operating a forklift, working and driving a vehicle." (Compl. ¶ 12).
The day after his injury, Williams' physician restricted him to light duty work, rendering Williams unable to operate the forklift. (Id. ¶ 5). Although Williams does not detail his efforts to notify Defendants of his condition or request an accommodation, he asserts that an unspecified Defendant "failed to engage [him] in an interactive process to arrive at a reasonable accommodation." (Id. ¶ 19). Williams asserts that if the unspecified Defendant had engaged in an interactive process, they could have agreed on a reasonableaccommodation, "such as, but not limited to light duty work and/or medical leave to care for his injure[d] wrist." (Id. ¶ 20). On May 16, 2019, Williams filed a claim with the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission. (Id. ¶ 6). Williams does not provide information regarding any steps he took to notify Defendants of this action. The following day, Defendants denied Williams' request for light duty and terminated his employment. (Id. ¶ 7). Williams does not explain who denied his request, who discharged him, or the reasons provided for his discharge.
Williams filed charges against American Lumpers and Solo with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on July 31, 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9). On March 10, 2020, Williams filed this lawsuit against Defendants. (ECF No. 1). The four-count Complaint alleges: Disability Discrimination in Violation of SG § 20-606 (Count 1); Failure to Accommodate Plaintiff's Disability in Violation of SG § 20-606 (Count 2); Defendant's3 Failure to Engage the Plaintiff in an Interactive Process (Count 3); and Wrongful Termination (Count 4). (Id. ¶¶ 11-26). Williams seeks reinstatement, compensatory damages, including damages for lost wages and emotional distress, punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and prejudgment interest. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 17, 22, 26).
On August 28, 2020, Solo filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18), and American Lumpers filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19). On September 22, 2020, Williams filed Oppositions to both Motions. (ECFNos. 32, 34). On September 30, 2020, American Lumpers filed a Reply in support of its Motion. (ECF No. 36). Solo filed its Reply on October 16, 2020. (ECF No. 39).
American Lumpers styles its Motion as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment under Rule 56. A motion styled in this manner implicates the Court's discretion under Rule 12(d). See Pevia v. Hogan, 443 F.Supp.3d 612, 625 (D.Md. 2020) (citation omitted). Rule 12(d) provides that when "matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). The Court "has 'complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not consider it.'" Wells-Bey v. Kopp, No. ELH-12-2319, 2013 WL 1700927, at *5 (D.Md. Apr. 16, 2013) (quoting 5C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366, at 159 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2012)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has articulated two requirements for proper conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion: notice and a reasonable opportunity for discovery. See Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2013). When the movant expressly captions its motion "in the alternative" as one for summary judgment and submits mattersoutside the pleadings for the court's consideration, the parties are deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur. See Moret v. Harvey, 381 F.Supp.2d 458, 464 (D.Md. 2005) (citing Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260-61 (4th Cir. 1998)). The Court "does not have an obligation to notify parties of the obvious." Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 261.
Ordinarily, summary judgment is inappropriate when "the parties have not had an opportunity for reasonable discovery." E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011). Yet "the party opposing summary judgment 'cannot complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that party had made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was needed for discovery.'" Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1996)). To successfully raise the need for additional discovery, the non-movant must typically file an affidavit or declaration under Rule 56(d), explaining the "specified reasons" why "it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). A Rule 56(d) affidavit is inadequate if it simply demands "discovery for the sake of discovery." Hamilton v. Mayor of Balt., 807 F.Supp.2d 331, 342 (D.Md. 2011) (citation omitted). A Rule 56(d) request for discovery is properly denied when "the additional evidence sought for discovery would not have by itself created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment." Ingle ex rel. Estate of Ingle v. Yelton, 439 F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Strag v. Bd. of Trs., Craven Cmty. Coll., 55 F.3d 943, 954 (4th Cir. 1995)).
The Fourth Circuit has warned that it "'place[s] great weight on the Rule 56[d] affidavit' and that 'a reference to Rule 56[d] and the need for additional discovery in a memorandum of law in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is not an adequate substitute for a Rule 56[d] affidavit.'" Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244 (quoting Evans, 80 F.3d at 961). Failing to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit "is itself sufficient grounds to reject a claim that the opportunity for discovery was inadequate." Id. (quoting Evans, 80 F.3d at 961). Despite these holdings, the Fourth Circuit has indicated that there are some limited circumstances in which summary judgment may be premature, notwithstanding the non-movants' failure to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit. See id. A court may excuse the failure to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit when "fact-intensive issues, such as intent, are involved" and the nonmovant's objections to deciding summary judgment without discovery "serve[ ] as the functional equivalent of an affidavit." Id. at 244-45 (quoting First Chi. Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1380-81 (D.C.Cir. 1988)).
Here, the Court in its discretion will decline to convert American Lumpers' Motion to a motion for summary judgment. While Williams failed to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit, he repeatedly states in his Opposition that "[a]lthough Defendant has styled its motion as a motion for summary judgment, the Court should disregard that request because the Plaintiff has not had the benefit of discovery." (Pl.'s Resp. Opp'n Def. Am. Lumpers' Mot. Dismiss Alt. Summ. J. ["Am. Lumpers Opp'n"] at 5, ECF No. 32; see also id. at 14 n.3, 15). Accordingly, the Court will not consider documents outside of Williams' Complaint in resolving American Lumpers' Motion and will treat the Motion as one to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to "test[ ] the sufficiency of a complaint," not to "resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted)). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), or does not "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at...
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